

TULLY's
OFFICES,
IN
THREE BOOKS.

Translated into *English*,
By Sir R. L'ESTRANGE.

THE SIXTH EDITION, Revised
throughout, and carefully Corrected
according to the *Latin* Original.

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TO THE READER.



IS hard, methinks,
that a Man cannot
Publish a Book, but
he must presently
give the World a
Reason for't ; when yet there's
not *One* Book of *Twenty* that
will *bear* a *Reason* ; not *One*
Man of a *Hundred*, perhaps,
that is able to *Give* One ; nor
One Reason of a *Thousand* (when
A 3 they

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they are given) that was the *True Reason* of Doing it. The *True Reason* (I say :) For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a *Good Reason*, for the doing of a thing, and the *True Reason* why the thing was done. The *Service* of God is a very *Good Reason* for a Man's going to Church; and yet the meeting of a *Mistress* There, may, perchance, be the *True Reason* of his *Going*. And so likewise in Other Cases, where we cover our *Passions* and our *Interests* under the Semblances of *Virtue*, and *Duty*. But however, since *Custom*; (the *Plague* of *Wise men*, and the *Idol* of *Fools*) since *Custom* (I say) will have it so, that a Man had as good go to *Court* without his *Cravat*,

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Cravat, as shew himself in *Print* without a *Preface*; I shall e'en Content my Self to play the Fool too, in so *Much*, and in so *Good Company*, (*General Dedications* being no Other, than *Fashionable Fopperies*.) For what can be more *Ridiculous* than for a Man to Treat *Princes*, and *Tinkers*; *Coxcombs*, and *Philosophers*; Men of *Honour*, and *Rascals*; promiscuously, *all in a Stile*?

Now as it is no *Easie Matter* to give a *Good Reason* for *Writing at all*; so it is yet more *Difficult* to give *That Reason* in an *Epistle*; which, at best, stands in need of *another very good Reason*, for its *own support*. But *Prefaces*, at the *Ordinary rate* of *Prefaces*, are wholly *Inexcusable*;

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cusable ; Only an Idle Deal of *Fiddle-Faddle* betwixt the *Writer* and the *Reader*, made worse, by *Care*, and *Pains* ; and Digested, out of *Vulgar* and *Pedantick Common-Places*, into one Mass of *Putid* and *Elaborate Folly*. This Liberty of *Prefacing* against *Prefaces*, may seem a little *Unreasonable* ; but *Common Scriblers* are allow'd the Privileges of *Common Strumpets*. One of the *Frankest Prostitutes* that ever I knew since I was born, had These Words the ofteneft in her Mouth : *Lord !* (says she) *to see the Impudence of some Women !*

To come now to the *Reasons* that induced me to the *Translating* of this *Little Book* ; I shall *Begin* with the *Excellency* of the
Work

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Work it self; which has ever been Esteemed, both for the *Method*, and *Matter* of it, as one of the most Exact Pieces of the Kind that ever was written, and the most *Instructive* of *Humane Life*. In so much, that *Cicero* himself valu'd himself upon This Tract of *Morals*, as his *Master-piece*, and accordingly recommended the Study of it to his Beloved Son, under *That* Illustrious Character. *Secondly*, as it was Composed in a *Loose*, and *Troublesome Age*, so was it accommodated also to the Circumstances of *Those Times*; for the asserting of the *Force* and Efficacy of *Virtue*, against the utmost *Rigour* and *Iniquity* of *Fortune*. Upon which Consideration likewise, I have now

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turn'd it into *English*, with a regard to a *Place*, and *Season*, that extremely *needs* it. I do not speak This, as if at any time it would have been *Superfluous*; but that *Desperate Diseases* require the most *Powerful Remedies*.

To give you the Sum of it in a few Words; It is a Manual of *Precepts* for the Government of our-selves, in all the Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Human Life; and tending, not only to the Comfort of Men in *Society*, but to the Conducting of *Particulars* also, into a State of *Felicity*, and *Virtue*. It is a Lesson that serves us from the very *Cradle*, to the *Grave*. It teaches us what we Owe to *Mankind*; to our *Country*;

To the Reader.

try; to our *Parents*; to our *Friends*; to our *Selves*; what we are to do as *Children*; what, as *Men*; what, as *Citizens*: It *sets*, and it *keeps* us *Right* in all the Duties of *Prudence*, *Moderation*, *Resolution*, and *Justice*. It *Forms* our *Manners*; *Purges* our *Affections*; *Enlightens* our *Understandings*; and leads us, through the *Knowledge*, and the *Love* of *Virtue*, to the *Practice* and *Habit* of it.

This Treatise of *Offices*, I find to be one of the *Commonest School-Books* that we have; and as it is the *Best* of *Books*, so it is apply'd to the *Best* of *Purposes*; that is to say, to the *Training* up of *Youth*, in the *Study* and *Exercise* of *Virtue*. The *Foundations* of an *Honourable*,
and

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and a *Blessed Life*, are laid in the very *Cradle*; and we suck in the Tincture of *Generous* or *Perverse Inclinations*, even with our *Mothers Milk*: Insomuch that we may date the greater part of our greatest Miscarriages, from the *Errors*, and *In-felicities* of our *First Institution*, and *Education*. But tho', upon the whole matter, I do highly approve of the *Usage* of *This Book* in *Schools*, I must confess yet, with Submission, that I am not at all satisfy'd in the *ordinary way* of using it. For the cutting of it out into *Particles*, here and there a *Chop*, makes it a *Lesson*, to the Boys, rather of *Syntax*, than *Morality*; beside the *prejudice* that it suffers under the Trivial name of
of

To the Reader.

of a *School-Book*; and the *dis-*
gust which naturally continues
with us, even when we are *Men*,
for that which we were *whipt*
for, when we were *Boys*.

Now the *Matter* of this Book
being so *Excellent*; and truly
the *Latin* of it hardly *Cicero-*
nian; it should be our business
rather to inculcate the *Doctrine*
than the *Stile*; and yet in *such*
manner too, that the *One* may
be *Attended*, without *Neglect-*
ing the *Other*. And This may
be effected to the Common Be-
nefit of the *Scholar*, in *Both*
Kinds; by, *First Reading*, and *Ex-*
pounding These Offices, *Whole*
to him, in *English*, before he be
put to Hack, and Puzzle upon
them by *Snaps* in the Original;
the *One Facilitating*, and *Pre-*
paring

To the Reader.

paring him for the *Other*. Let him be, *First*, and in his *Mother-Tongue*, instructed in the *Principles* of *Moral Duties*; and he shall then with the more *Ease*, *Profit*, and *Delight*, take the same Notions down in *Latin*, and Digest them. Whereas in beginning with the *Latin*, the *Pupil* has little more to do, than to bring together the *Nominative Case*, and the *Verb*, without either *Understanding*, or *Heeding* the main *Scope*, and *Intent* of the *Book*.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the *Interruptions* I have met with, in the Course of *This Translation*; how it has been only the Work of *Broken Hours*; and I might plead *These Distractions*
in

To the Reader.

in excuse of all its *Inequalities*, and *Defects*. But such as it is, *Plain*, and *Simple*, I do here present it to the *Publick*, without either *Vanity*, or *Complement*: and, I hope, without giving unto any sort of *Reader* any Just Cause of *Complaint*. For *He that does not like it may let it alone*; and there's no Hurt done.



Adver-

To the Reader.

in excuse of all its Inequalities;
and Defects. But such as it is,
Plain, and simple, I do here
present it to the Publick, with-
out either Noise, or Compla-
ment; and I hope, without gi-
ving into any sort of Reflection
the Cause of Complaint. For
the Author, who has been
it always; and there's no flint
done.





A N

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T O T H E

R E A D E R

Concerning this Edition.

THE Reader need not be told what a great Reputation this Book of Morals hath constantly had in the World ever since it was first written ; nor how much oftner it has been Printed, since the revival of Ancient Learning, than any other Treatise of Heathen Morality ; nor how this just Opinion of its Usefulness and Excellence has
occa-

Advertisement to

occasioned so many Translations of it into the Modern Languages for the Benefit of less Learned Readers.

But there are two Enquiries to which he may here be reasonably presumed to expect some Satisfaction, as relating more particularly to the present Edition.

First, why this Translation, after so long an Intermission, is now sent abroad again a-new with such Alterations as are here offered: Especially after another very useful Translation with Notes by Mr. *Cockman* has had a course of twenty Years in the World.

Secondly, what he may expect to find in this New Edition, different from the former.

Now as to the first of these, he may be pleased to know, that it was neither any Partiality to the Memory of Sir *Roger L'Estrange*, nor any

the Reader.

any intended Disrespect to Mr. Cockman's excellent Performance, that gave Occasion to this Attempt; but an earnest desire that so Instructive a Draught of Moral Precepts might, by a variety of Copies from different Hands, be more universally known to such as have no means of directly viewing the inimitable Original. For since all Men have not the same Taste of any Performance, it was judged that a diversity of manner in representing so excellent a Piece of *Tully* might be a means of recommending it to the perusal of some, who would not otherwise have concerned themselves with it. Upon this account there was good reason to think, that a *Version* which had formerly been so well received by the Publick, as to have undergone five large Impressions in a few Years, had something in it which deserved not to be intirely thrown away: Though at the same time it was evident to all competent Judges, that there were many such apparent Mistakes left standing, even in the last
of

Advertisement to

of those Impressions, as plainly shewed that neither Sir Roger's Skill in the Latin Tongue, nor his Acquaintance with the other Philosophical Writings of *Tully*, were any ways equal to his admired Talent of expressing himself in *English*. And indeed if they had, he would scarce have told the Reader so roundly, as he does in his Preface, that *the Latin of it is hardly Ciceronian*. Now to remove these Blemishes, and yet to preserve what was commendable in Sir Roger's Performance, was the true Occasion of this present Undertaking; and 'tis hoped the Reader will take this for an Answer to the first Enquiry.

As to the second, *viz.* what Improvement he may expect to find in this new Edition. This Account may be truly given: That the whole Version has been very carefully examined by the best Editions of the Original *Latin*: And in Correcting such Places where the Author's Sense was either made uncertain, or manifestly

the Reader.

festly mistaken, the following Method has been observed.

First, where the Alteration or Addition of one or two words would restore the true Sense, there it was thought most convenient not to enlarge further; though indeed some few Expressions, such as *Flesh and Blood, Charity, &c.* have been changed, notwithstanding their being of common use among us; because being of Scripture Original, they were thought improper to be used in translating of a Pagan Author. Some few others have been also changed, because they were too trivial and below the dignity of the Subject.

Secondly, where a greater Alteration was found necessary, yet even there care has been taken to retain as much of Sir *Roger's* Phrase and manner of Expression as could be done consistently with representing the true Meaning of *Tully*.

It

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It would be a piece of Vanity here to mention any particular places which are so corrected, or to mention the instances in which they wanted Correction; since those Readers who do not understand *Latin*, though they may perhaps find some of those places more intelligible than they were in the former Editions; yet cannot judge of their agreement or disagreement with the Original. And as for those who do understand the Original, 'tis presumed they will be better satisfied with viewing the Corrections as they stand in the Book it self, if they think it worth their while to compare them. And for their greater Convenience in Undertaking such a Comparison, the several Chapters or Sections are number'd in this Edition as they are in the latest *Latin* Editions, that they may more easily examine and judge for themselves. And though the Undertaker is neither so vain as to think the Work perfect, nor so weak as to imagine, that if it were much better

the Reader.

better than it is, it could give Satisfaction to all Readers; yet he hopes all equitable Judges will take it for a reasonable Request, not to pass an hard Censure before they have examined it.



THE

the Reader.

better than it is, it could give 25-
injection to all Readers; for the hopes
all equitable Judges will take it for a
reasonable Request, that it pass an
hard Oath before they have con-
sidered it.



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TUL





TULLY's OFFICES.

BOOK I.

I.  LTHOUGH, after Twelve ^{'Tis a} Months spent in the School ^{great ad-} of *Cratippus*, and That at ^{vantage,} *Athens* too, you cannot (my ^{Good In-} Son *Marcus*) but be abun- ^{stitution,} dantly instructed in the Pre- ^{and Good} Example.

cepts and Institutions of Philosophy, by reason of the Great Authority of the *Master*, as well as of the *Place*; the One for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you shall do well, nevertheless, to take the same Course in *Your* Studies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle

B

Latin

Greek,
and Latin,
Rhetorick
and Philo-
sophy, do
well toge-
ther.

Cicero
half a Pe-
ripare-
tique.

A better
Orator
than Phi-
losopher.

Latin with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Conducing to the Bus'ness, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philosopher*: Beside, that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In this Particular, I am perswaded that I have done my Country-men no small Service; and that not only those who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themselfes will acknowledge, that I have in some sort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*. Wherefore, as you have the greatest Philosopher of this Age for your Master, you shall also Learn of him as long as you please: and so long, certainly, you ought to desire to learn, as you find your self the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will see a great deal in them of your *Peripatetiques* (for we are both Followers of *Socrates*, and of *Plato*). As to the Matter it self, you are at liberty to use your Own Judgment; and yet the Acquainting of your self with my Writings, will undoubtedly be of some Use toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in this be thought arrogant neither; For, allowing my self the meanest of many *Philosophers*, I have yet some Right, - methinks, after an Age spent upon this Study, to value my self upon what peculiarly belongs to an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, and the *Flowers* and *Ornaments* of *Well-speaking*. Wherefore I must Earnestly



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ly recommend unto you the Perusal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewise of my *Philosophical Discourses*, which are now swell'd almost to the Bulk of the Other: and that you will read them with Intention and Care: for tho' there may be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This smooth and temperate kind of speaking is not to be neglected. Among the *Greeks*, I have not found any Man that has Successfully apply'd himself to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unless I should reckon *Demetrius Phaleræus* for one: who was indeed a *subtle Disputant*, no very powerful *Orator*; but then had such a Vein of Sweetness with him, that a Body might easily know *Theophrastus* had been his Tutor. For my own part I have labour'd in Both These Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato*, I believe, would have made a *Ready*, and a *Weighty Pleader*, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demosthenes*, a *Queint* and a *Polite Philosopher*, if he would but have treated of, and stuck to, what he had from *Plato*. And this, I judge, was the case also of *Aristotle*, and *Isocrates*: they were each of them fond of their Own Way, and slighted the other.

II. BUT being resolved to Write something to you at present, and more hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon that Subject, which I look upon to be most accommodate to your *Age*, and best

None of the
Greeks
Excellent
in Both
Kinds.

His Reasons for the
Choice of
This Subject.

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becoming the Authority of a *Parent*. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philosophy, which have been accurately, and copiously handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greatest Latitude, falls under the Head of *Offices*, or *Duties betwixt Man and Man*; whereof they have transmitted to us many *Precepts* and *Directions*. For there is no Condition of Life, either *Publick*, or *Private*; from *Courts of Justice*, to *Particular Families*; either *Solitary*, or in *Society*; but there is still a place for *Humane Duty*: And it is the *Well*, or *Ill discharging of this Office*, that makes our *Character* in the World, either *Glorious*, or *Shameful*. And this is the Common Theme too of all Philosophers; for who shall dare to Usurp that Sacred Name, that never prescrib'd Rules for the Government of Life?

He taxes
the Epicu-
reans.

BUT there are some Sects yet, that upon a Mistake about the Measures of *Good* and *Evil*, render These Offices wholly Vain and Useless. For whoever thinks of Separating the *Supreme Good* from *Virtue*, consulting his own convenience, and not strict honesty in the Case: That man can never be, either a *True Friend*, or a *Just* and a *Generous Person*, upon That Bottom; that is to say, in a Consistence with himself, and without submitting some time to the Direction of a Nature better than his Principles. Can any Man be *Brave*, that makes *Pain* the Worst of *Evils*? Or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleasure*

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sure the *Supreme Good*? This is so Obvious, that there is no Room left for a Doubt: beside that I have spoken to this Point in Another Place. The Patrons of These Opinions cannot pretend in any sort to intermeddle in This Matter, without contradicting Themselves: for there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty, erected upon any other Foundation than This; that *Virtue is Only, or at least Chiefly Desirable for its Proper Self*. So that the *Stoicks*, ^{Nothing desirable for it self} *Academicks*, and *Peripateticks*, are the only ^{but} *Virtue* Persons fit to direct in This Particular: As the Whimsies of *Aristo*, *Pyrrho*, and *Herillus* are long since exploded, and out of doors. Not but that they had the same Right to a Freedom of Debate with other People, if they would but have left us in a State or Capacity of *Election*, without cutting off the very Means of any Communication with *Humane Duties*. Wherefore, at This Time, and upon This Subject, I shall chiefly follow the *Stoicks*, not as an Expositor, but (after my Usual Way) I shall Draw what Water I think fit from that Fountain, and then Apply it according to my own Discretion.

BEING now to treat in this Discourse of *All Duties* the *Offices* or *Duties* of Mankind; it will ^{putes to begin with a} be Proper, in the First place, to define what ^{Definitio-} is meant by the Word *Office*: a Thing omitted by *Panaetius*, which I much wonder at. For *all Reasonable Methods of Instruction in any Matter should be introduced by a*

Definition, for the better understanding of the Matter in Debate.

Two ways
of treating
concerning
Duties.

III. THE whole way of treating concerning *Duties* or *Offices* is divided into two kinds: the *One* has a Respect to the *Summum Bonum*; the *Other* consists in certain Rules and Practices accommodated to the Use and Conduct of Humane Life. Under the *Former*, there Occur These Questions. *Whether All Offices be Perfect or not: whether One Office be Greater or Less than Another*, with others of the like kind. But those Offices that are deliver'd to us by *Precept*, though they have a Relation also to the Constitution of the *Sovereign Good*; yet do not so immediately appear to have it, because they seem to be rather a Provision for the Ordering of Life in Society. These are the Offices which we shall Discourse of in this Book. There is also another Division of *Offices*; some are call'd *Middle*, and *Imperfect*, others *Perfect*; We may call the *Latter*, a *Right*, (according to the Greek word *κατόρθωμα*) and the *Other*, a *Common Office*, (*καθῆκον*) defining so as to make That a *Perfect Office* which is exactly *Right*; and That a *Middle Office*, whereof a Man may give a Reasonable Account for the doing of it.

Deliberation, according to Panætius, under three Heads.

Now, according to *Panætius*, in forming any Resolution of acting, there are Three general Heads of *Deliberation*. The *First Question* is, *Whether the thing deliberated upon, be Good, or Evil?* Wherein several

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veral Men are many times of several Opinions. The *Second* Enquiry or Consult refers to the *Ease, Pleasure, or Convenience of Life*; as *Estate*, for the purpose; *Wealth*, or *Power*; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our selves, and our Friends: Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or not? And this sort of Deliberation falls wholly under the head of *Profit*. The *Third* Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Case, where the *Honest* and the seemingly *Profitable* come in *Competition*. For when *Utility* seems to drive *One way*, and *Honesty* to invite us *Another*, there follows a *Distraction* of *Mind*, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought*. It is a great failing to leave out any thing in a Division; and yet there are Two things omitted in This. For the Question is not only, Whether a thing be *Honest*, or *not*? but where there are *Two things Honest*, before us, which is the *Honestest*? and of *Two Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable*? So that his *three Branches* must be extended to *Five*. First therefore we shall Discourse of what is *Honest*, under two Heads; then of that which is *Profitable*, under as many; and lastly, of the Comparison between them.

IV. ALL Living Creatures are Original-ly mov'd by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of *Self-preservation*: As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies*; the *Avoidance* of things *hurtful* to them; the *search*, and *provision* of all *Necessaries* for Life; as *Food*,
B 4
Shelter,

Shelter, and the like. The Appetite of Propagating and Continuing their *Kind*, is likewise common to all Animals, together with a certain Care, and Tenderness for their *Issue*. Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently this Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *Sense*, and to That only which is *present*; with little or no regard to what is either *past*, or to *come*: whereas the *Other*, enjoying the Benefit of *Reason*, (whereby he sees the *Consequences* of Things, views their Causes, and observes the several Steps, and as it were the Train in which one goes before another; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions*, and *Events*, and tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*) can easily take in his whole Life at one View, and prepare all things necessary for the Use, and Comfort of it.

The Seeds of Justice. IT is by force of the same *Reason*, that *Nature* makes one Man a *Friend* to another; that she moves us to the Love of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Affection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us the *Necessity* of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for Food, and Cloathing; and not for our selves alone, but for our Wives, our Children, our Friends, and for all those that are under our Protection.

Prudence. This Impression raises great Thoughts in us; and fits us for Action: but there is nothing so *Appropriate*, and *Peculiar* to *Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Faculty* of Tracing out the Truth.

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Truth. Infomuch, that we are no sooner at Liberty from Common Cares and Business, but our Heads are presently at work upon something to be either *seen*, or *heard*, or *learnt*: accounting upon the knowledge of things *wonderful*, and *bidden*, as a necessary Ingredient into a Happy Life. From whence may be drawn this Conclusion, That *whatsoever* is True, Simple, and Sincere, is most congruous to the Nature of Man. This love of Truth is accompany'd with a desire of Rule; so that a Generous *Magnanimity* and Well-qualified Mind, will never be brought into Subjection, unless either for Learning, or Instruction sake; or in submission to a Just, and Lawful Governour, for the Common Good. This Elevation begets a Contempt of Fortune, and a Dignity of Spirit. And it is no small matter *Modesty and Temperance* neither, the power of Reasonable Nature even in This respect: that Man alone understands Order, and Decency, and the proper Bounds to be observed in Words, and Actions: That of all Creatures only Man is affected with the Beauty, the Gracefulness, and the Symmetry of Visible Objects. Now if Nature, and Reason, pursue an Analogy or Resemblance between the Eye and the Mind; then how much a greater Value must she set upon the Grace, and Constancy of our Manners; and the keeping such a guard upon all our Words, and Deeds, that no Unmanly thing, not a loose Syllable, or Thought escape us? This

is the Composition of that *Honesty* we look for, which is never the less Venerable, though it be not set off with any outward Ornaments. For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole Earth cannot yet hinder it from being praise-worthy in its own Nature.

V. THUS, my Son *Marcus*, you see a faint Idea or Sketch of *Honesty*, which if it could be presented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Lustre*, how wonderfully should we be *transported* (as *Plato* says) with the Love of Wisdom.

The four
Cardinal
Virtues,
and the
subject
matter of
each.

THERE is not any Virtue whatsoever but arises from *One*, or *Other*, of these four *Heads*; and consists either, First, in the perception of *Truth*, and a sagacity of *Mind*; or, Secondly, in the Conservation of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*, and keeping faith in all *Promises*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatness*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly, in the *Order*, and *Measure* of all our *Words* and *Actions*; according to the Rules of *Modesty*, and *Temperance*.

Distinct
Duties in
a Compli-
cation of
Virtue.

Prudence
searches the
Truth of
Things.

Now though these four *Virtues* may be *Complicate*, and *Linkt* together, there are yet certain *distinct Duties*, that issue severally from each of them: As for instance, the *Scrutiny* and *Bolting* out of a *Truth*, arises from that part which we first described, in which we placed *Wisdom* and *Prudence*. The search of *Truth* is a business particularly appertaining to *That Virtue*: For
he

he that makes the best judgment of the *Truth* of Things ; he that most readily finds the way to't ; and gives the best account of the *Reason* of it, we conclude him, without all dispute, to be the wisest Man. So that effectually, the proper *Subject* of This Virtue, is *Truth* : But the Business of the *Other* ^{Justice} *three Virtues*, is, to procure and maintain ^{shows it} *Necessaries*, for the *Commodity* of *Life* ; ^{self in So-} *ciety*. the upholding of *Communities*, and *Society* ; and to shew the *Dignity* of the *Mind*, as well ^{Fortitude} in the *Communicating* of our *Fortunes*, as ^{in the Con-} in the *Acquiring* of *them* ; and more yet (if ^{tempt of} there shall be occasion) in the *despising* of ^{difficulties,} *them*. But *Order*, *Constancy*, *Moderation*, ^{Tempe-} and the like, require something of *Action*, ^{rance in} in concurrence with the *Operations* of the *Mind* : And he that would acquit himself in the *Course* of his *Life*, with *Reputation* and a good *Grace*, must observe *Order*, and *Mea-* ^{Order and} *sure*. ^{Measure.} ^{A decorum} ^{in the Con-} ^{gruity of} ^{all.}

VI. OF these *Four Parts*, into which we ^{Prudence} have divided the *Nature*, and the *Power* of ^{is a Natu-} *Virtue* ; that which concerns the disquisition of *Truth* holds most affinity with the *Soul* of *Man*. We are all of us, both *drawn*, and *led*, to a desire of *Knowledge* ; and every man values himself upon being *wiser* than his *Neighbour* ; but on the other side, to *Fail*, to *Mistake*, to be *Ignorant*, and to be *deceived*, we look upon as a wretched, and a reproachful thing.

IN the pursuit of this most Natural Vir- ^{Have a} ^{care of two} ^{mistakes.} *tue*, we must take heed of *Two Mistakes* :
 First,

Credulity,
and

Curiosity.

First, the taking up of Things upon *Trust*; and flattering our selves, that we *know more*, than effectually we *do*. He that would keep clear of this Rock (as every man should endeavour it) must diligently attend his Business, and allow himself time to consider of it. The *Other* is the bestowing of more *Pains* and *Study* upon things that are *obscure*, *hard*, and *superfluous*, than the Matter is *worth*: whereas by avoiding these Errors, and employing the same application upon profitable Knowledge, and the study of Virtue, a Man gains to himself deserved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Astronomy*; and have known *Sextus Pompeius* famous for his *Geometry*; and other persons eminent for *Logique*; and more for *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exercised in the Investigation of *Truth*; and yet for a Man to divert himself, by these Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Business*, is against the *Nature of Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of Virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals, there being frequent occasions of returning to Study. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but still in a Constant Agitation of *Thought*, even when we do not actually design it: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and advising upon things *Honest*, and tending to a *good and happy life*; or upon the *Acquiring of Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*. And so much for

Prus

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Prudence, which is the first Fountain of Virtue.

VII. OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find ^{*Justice*} That to be of the largest extent, which di- ^{*and Libe-*} rects the Ordering of Men in *Society*; and ^{*rality.*} in a kind of *Community* of Life. Of This, there are *Two parts*; *Justice*, which is the more *Glorious Virtue*; and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good Men*; and *Beneficence*, which is of near affinity with it, which we may otherwise call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*. The first Duty ^{*The duties*} of *Justice* is *This*; *That we hurt no Man*, ^{*of Justice.*} unless provok'd to it by an *Injury*, and in our Own *Defence*. We are then to *distinguish* betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular*; and to use them accordingly: Not that any thing is *Private* in its *Own Nature*; ^{*The bounds*} but as it becomes so, either by *Ancient pos-* ^{*of it by the*} *session*, as appropriated by the first *Occupant*; ^{*Civil Law.*} or by *Conquest*, upon the right of *Arms*; or else by *Law*, *Agreement*, *Condition*, or *Lot*. From hence the *Arpine Field* is said to belong to the People of *Arpinum*, and the *Tusculan Field* to those of *Tusculum*: and in like manner is the designation of *Private Possessions*. Now since *Custom* and *Usage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common*; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot*; and whoever shall attempt to break in upon it, ought to be look'd upon as one that violates the Rights of human Society. But because (as *Plato* says singularly well) *we are not born* for

for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends : and because (as the *Stoicks* will have it) the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were Created for the Use of *Man* ; and *Man* only for *Mans* sake begotten ; that one might be helpful to another : What can we do better than to follow, where *Nature* is our *Guide* ? To lay *Common Benefits* in *Common* ; and by an *Intercourse* of *Good Offices*, as *Giving*, and *Receiving* ; by *Arts*, *Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind* into One *Society*.

THE Foundation of *Justice*, is *Faith* ; That is to say, a *Firmness*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promises*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are great *Etymologists*, will have *Fides* to be so called, *quia fit quod dictum est* ; (because that which is said, is done.) This may seem to be far fetch'd ; but however we have taken the Freedom to apply it.

Two sorts
of Inju-
stice.

The injuri-
ous Ag-
gressor.

And the
Deserter.

THERE are Two sorts of *Injustice* : One is the *Immediate* doing of an *Injury* ; and the *Other* is, the *not protecting*, or *defending* the *Injur'd person* ; for so much as in us lies. For he that *Injuriously* offers Violence to any man, either in his *Rage*, or any other *Passion* whatsoever, may be taken to be in some degree, constructively, a *Murderer* ; and he that does not his best, to *save* his Neighbour from *harm*, and to keep off the blow, is as well to blame (tho' not so much) as the *Deserter* of his *Parents*,
his.

his *Friends*, or his *Country*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpose* to hurt us, which arise yet from *Fears*; as when he that watches to do another man mischief, does it upon prevention, for fear the Other should hurt him. But the greater Part of *Injuries* are done with a design to compass something we have a mind to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great share. *An injury out of fear.*

VIII. As to the Matter of *Riches*, they are desir'd, partly for our *Necessities*, and partly for our *Pleasures*. The desire of *Money* in great *Minds*, is to make an *Interest* by it: and to get into our *Power*, the means of obliging. It was lately the Saying of *Crassus*, that he that would be *Uppermost* in a *Commonwealth*, could never have *Money* enough, till he was able to maintain an *Army* at his own *Charge*. There is a pleasure also, in a *Splendid*, and *Magnificent Appearance*; *Rich Furniture*; and Men take delight to live in *Reputation*, *Glory*, and *Plenty*; which begets an *Insatiable Thirst* of *Money* to maintain it. And yet we are not forbidden to *advance*, or *encrease* our *Fortunes*; provided it be done without *wrong* to *Another*; but the injuring others is always to be avoided. But men are apt to forget the *Rules*, and *Measures* of *Justice*, when they come once to be transported with the desire of *Empire*, *High Places*, and *Titles*. It goes a great way, that saying of *Ennius*, *There is no Faith, or Fellowship in Empire*. 'Tis a hard matter to preserve *Friend-*

Friendship, and Agreement, in a Case where there are many *Competitors*, and but *one* can *succeed*: which manifestly appeared in that Tempest which *C. Cæsar* lately brought upon the Government: who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all Laws Divine, and Humane, for the compassing of that Power, which he (out of a mistaken judgment of things) propounded to himself. And great pity it is, that this inordinate desire of *Honor, Dominion, Power, and Glory*, does for the most part infest the most Famous Wits, and the largest Minds: so that an Error in this Case, is the more to be avoided.

Difference of Injuries. Now in all *Injuries*, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the *Sudden*, and in *Hot Blood* (which is Commonly but Short, and Transient) and that which is done upon *Fore-thought*, and *Council*; for those in a *heat*, are much lighter than those upon design and *preparation*. And this shall suffice to have spoken of *Injuries offer'd, or done*.

Injuries of Omission; and the Causes of them. Expence. Fear. Sloth. Bus'ness. IX. Now why we do not *Protect* and *Defend* the *Oppressed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be several Reasons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge*, or *Trouble*: we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent, lazy, sluggish*; taken up with *particular Studies*, or hinder'd by *Bus'ness*: and This makes us leave those expos'd to Ruine, whom it is our *Duty* to preserve. Wherefore we must take heed,

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heed, not to rest upon that which *Plato* observes of the *Philosophers* : as if the *studying* and *endeavouring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *despising* of the things that most Men vehemently *desire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them presently to the Character of *Honest Men* : Not considering, that while they are so *just* on the *One side*, as to *wrong no Body, themselves* : they are yet so *unjust*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other People* to do it : And so rather than quit their *Studies*, they forsake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore ('tis thought) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it self, if they were not compell'd by Force : A thing which ought rather to be done, by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never so *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are some, that either for *saving* of their *Own stake*, or out of an *Averseness* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Bus'ness; I meddle with no Body* : And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmless people*. These Men, while they *shun One Injustice*, they fall into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labour*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publick*, is a *Defserter* of the *Community*. Now these *Two sorts of Injuries* being laid down, together with the *Causes* of them ; and having stated beforehand the *Bounds of Justice*, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every

ry Person, and *Occasion*, its proper Duty, if we be not over-partial to our selves: but in another bodies Case, it is difficult to be equally careful: Although *Terence's Cbrenes* thinks no Case another bodies which is common to *Mankind*: But yet being more sensible, and quicker sighted in our Own Concerns, than for the Good, or Evil that befalls others; (which we look upon as very Remote) we pass upon the One, and the Other, (tho' in the very same Case) a quite Different Judgment. It is good advice therefore, to forbear acting, where we doubt whether the thing be good or bad. For the *Right* is as Clear as the *Sun*; but doubting implies some design at least of an *Injustice*.

Do nothing
with
doubting.

Promises
not al-
ways to
be kept.

X. BUT it often falls out, that the same thing which at one time would become a Man of Honour, and Justice, would at another time not only vary, but prove the Clear Contrary: As the delivering up of a Trust to a Mad man; or keeping Promise with him. Nay in matters of Faith, and Truth, it is just, in some Cases to deny; and in others, not to keep Touch; for all must refer to those Fundamentals of Justice already propounded. As First, to wrong no Man; and secondly, in all Cases to consult the Common Good. So that the Duty is not always the same; but changes with the Occasion. Suppose such a Promise or Contract past, as if it were performed, would manifestly tend to the Damage, either of the Party

The Duty
changes
with the
Occasion.

Party promising, or of the Person to whom the Promise was pass'd, to have it perform'd. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his Promise to *Theseus*, *Theseus* had not been deprived of his Son *Hippolytus* : for the Story goes, that of *Three wishes*, the *Last* was in his *Passion* the destruction of *Hippolytus* : and the *Grant* of that request, cast him into Inconsolable Sorrows. So that neither are we to keep those Promises that are unprofitable to the Promised : or more hurtful to the Promiser, than advantageous, to the Other. 'Tis against the Nature of our *Duty*, not to prefer a greater before a less : As if I promise to plead any man's Cause, and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerous Ill ; it is no Breach of Faith, or Duty in me, not to appear, but rather the contrary : and it were yet worse, in him to whom the Promise was made, to complain of such a disappointment. And now in matters where a man is under *Violence*, or over-aw'd by *Fear*, or out-witted, and over-reach'd by *Fraud*, every body knows that *Those promises* are not *Binding* : many of them being discharg'd in Form, by the *Prators Court*, and some by the very *Law it self*.

THERE are several *Injuries*, that are meerly matter of *Cavil*, and only advantages taken, by a *Crafty* and *malicious Interpretation* of the *Law*. From whence that saying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme Wrong*, is now become a common Proverb.

Of

Of This Sort, there have been many Practices, even upon a Publique Score : One agreed upon a *Truce* with the Enemy for 30 *days*, and afterward made Incurſions upon him, and deſtroyed his Country by *night* : becauſe the Ceſſation was for *days*, not *nights*. Neither can I juſtify our Countryman, if it be true : *Q. Fabius Labeo*, or ſome body elſe (for I have it only upon *Hearſay*) was by the Senate Conſtituted *Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries* of *Nola* and *Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the Com-miſſioners apart, and adviſed them in private, not to do any thing greedily, or to preſs too much ; but rather to abate of their Pretenſions, than to demand more : and prevailed ſo far upon them, that there was a good ſpace of ground left betwixt them ; ſo that when he had marked out their Bounds, according to their own ſeveral Demands, that which was left in the middle, he adjudg'd to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* than a *Judgment* ; and this Indirect, and Crafty way of Impoſing, ſhould be avoided in all Caſes.

XI. THERE are certain *Duties* to be obſerv'd alſo, even to thoſe that do us the greateſt wrong ; for there muſt be a *Mean* in the very *Puniſhment*, and *Revenge* : and I do not know, but it may be ſufficient, for the *Aggreſſor* to be brought to *Repent* of his Injury, both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example* of Others.

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THE Laws of *War*, among all Nations, ^{The Rules} should be strictly and punctually observ'd. ^{of War.} For since there are but *Two* ways of *Con-*
tending, the *One*, by *Dispute*, the *Other*, by
Force; the *One*, *Humane*, and the *Other*
Brutal: we must of necessity have recourse
to the *Latter*, where the *Former* will not
take place. Wherefore the end of *War* is ^{The End}
to secure our selves from *Violence*, in a state ^{of War.}
of *Peace*: and in case of *Victory*, we should
preserve those that behaved themselves with
Honor, and *Generosity* in the *Action* of the
War: As our Ancestors receiv'd into the ^{The Ro-}
very *Privileges* of the *City*, the *Tusculans*, ^{man Ge-}
the *Æqui*, the *Volscei*, the *Sabines*, the *Her-* ^{nerosity to}
nici: but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they ^{their Ene-}
wholly raz'd. I could wish they had spar'd ^{mies,}
Corinth: but they had a respect, I suppose,
to the strength, and situation of the Place,
and so destroy'd it: that for the future it
might not, some time or other, prove an
Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opi-
nion, *Peace* should be always consulted,
where it may be had without *Treachery*:
and if my advice had been hearkned to in
This matter, we might yet at this day have
had some sort of a *Republique*, though not
the Best; whereas now we have just none
at all. We should provide likewise, not
only for those that are *Overcome* in the *Field*; ^{And to}
but for those also that throw down their ^{those that}
Arms, and cast themselves upon the Faith ^{yielded.}
of the General, who are to be receiv'd, e-
ven after the *Battery* is begun, and the *Breach*
made.

Upon
what
Terms to
undertake
a War.

A Consci-
entious In-
stance.

made. In which point, we have been so scrupulously Just, that according to the Custom of our Ancestors, those that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegiance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of those they took. And the Rights of *War* are set forth with exact solemnity in the Provisions of the *Facial Law*; wherein we are given to understand that no *War* can be *Just*, and *Warrantable*, unless it be grounded upon some matter of *Claim*, or *denounced* beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Poppilius* (the General) held a Province: and a Son of *Cato's* list'd himself a Soldier under his Command. *Poppilius*, finding it convenient to discharge *one Legion*, *Cato's* Son, serving in that *Legion*, was also dismiss'd; but he continuing still in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Poppilius*, Requesting him, that if his Son continu'd with him in Arms, he would give him the Military Oath, over again, because his former being dissolv'd, he could not otherwise justify his putting himself into the Quarrel. Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the Conscience of making War! There is extant, an *Epistle* of *Marcus Cato* the Elder, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the War against *Perseus*, wherein he tells his Son, that he heard the Consul had dismiss'd him; and charges him not to engage in any Battel, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier, to fight an Enemy.

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XII. IT is remarkable, the changing of the word *Perduellis* (a publick Enemy) into *Hostis*; to sweeten the Foulness of the Thing, by the Softness of the Term. For *Hostis* (with our Forefathers) was the same as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) is with us, as appears by the *Twelve Tables*. *Aut status dies cum Hoste*. And then, *Adversus Hostem Æterna Authoritas*. What can be Gentler, than to Treat an Enemy in this easie Language? Although *Custom*, I must confess, has made it *harsher*, by transferring the signification of it, from That of a *Stranger*, to the proper Denomination of one that *bears Arms against us*. Nay in the Case of a War for *Honor*, or *Dominion*, there must yet be the same *Causes*, and *Grounds* before-mentioned, to make it Just: but still all Contests of This kind must give fairer Quarter. For as in Contests between Fellow-Citizens, we distinguish betwixt an *Enemy* and a *Rival*, our *Title* and *Dignity* lies at Stake in the *One Case*; but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the *other*; so the War we had with the *Celtiberi*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *Enmity*: and the question was not, who should *Govern*, but who should *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*; and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *cruel*; but the Rest more *Honourable*. It was a *Glorious Declaration*, that of *Pyrrhus*, about
the

the discharge of some Prisoners, as we find it in *Ennius*.

A Brave
Resolution
of Pyrrhus.

*Let Mercenaries Truck, and Treat for Gold;
Honor's a thing not to be Bought or Sold.*

*Courage and Steel must end this Glorious
Strife :*

*And in the Case of Victory, or Life,
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance
of War :*

*And what Brave Man soever she shall spare
With Life; depend upon't, I'll set him Free;
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods,
and Me.*

THIS was a Royal Speech, and Resolution, and well becoming the Blood of *Æacus*.

Faith must
be kept
with an
Enemy.
A noble
example of
Regulus.

XIII. BUT even in the Case of a private promise : and upon what pinch, or necessity soever ; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Prisoner in the first *Punique War*, and sent to *Rome* to solicit the exchange of some Prisoners, upon his Oath to return ; so soon as ever he came There, he advised the Senate against himself ; and that they should not agree to the *Exchange*. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again ; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, than to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy.

IN the second *Punique War*, after the Battle of *Cannæ*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to
Rome,

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Rome, under an Oath of returning ; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp, by *Hannibal's* permission, ^{A glorious piece of Justice.} but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath : and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was in *Words*, but not in *Effect* : for in all *Promises*, the *Intention* is to be consider'd, not the *Letter*. The *Censors* set a Fine during life, upon all their Heads that were forsworn : and upon His, among the rest, that invented this *shift*. But the most Generous Instance of *Justice* to an *Enemy*, ^{The Romans a generous Enemy.} was that of our Ancestors in the Case of *Pyrrhus* : There was a Deserter that made a Proposal to the Senate, for the Poysoning and Dispatching of *Pyrrhus* : but the Senate, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Master : Such was the detestation they had for Treachery, that they would not make use of it, tho' to the destruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And so much for *Military Duties*.

WE must not forget neither, that toward the meanest of men also, there is a Justice to be observ'd ; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves : and it is good Counsel, to advise the using of them as *Hirelings* : to require their *Work* ; and to make them a just and reasonable allowance. ^{Of Justice to Inferi-ors.}

Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man

C

an

Of Force and Fraud. an *Injury*: the *one* is by *Force*, the *other* by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*: but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the *Two*: and of all *Injustices* that is the most *Abominable*, and *Capital*, which imposes upon us under the colour of *Honesty* and *Good* meaning, at the time when the greatest act of *Knavery* is intended. And this shall suffice for *Justice*.

Of Liberality.

How to give, How much, and to Whom.

XIV. To pursue my purpose, I shall now handle the Point of *Liberality*, or *Bounty*: than which there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many *Limitations*. It should be our *first* Care to see, that what we *Give*, may not be to the disadvantage of the Person we would *oblige*, or of any other body: and next, that it be not above our *Proportion*: and then, that it be suited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*. For the *first* is the Foundation of *Justice*, to which all these Circumstances are to be *referr'd*. He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *Damage*, than to his *Benefit*, is so far from deserving the Reputation of being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the most pernicious of *Flatterers*. And Those also that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the same *Injustice*, with them, that take Money out of their Neighbors Pockets, to put into their Own. There are many People that look big, and set up for men of Honor, that yet have

have this humour of *taking* from one, and *giving* to another; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a Friend, upon what Terms soever. But This is so far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*. Let us ^{Whom to Oblige.} therefore so govern our Favours, that we may oblige those we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Caesar*, the Translation of so many Estates from the Right Owners, into the possession of Strangers? There can be no *Liberality* in a Case of *Injustice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our Bounty within *Compass*: and not to *give* beyond ^{Give in Proportion.} our *Ability*: for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those Bounties to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humour of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no Scruple of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or Injury, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken Bounty. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful*; and This, ^{Consider the Intent of the Giver.} only upon a Score of Vanity, without any Frankness of Heart; which is rather a flash of *Ostentation*, than an act of *Generosity*, and *Virtue*. The *Third Caution* is, the making ^{The Choice of the Person.} Choice of a worthy Person: wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition

sition towards us ; our intercourse with him in Community, and Society of Life ; and the good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these : but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight.

There is no
Stoical
Perfection.

Whom to
value
most.

HOWBEIT, since we do not live with Men absolutely *Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom* ; but with those that acquit themselves very well, if they can but arrive at some faint resemblances of *Virtue* : let this be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign or glimmering of Goodness. But still we are to set the greatest Value upon him, that we find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly* *Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*, is commonly more forward, and eager, perhaps, than is *Convenient*. The Other are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for the *Morals* of the Person.

How to
return
Benefits.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any Man bears us : it is, *First*, our Duty to do much *Good*, where we are much *Beloved* : but then we are not to judge of that *Good Will* like Children from the Ardour, and Fondness of Passion : but from the Constancy, and Steadiness of it.

IN the Case of an *Antecedent Merit*, ^{Benefits to be repaid with Interest.} where we are not now to *Enter* into an *Obligation*, but to *Acknowledge*, and *Requite* it: there must be a more than Ordinary Care taken. For *Gratitude is the most Indispensable of all Duties*. If *Hesiod* bids us, *Restore what we borrow; if we can, in a Larger Measure*: what ought we to do in the Case of a *Prior Obligation*? Are we not to imitate Fruitful Lands, that still Return more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige those that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How should we behave our selves then, towards such as we are the Better for already? Since so it is, that there are *two sorts of Liberality*, the *One*, of *Bestowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it: It is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: but an Honest Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it: provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to distinguish also betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*: and the *Greater the Benefit*, the *Greater* no doubt is the *Obligation*. Now the *Obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without ^{Rash} *Judgment*, or out of a *Distemper* of Mind. ^{Bounties.} They *Squander* away indifferently upon all; carry'd on by suddain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with

Whom to
requite
first.

Discretion, Consideration, and Steadiness. As to the Placing of our Bounties, and Returning of Acknowledgments, (supposing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *first*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

Reason
and Speech
are the
Bond of
Humane
Society.

XVI. FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*: and to give *most* to those that are *our nearest Friends*. But for those Principles of Nature, which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it: which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Discoursing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another, and cement the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are further remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*, but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them: and the business is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of one Man with another, and of *All*, with *All*: This Society, (I say) *General*, and *Particular*,

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ticular, is of a large extent: and herein there must be a Community preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men: provided always, that such things as are limited by Laws, and Civil Ordinances, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest; they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

*To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,
Is but to light One Candle with Another:
I've ne'er the less of light, for what I Give.*

FROM this one Case we may learn, that *Benefits in
Common.* whatsoever we may part with to another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of this sort, we reckon many things to be in *Common*; as *Water from a River, Fire from Fire, Good Counsel to a Man that is in doubt, or distress*. All these things are profitable to the *Receiver*, without any loss, or burthen to the *Giver*. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the Common good. But in regard that particular persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost infinite; Common Liberality must

have a respect to that End of *Ennius*,
I've ne'er the less of light, that we may
 have the Means of being bountiful to our
 own.

Degrees of
 Communi-
 ties.

Common
 Privileges

Marriage,
 Children,
 Families.

XVII. To descend now from *Humane*
Society in the *Latitude*, of which there are
 many degrees; there is a nearer Bond yet,
 betwixt People of the same *Province*, the
 same *Nation*, and the same *Language*: And
 it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same
City: For among Citizens, there are many
 things in Common: As Markets, Tem-
 ples, Walks, Ways, Laws, Privileges, Cu-
 stoms, Courts of Justice, Right of Suffrage;
 beside frequent Meetings, and Familiarities,
 Common Bus'ness, Commerce, and Con-
 tract. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and
 That is the Society of Kindred, which is
 Contracted into a narrow compass, out of
 the vast Society of Mankind. For where-
 as the desire of producing their kind, is by
 Nature common to all living Creatures;
 The first Society is in Wedlock, the next,
 in Children; it comes then to a Family,
 and a Community of all things. And this
 is the Original of a City, and as it were
 the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The
 Relation of Brothers comes next; and af-
 ter That, of Brothers and Sisters Children;
 who, when they are too many for One
 House, are transplanted into Others, as in-
 to Colonies. And then follow Matches,
 and Alliances, with further extent of Affi-
 nity: and from this increase of Kindred,
 and

and their Off-spring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but *Kindred*, Relation of Blood, and the Kindness that arises from it, must necessarily endear Men to one another. For it is a great matter to have the same Pedigree: to exercise the same Religion, and to deposite their Ashes in Common Sepulchres: But of all *Friendship*, Associations, there is none so Firm, none so Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correspondency of Manners; and a Freedom of Conversation. For such is the Charm of That Honesty (which we have often occasion to speak of) that the very discovery of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Possessor of it, where-ever we find it. Now tho' all Virtue whatsoever is of it self Amiable, and Attractive; insomuch that we cannot but have an Esteem for those that we find possess'd of it; yet *Justice* and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity*, and *Agreement* of Good *Similitude of manners*, *Manners*. For where there are the same Inclinations, the same Desires, and the same Will, the one cannot chuse but be delighted with the other, as with his proper self: and it effects that which *Pythagoras* requires in Friendship: the making *one*, of *many*: And it is a considerable Society that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that *Exchange of Benefits*, pass Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being mutual, and grateful; must

C 5

needs,

Our Duty
to our
Country.

Our Kin-
dred and
Friends.

needs, upon the *Entercourse*, produce firm and extraordinary Friendship. But when you shall have lookt over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reason can carry you: you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, than that by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents, Children, Kindred, Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our single Country* is more than *all the Rest*: and every honest man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that sacred Interest. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of those people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all sorts of Villany: and who not only have been, but are at this instant, conspiring the destruction of it, by a final desolation? But if there should be any Dispute or Comparison, where to pay our duty, in the first place; our *Country* and our *Parents* are the *Principal*; to whose Benefits we are the most *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and our *Families* are next: as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *These*, our *Friends* and *Relations*: which are commonly of our own Rank; and Condition. Wherefore we owe the necessary helps of Life to these beforementioned: But for Conversation, Table-Society, Counsels, Exhortations, Consolations, and (upon Occasion) Reproofs: These things are found most amongst Friends: and let me tell you over again: *The pleasantest*

santest Friendship is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.

XVIII. Now in the Exercise of all these Duties vary with Circumstances Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what without our help, he cannot attain: and in some cases there is a respect to be had to *Times*, and *Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are some Offices that we should rather pay to *one* than to *another*: as I would sooner help a *Neighbour* in with his *Harvest*, than either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*: but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman*, or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these *Circumstances*, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By Custom, and Exercise, we shall become as it were good Accountants in matter of Duty: For it is by *Adding* and *Subtracting*, that we come to know *what Remains*: and consequently, in all Cases, the Bounds, and Limits of our Duty to each particular. But as neither Physicians, nor Commanders, nor Orators, tho' never so well instructed in the Rules of their Profession, shall ever be able, without Use, and Practice, to make themselves Eminently famous: to the same end, are the Precepts of Humane Duties deliver'd, as I my self am now delivering them: but yet the difficulty of the thing does over and above require Use and Practice. Now in what manner that Virtue (or *Honesty*) upon which our Duty depends,

pends, is derived from such things as concern the Rights of human Society, we have almost said enough already.

Magnanimity.

IN the propounding of *Four general Heads*, from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow ; That which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind ; a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things : that Virtue, I say, ought to be reputed the most Glorious : and therefore in matter of Reproach that (of *Ennius*) is always at hand where there is ground for it :

Young Men, *in shew*, but Women, *in your Hearts* :

While Clælia plays the Brave, and acts your Parts.

And likewise again ;

You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor Blood, &c.

AND on the other side, in matter of Praise, with what Transport and Rapture do we extol the honour of Brave, and Gallant, and Courageous Actions ? From hence comes that Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon, Salamis, Platea, Thermopylae, Leuctra* : and from hence it is, that our *Cocles*, the *Decii*, the two *Scipio's*, *Marcellus*, and a World of others, and especially the *Roman* people in general, are grown so famous, for the greatness of their Minds. And their ambition of Military honour, may appear

pear in This, that almost all the Statues they have left us, are dress'd up in Armour.

XIX. AND yet that Elevation of Courage which is seen in Hazards, and Adventures, unless accompanied with Justice, and contending rather for the Publique, than for ones self: That Courage (I say) is so far from being a Virtue, that it is a Fault, and a brutal Ferity, inconsistent with the Tenderneſs of humane nature. Wherefore the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling

Courage, a Virtue contending for Equity. Courage defined.

Nor did any man ever gain the Reputation of *True Valour*, by *Treachery*, or *Malice*.

Nothing can be *Honest*, but what is Just: and therefore it was notably said of *Plato*.

As that knowledge (says he) which is divided from Justice, is rather Craft, than Wisdom;

so that Courage, which is Bold, and Adventurous, is rather Temerity, and Fool-

hardineſs, than Valor: if it be carryed on by Passion, or Interest, rather than for a

Common Good. Wherefore all Men of Valor, and great Undertakings, should be

likewise Men of Goodneſs, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of *Truth*, and Strangers

to all Fraud; which Characters are all Inseparable from Justice. But the Mischief

is, that this Tumor, and Elation of Mind, breaks out many times into a *Pertinacy*, and

an ambitious desire of *Rule*. For as *Plato* Pertinacy and Ambition. observes,

that the *Lacedaemonians*, in all their Manners and Customs, were Naturally inflam'd with an Ardent desire of

Over-

Overcoming: So whosoever has the greatest Soul, is the most addicted to aspiring Thoughts; and to set himself above all; or in Truth rather to stand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a Man to observe the Tenor of *True Equity* (which peculiarly belongs to Justice) in the Inordinate Appetite of *Superiority*, and *Dominion*. From whence it comes to pass, that such men will not be over-ruled; either by *fair Reasoning*, or by any *Publique*, and *Lawful Constitution*. This humor starts Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes: whose business it is, rather to make themselves Greater, by *Violence*, than to keep in a Sation of *Equality* by *Justice*. But the harder any thing is, the more excellent it is: nor is there any Time, or Season, that can dispense a man from Justice. Wherefore Those are Truly *Brave*, and *Magnanimous*, that *keep off* an *Injury*, not Those that *offer* it. He that is truly *Wise*, and *Stout*, places That Virtue which is most consonant to Nature, in *Action*, and not in *Glory*: and in *making* himself more Considerable than other men, rather than *appearing* so. No man can be said to be a truly *Heroique*, or great Man, that depends, for his Reputation, upon the mistaken Opinion of the ignorant Multitude. But every man the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honor, the more easily is he transported to do Unjust things.

He

He stands upon a slippery place: For where is the Man, who after all his hazards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures?

XX. YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *Courage*, chiefly by these *two Marks*. *True Magnanimity.*

The first is, that he despise *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is Becoming and Honest; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The *Other* is, that having such a Disposition of Mind, as is before-mentioned, he attempts things *Great*, and mighty *Profitable*; but withal, very *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self, as in other Conveniences that belong to't. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me say, the *Profit* also) of These two Things rests in the *Latter*: but the *Cause*, and the *Motive*, which makes Men truly *Great*, is in the *Former*: For There is the Rise, and Spring of great Resolves, that carry men even above the Consideration of any thing that is below. The thing it self is seen in *Two particulars*: *First* in Judging That only to be *Good* which is *Honest*; and *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it must be confest to be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Those, as Little Things, which many Account to be Great, and Glorious; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a firm, and settled Judgment. It is like-

Contempt
of Money.

Affectati-
on of Glo-
ry.

likewise the part of a Constant, and Invincible Mind, to bear all the several sorts of Calamity, and Affliction, to which the Life and Fortune of Man is exposed, so as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to descend below the Dignities of a Wise man. And again, how Incongruous is it for a man that stands the shock of *Fear*, to be broken with *Desire*? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labour*; and then to be overcome with *Pleasure*? These things must therefore be well attended to, and the greedy desire of Money must also be carefully avoided. For there is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and Wretched Mind, than to dote upon *Pelf*: Nothing more honorable and brave, than to despise it, if we have it not; and to employ it generously, and do good with it, if we have it. And so for the Affectation of *Glory*: We must beware of it (as is said already) for it robs Men of their *Liberty*, which a Brave Man will rather dye, than part with. We should not be solicitous neither for Offices of *Power*; which in some Cases, we should not receive, and in others, we should lay down. We must deliver our selves from all disorders of mind; not only *Desire* and *Fear*, but likewise *Grief*, and *Softness of Mind*, and *Anger*; that we may be Calm, and Secure: In which State, we shall find both Steadiness, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repose, have wholly with-
drawn

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drawn themselves from Publique Business, and taken Refuge in Retirement. Among *A Retired Life.* these, the noblest, and most eminent of Philosophers; and some men of great Severity, and Gravity; who could neither endure the Manners of People, nor of their Rulers: and some have betaken themselves to a Country Life, pleasing themselves with the management of their own private Estate. And these men, in this Recess, had the same Design with Princes, that they might want nothing, might not be under the Controul of any, but enjoy their Freedom, the peculiar privilege of which, is to live according to our Mind.

XXI. WHEREFORE, since both Those affect Power, and the other Retired Persons that I speak of, aim at the same thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One think they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the Other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little. They may be Both, (for ought I know) in some measure, in the Right. But it must yet be allowed, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Easier and Safer: And less Importune, and Troublesome to Others. But the Life of Those that apply themselves to Publique Business, and are engaged in managing great Affairs, is more profitable to Mankind: and more conducing to the Acquisition of Honor, and Reputation in the World. Wherefore there is something to be

be said for those Excellent Wits that dedicate themselves to Letters ; without meddling in Publique Affairs : and also for such Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps some more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations, being well satisfi'd, that others should enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for those that have none of this Presence, to talk of despising Government, and Offices, which most people have in great estimation ; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I can easily disallow of their Judgment, in the little Consideration they seem to have for Glory ; but because they seem manifestly afraid of the Labours, and Troubles, of incurring Displeasure or suffering a Repulse, as if it were of Ignominy or Disgrace. For there are many that behave themselves *Unequally in Contrary Cases* : Severe Contemners of *Pleasure*, but they sink under *Pain* ; Regardless of *Fame*, but dejected with *Disgrace*. Now these things are not so Consistent as they should be. But those that are by nature fitted and qualified for civil business, I should advise to apply themselves to it without delay : and to take some Commission in the Government. For This is Necessary, both as to Publique Administration ; and to shew the Greatness of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philosophers themselves, (if not more) should

should be affected with a generous Contempt of External things, (which I have often occasion to mention) and stated in an Immoveable Tranquility, and Security of Mind, if they expect to be free from Anxiety, and live a life of Constancy, and Honor. Now this Point is by so much easier for a Philosopher to gain, by how much his Life is less expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune, and there are not so many things that he stands in need of: besides, that in case of any disaster, his Fall is not so dangerous. It is but reasonable therefore to conclude, that Men in great and publique places, are exposed to greater perturbations of Thought, than those that live in Privacy and Repose. So that a greater Stock of Courage is there necessary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and Care. But for him that puts himself into *Business*; let him first consider the *Honesty* of the Employment; and then, his *Own Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither, rashly despair, out of heartlessness, and sloth: nor be over-confident neither, in the Opinion of himself. But in all matters of Business, a man should diligently prepare himself before he goes about it.

XXII. BUT since most Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Consideration than *Civil*, This Opinion should be a little qualify'd. For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themselves to that course of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and

A Comparison of Military Virtues with Civil.

and this happens most frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Especially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Disposition* carries them to the Profession of *Arms*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the *Senate*, than in the *Field*. for although *Themistocles* be worthy of all honor, and his Name, and Memory more Illustrious than that of *Solon*, *Salamis* being still mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is still prefer'd before the Counsel of *Solon*, for the Institution of the *Areopagites*; yet This must not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once* deliver, preserve, and help the City; but the *Other* will *ever* do it. This Counsel preserves the Law of *Athens*, and Constitutions of their Ancestors. *Themistocles* cannot say that ever he help'd the *Areopagus*, but the other may truly boast of serving *Themistocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate, by advice whereof the War was managed. And so for *Pausanias*, and *Lyfander*: It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarg'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws and Discipline of *Lycurgus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Consideration, their Armies were both more at Command and *Bolder*. It was ever my Opinion, that when I was a Boy, *Marcus Scaurus* was not inferior to *Gaius Marius*; and that when I came afterwards into Pub-
lick

ick Business, *Q. Catulus* was not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what signify *Armies Abroad*, without *Counsel at Home*? Neither did *Africanius* (tho' an Excellent Man, as well as a great Captain) do the Common-wealth a Nobler Service in the Rasing of *Numantia*, than *Pub. Nasica* (a private Man) did at the same time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now this Instance is not purely *Civil*; but in some respect *Military*, because it was done by a *Violent hand*: But still it was done by a *Civil Direction*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable Saying of mine, that is so often cast in my Teeth, by a sort of Malicious, and Envious people.

*Let Swordmen to the Gown give place,
And Crown the Orator with Bayes.*

FOR to pass over other Instances: Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Commonwealth was under *My Administration*? Never was there a more Dangerous Conspiracy; nor did ever less Disturbance ensue; so quickly, by the influence of my Counsel and Diligence, did the very Arms drop out of the hands of the most Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Triumph Comparable to it? This Boast, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honor of my Actions, and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boast, to You, (I say) may be allowed me. Nor
is

is it any more than *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden with Military honors) ascribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (says he) *would have been to little purpose, if Cicero, by preserving the Commonwealth, had not left me a place wherein to Triumph.* So that *Domestique, and Civil Resolution,* is not Inferior to *Military.* And it requires more Pain, and Study, to be employ'd upon it.

XXIII. THAT Virtue without dispute, which we look for from a High, and Illustrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is still to be kept in Exercise; and so affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counsel and Reason, in the dispatch of Business, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honesty* here in question is wholly plac'd in the Care and Consideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe, in Civil Administration,* bring no less advantage to the *Publick,* than Those that bear *Arms:* For Wars are many times, either not begun, or otherwise finish'd, by their Advice: Nay, and some brought on too: as the *Third Punic War* was by the advice of *M. Cato;* where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead. Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining,* is more desirable than the ability of *Contending.* Always provided that we steer not our Course rather by an *Aversion to War,* than a *Consideration to publick Benefit.* In the Undertaking of a War there should be such a prospect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace.* It is the part
of

of a Valiant and Resolute Man, not to be discomposed in disasters, or to make a bustle, and be put beside himself; but to maintain a presence of Mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reason. And as this is the Mark and Effect of a great Courage: so is the other, of an excellent Understanding, to forecast in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh beforehand the Good and the Bad, which may happen; and what's to be done when it does happen, without being put to the foolish Exclamation of *who would have Thought it?* These are the Works of an elevated Soul, that supports it self upon Prudence, and Judgment: but rashly to thrust himself into Dangers without fear, or wit; and engage an Enemy hand over head; this is only Brutality, and Outrage: But yet when the time comes, and necessity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand, and rather lose his Life, than his Honor and Freedom.

XXIV. IN the Case of *Rasing* or *De-* Clemency
molishing of *Cities*, there should be great to the Con-
care taken, that nothing be done either quer'd.
Headily, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a
Great and Noble-spirited Man, upon due
examination of the Case, to punish the
Guilty; but still to spare the *Multitude*; Spare the
and in all conditions, to adhere to that which Multitude.
is Right, and Honest.

As there are some that esteem *Feats of*
Arms above *Civil Administrations*: (as is
afore-

Courage
with Dis-
cretion.

aforesaid) so there are many that think it more great and noble, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Hot Advice*, than in *Quiet* and *Considerate Counsels*. We must never in such manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *Faint-hearted*. And we must likewise have a care, on the other side, not to thrust our selves into *Unnecessary hazards*: which is one of the greatest Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult cases, we should do like Physicians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diseases*: but in cases of *Extremity*, a *desperate Disease* must have a *desperate Cure*. None but a Mad man will wish for a Storm in fair Weather. But it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And so much the more, if the advantage of the success be greater than the mischief of putting it to hazard.

Danger
Publick
and Pri-
vate.

ACTIONS of great Adventure are dangerous, sometimes to the *Undertakers*, and in part to the *Commonwealth*. Again, some men run the hazard of their Lives: Some of their Good names; and Others of the Love of the people. Now we should more frankly venture our selves, than the Publick: and more chearfully expose our selves for Honor, and Reputation, than for other Commodities. Some there are that make no scruple of hazarding their Lives, and Fortunes in the defence of their *Country*; and yet are so nice and scrupulous in the matter of *Reputation*, that, rather than
run

A mistake
in point of
Honor.

run any risque of their *Honor*, they will leave their very *Country* in danger. As *Callicradidas* the *Lacedemonian Admiral*, in the *Peloponnesian War*, after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at last, by not removing the Navy from the *Arginuse*, and making his Retreat without giving the *Athenians* Battel, as he was advis'd to do; to which he made This answer, that *if the Lacedemonians lost one Fleet, they might set out another; but that if he should fly, his Honor was lost for ever*. But the *Lacedemonians* however might have born this Loss; whereas the Other Blow was mortal, when *Cleombrotus*, for fear of an Ill Report, unadvisedly engaged with *Epaminondas*, where the whole power of the *Lacedemonians* was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the conduct of *Q. Fabius Maximus*, of whom *Ennius*,

*Fabius was slow, but sure, and his Delay
Restor'd the tottering State. Now 'twas his
way
To mind his Bus'ness, not what people said:
He liv'd a Great man, but he's Greater
dead.*

THIS is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided also in civil matters. For there are many that dare not speak their Opinions, tho' for the best; for fear of falling under Envious Tongues.

Plato's
advice to
Mages-
trates.

The danger
of Facti-
ons.

XXV. THERE are two Precepts of *Plato* to be observ'd by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in such sort to assert and defend the Publick Interest, that all their Actions should refer to That, without any regard to their own advantage. The other is, to attend the service of the whole body politick in such sort, that while they are serving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Administration of a *Government*, as in the case of a *Ward*: The *Commission* has a regard to the benefit of those that are deliver'd up in *Charge*: and not those to whom such a charge, or care is *Committed*. But they that provide for One part of the people, and neglect another, bring into a City the most pernicious things in the World; that is to say, *Discord*, and *Sedition*: and when they are split into parties, some side with the People; others with the Nobility: but none mind the Whole. This wrought great Dissentions among the *Athenians*: and in our *Republick* not only *Sedition*, but the most pestilent *Civil Wars*. A course not to be endur'd by a sober, and valiant Patriot; or any man that deserves a place in the Government: For such a man will apply himself wholly to the care of the *Publick*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it: Neither will he bring any man into *Envy*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*,
or

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or *Subornation*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die than desert the aforesaid Duties.

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honor is of *Am-
bition.* a wretched thing: Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republick*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us farther, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Arms* against the *Commonwealth*; and not such as with their (*best, though different*) *Judgment* labour to defend it. Such was the Controversie betwixt *P. Africanus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness.

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be violently *Angry* with an *Enemy*: For there is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous person, than *Clemency* and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should shew an easiness of access, and a Mind above being disturb'd at little Matters, lest if we should accustom our selves to *Transports* upon unseasonable Addresses, or too eager Importunities, we should fall into a humor of morose and unprofitable Sourness: Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use severity also, where the Publick requires it; for without That, a City can never be kept in order.

Of Re-
proof and
Correction.

ALL *Reproof*, and *Correction*, let it be without *Contumely*, as being directed only to the profit of the *Commonwealth*; without regard to the gratifying of his *Passion*, or *Interest* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the *Punishment* likewise should be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjust that one man should have *Blows*, and another not so much as a *Check*, for the same transgression. But above all things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in *Passion* will never observe that due mean betwixt the two extreams of too much, and too little, which the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right for approving; if they would not also commend *Anger* it self, and account it given us by Nature for our Advantage. But I am for the avoiding of it in all Cases; and I could wish that *Magistrates* were like the *Laws Themselves*, which never proceed to punish, from *Anger*, but only the *Reason* of the thing.

Moderati-
on in both
Fortunes.

XXVI. LET us also in *Prosperity*, and when we have the World at will, as much as possible, avoid *Pride*; *disgusting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the same *Levity* to be Transported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to observe an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have still the same humor, and the same countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Laelius*. *Philip* of *Macedon* was outstript by his Son, in *Glorious Atchievements*, and *Military Executions*,

ecutions; but in *Gentleness*, and *Humanity* of manners, *Alexander* came short of him: So that the *One* of them was *always Great*, and the *Other* was *many Times Base*, and *Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the more *Humble*. *Panæti*us tells us of *Africanus* (his Disciple, and Familiar Friend) how he was wont to say, that as we put out Horses of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for use, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmanageable, by being chaf'd, and heated by the Action of the Battle; so should we commit Men, that are Transported with Prosperity, and over-confident in Themselves, to some Guide that should keep them, as it were in the Ring; or within the bounds of Reason, and good Government, to make them understand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Prosperity, that we should chiefly consult our Friends; and allow them more Authority over us than at other times: 'Tis then also we must have a Care of Entertaining Flatterers, and of being imposed upon by Fair words, wherein we are too easie to be Mistaken. For such is the conceit we commonly have of our selves; that we think no Commendation more than we deserve. From this weakness there arise Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praises, and high Opinions of our selves, we do but

serve to make sport for Others, and labour under grievous Mistakes. And so much for this Point.

Greatness
of mind in
a private
Life.

THEIR Business that Govern Commonwealths, must of necessity be of the greatest moment, and require the largest Souls; because it has the largest prospect, and concerns most people. This is to be given for granted; and yet it must not be deny'd neither, on the Other side, that great Generosity of Mind is and has been many times shew'd in a private Life, by such as have employed themselves either in the search, or attempt of Great Matters, yet keeping within their own Bounds; Or by such as taking a middle way between Philosophers, and Men in Publick Business, contented themselves with looking after their private Estate: Neither scraping together by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the use of what they had, but rather dividing with Them, and with the Republick where there was Occasion. Now for *This Estate*, let it be, First, *well gotten*, and neither by *Shameful*, nor by *Odious ways*: Let a man next do good with it to as many as he can; (so they be worthy) let him encrease it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Husbandry*: and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, than *Luxury*, and *Lust*. He that observes these Rules may live Splendidly, Grandly, and Generously; and

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no less Candidly, Faithfully and Amicably with all Men.

XXVII. WE are now to speak of the only remaining part of *Honesty*; wherein *Bashfulness*, and a certain *Gracefulness* of Life, which is, *Temperance*, *Modesty*, the Composure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be consider'd. Here it is that we find that same *Decorum*, (as it may be called in Latin; for the *Greeks* call it ἀρετοῖς) which is of so Excellent a Nature, that it is Inseparable from Virtue. For whatsoever is *Decent*, is likewise *Honest*; and whatsoever is *Honest*, is *becoming*. But the difference betwixt this same *Honesty*, and *Decorum*, may be better understood, than explained: For That which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honesty* goes before.

Honesty and Decorum.

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in that part of *Honesty* now in question, but also in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent use of Reason, and Speech; the doing of every thing Considerately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other side to be Deceived, to Mistake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming, as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And so whatsoever is *Just*, is also *Graceful*: and whatsoever is *Unjust*, or *Dishonest*, is not only *base*, but likewise *misbecoming*. And the same Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For what-

A Decorum in Prudence,

In Justice,

In Fortitude,

soever is done *Generously*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*. Wherefore the *Decorum* I here speak of, *And in all* appears likewise in all other *Virtues*; and *Virtues.* does in such manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no Mystery to the finding of it out. There is in all *Virtue*, somewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *separable* from *Virtue*, by *Imagination*: As the *Gracefulness*, and *Beauty* of the *Body* cannot well be separated from *Health*: And so it is with the *Gracefulness* here in *question*. It is a *Decorum* that is in a manner so confused with *Virtue*, that it is Incorporated with it; but in the *Mind* and *Conception*, it may be distinguish'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts*. The *One* is a certain *General Decorum*, that shines in all *Virtues*; and there is *Another* that is subject to *This*, or dependent upon it, which respects every *Virtue* in *particular*. The *Former* is Commonly defined thus, *Decorum* is what is *Congruous* to the *Excellency* of *Man*, in that which distinguishes his *Nature* from *Other Living Creatures*. But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the *General*, they define to be a *quality* so *Congruous* to *Nature*, that *Moderation* and *Temperance* appear in it, with an air of good breeding.

The *Deco-*
rum of the
Poets.

XXVIII. *THIS* we may judge by that *Decorum*, which the *Poets* observe; where-
of

of there is generally much said upon other occasions. However Poets are then said to observe *strict Decorum*, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and *Condition* of the *Person*. As what could be more Improper, and Unseemly than to bring in *Æacus*, and *Minos* with these words in their Mouths,

-----*Well, let them hate me, so they do but fear :*

Or,

-----*A Father is the Childrens fittest Tomb.*

Because they are generally taken to have been just and virtuous Men. But when *Atreus* says it, what Acclamations are there, because the Expression suits with the Person! Thus the Poets judge what's proper for each according to the Person he sustains; But Nature her self, as to us, has given every man his Part, with great Excellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. Wherefore in a great variety of Characters, Poets must consider what's fit and becoming to be said, even by Persons of the most vicious Character. But since Nature has assign'd us our parts of Constancy, Moderation, Temperance, Modesty; and the same Nature teaches us not to be wholly careless, how we demean our selves toward one another; it is clear to us, both how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs

The Deco-
rum of Or-
der, Stea-
diness and
Moderati-
on.

to Honesty or Virtue in general, and also how far this extends, which is visible in every particular Virtue. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt disposition of the Parts, moves the Eye; and delights us by the graceful Correspondence, and Symmetry of all the Members; so this *Decorum*, that appears so beautiful in Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Words, and Deeds. Wherefore there should a Certain reverence be used toward men, not only of the greatest worth but all others: for 'tis a sign not only of an Arrogant but a Dissolute Man, not to care what the World says of him. But there's a difference betwixt *Justice*, and *Modesty*, in the Regards we owe to men. It belongs to *Justice* not to *wrong* men; and to *Modesty*, not to *offend* them: Wherein the Power, and Virtue of *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call *Decorum*.

A Deco-
rum in a
Conformi-
ty to Na-
ture.

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is chiefly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature; A Guide That will never mislead us; but conduct those that follow her, to a natural acuteness, and perspicacity of Understanding; to the best means of Uniting men in Society; to That which is strong, and manly. But the mighty Power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon: For not only
the

the Motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be approved, but the Motions of the Mind likewise much more.

XXIX. THE Natural Power of the *Mind*, is *Two fold*: *One part* is plac'd in the *Appetite*; the *Greeks* call it *ὀρεξις*: that carries a man hither and thither: The *Other*, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to do, and what to *avoid*, by which means, *Reason* is the Governing part, and *Appetite* the part in Subjection. In all Cases, we should have a care of Rashness and *Negligence*; and do nothing but what we can give a fair Account of. This is in some degree, the Image and Description of Duty; But then we must so order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reason*, so as neither *rashly* to outrun it, nor out of *Heaviness*, and *Sloth* to desert it; but keep it self *quiet*, and *calm*, and free from all *Perturbation*. This will make us Eminent for *Constancy* and *Moderation*: For *Those Appetites* that wander astray too far, and when they do as it were offer to break out either in *coveting* or *avoiding*, are not sufficiently restrained by *Reason*, will without question pass all *Bounds* and *Measure*; for they relinquish and cast off their *Allegiance* to *Reason*, which they ought to obey by the *Law of Nature*: and their Ill Effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but also visibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Transports of *Wrath*, *Lust*, *Fear*, *Pleasure*; What an Alteration is there of Countenance,

From the
Appetite
arise Per-
turbations.

Passion
disorders
both Mind,
and Body.

tenance, Voice, Motion, Gesture? Now to return, to give an *idea* of this as it is a *Duty*, we may from hence Collect, how necessary it is to moderate, and govern our Passions; and so to keep our selves upon a Guard, that we do nothing heedlessly, as it were by Chance, without Care, or Consideration. For man was never so made by Nature, as if he were intended only for Sport and Levity, but rather for the severity of grave, and weighty Studies. Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of Divertisement and Pleasantry; provided that we use them only as Sleep, and such other ways of Repose; after the discharge of our Serious and more Important Duties. And our very Liberties in Discourse must not be Profuse neither, nor Immodest; but only Genteel, and Facetious: For as we do not allow our Children all sorts of Games; but only such sports as hold some proportion with honest Actions; So in *Rail- lery* it self, there must be a mixture of Good Manners as well as Wit.

*The Bounds
of Mirth.*

*Two Sorts
of Raille-
ry, scurril-
lous and
facetious.*

THERE are two sorts of *Raillery*, or *Jesting*; the One is *Course, Petulant, Criminal, and Foul*; the Other, *Neat, Cour- tly, Ingenious, and Facetious*: Of which kind, not only *Plautus* with us, and the Old Comedians at *Athens*, but even the Writings of Philosophers who were fol- lowers of *Socrates*, are very full. And there are a great many witty Sayings and Conceits of several Authors, as the Col-
lection

lection made by Cato the Elder, called *Apophthegms*, &c. Now 'tis an easie matter, to distinguish betwixt a Genteel and a Clownish way of *Jesting*. The *One*, if it be in *season*, only for *Recreation*, is worthy of a man of Honor. The *Other*, not fit for any man above the rank of a slave; especially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in *obscene Words*.

NAY in our very *Recreations*, we should keep within Compass; and have a Care that we do not lash out into Excesses, and pass the Limits of Modesty, in the Transports of our Pleasures. The Chase of Wild Beasts, and the Military and Manly Exercises that are Practis'd in our Field, (or *Campus Martis*) I reckon to be creditable ways of Diversion, which we need never want.

XXX. BUT it is something to the clearing any point of doubt concerning our *Duty*, to have always in our Thoughts the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above that of *Brutes*; which are only push'd on by *Violent Appetites* to *Sensual Pleasures*: Whereas the Entertainment of a man's Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation*; it is never Idle, but still employed either upon Enquiry, or Action; and charmed with a delight that arises from what we hear, or see. Nay the very man himself, that is most addicted to his Pleasures: (if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* (for such there

Honest and manly pleasures.

The Excellency of Man.

Brutal Pleasures.

there are) Though he may be overcome by his *Lusts*, he yet stands so right, as to be *asham'd* of, to *conceal*, and to *disguise* his *Love* of Those *pleasures*, even for *Modesty* sake; which shews that *Pleasures* of the *Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity* of the *Soul*; but rather *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man should be found to have any real *Regard* for *Pleasures*, let him be sure to use them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloaths*, and *Diet*, we should still keep an *Eye* rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, than to the humouring of the *Fancy*, or *Palate*; and if we shall but duly weigh, and examine the *Dignity*, and *Excellency* of *Nature*; we shall quickly find how shameful a Thing it is to dissolve in a luxurious *Softness*, and *Delicacy*: And how becoming, on the other side, to live *Frugally*, *Temperately*, *Gravely*, and *Soberly*.

Man has
Two Ca-
pacities.

EVERY man must be understood to be invested with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common* to *Mankind*, as endu'd with *Reason*, and in a preference to *Beasts*; from whence we do not only derive the *Knowledge* of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; but the very means of finding out our several *Duties*. The Other is a *Propriety* that has a respect particularly to *Individuals*. There is a great difference in *Bodies*: One man is better for a *Course*, Another for a *Scuffle*; and so in *Beauties*; One *Beauty* is *Graceful*, and *Majestical*; Another *Charming*. Now there

A great
Diversity
both in
Minds and
Bodies.

are

are at least as great or greater *Diversities*, ^{Several} and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. *L. Crassus*, ^{Humours} and *L. Philippus*, were both of them of a *Nature*, Wonderfully Witty and Entertaining; and this Quality was yet more Eminent, and more Labour'd too, in *C. Cæsar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was at the same time a strange Austerity of Humor in *M. Scaurus*, and in *M. Drusus* when he was but a Youth. *C. Lælius* was Gay, and Pleasant; his Friend *Scipio* more Ambitious, and Reserved. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a Gentle and a pleasant Companion; a Wit that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an Excellent faculty of speaking his Mind, under an agreeable Disguise, which sort of Person the *Greeks* call εἰρων, or a *Droll*. *Pythagoras*, on the other side, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themselves to great Credit, without any Gayety of Humor at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among our Own Commanders, *Q. Maximus* have the Name of Men extremely Subtle, and Secret, Silent, Dissembling; notably good at *Stratagems*, or setting Spies upon an Enemy, and disappointing their Counsels. Those that the *Greeks* have the greatest esteem of in this kind, are *Themistocles* the *Athenian*, and *Jason* the *Pheræan*. But above all, they magnifie that crafty, and politick Fetch of *Solon*: who, for the advantage of the Commonwealth, and for his Own Security, counterfeited himself

Mad.

Mad. There are others now, so far from This Artifice, that they are *Simple* and *Open*: to the degree of not enduring any thing but what's done above aboard; They will not suffer any thing that looks like Treachery. These men are the Servants of *Truth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and crouch to any man, for their own Ends; as we have seen *M. Crassus* do to *Sylla*: The *Lacedemonian Lysander* is said to have been a great Master of his Art in This kind; and yet *Callicratides*, that succeeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humor. And we find diversity as well in the *Stile*, and *Fashion* of *Speaking*, as in the *difference* of *Manners*. As you shall see men of great Authority, and Parts, that yet wont themselves to the Phrase, and Language of the Common people: As the *Two Catulus's*, Father and Son, and the like *Q. Mutius Mancius*, which I my self am a Witness of. Nay I have heard old men say, that *P. Scipio Nasica* had that way with him; but his Father on the contrary, had no affability of Speech in the World. I speak of him that by severe punishment put an end to the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the severest of Philosophers; and yet Famous and Eminent for that very Sourness. There are a world of *Other dissimilitudes*, both of *Nature*,

ture, and *Manners*, which yet are not to be discommended.

XXXI. So that every man should do well to stick to that Inclination that nature has given him in particular; provided that it be not Vicious: and by so doing, we shall more easily retain the *Decorum* which we look for in this place.

FOR we are so to behave our selves, ^{Nature is the best Mistress.} that without opposing *Common Nature*, we follow the *Dictates*, every man of his *Own Genius*; and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier, and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the bent of our own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature; or to pursue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Graceful*, that is done (as they say) against the grain, or that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short, there is nothing more *becoming*, in human life, than an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions*: which, we can never preserve when we pass to the *Affectation* of another man's *Nature*, and neglect *our Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing foreign Words into it (as some people do) lest we make our selves justly ridiculous for our pains; so should we in our *LIVES*, and *Actions*, make our selves all of a piece.

NAY,

The same
thing Good
in one, and
Ill in ano-
ther.

NAY, so sensible is This difference of Natures, that one man shall be *honour'd* for *destroying of himself*, and another *condemn'd* for it, all in the same Case : as it was with *Marcus Cato* that *kill'd himself*, and the rest that *rendred themselves up to Caesar in Africa*. This might perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they had laid violent hands upon themselves : For such an Action would have born no proportion with the softness and facility of their Ways and Manners. But for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and *Severe*, (even to a Miracle) and harden'd to it by a long habit of Constancy : a man unalterably *Firm* to his *purpose*, and *resolution* : it made for the *dignity* of his *Humour*, and *Character*, rather to support *death* it self, than come into the presence of a *Tyrant*. How many miseries did *Ulysses* suffer, in that tedious Ramble of his, when he was forced to be a slave to Women, (if a body may give *Circe* and *Calypso* that name) and was ready to shew Complaisance upon all Occasions to all sorts of people ? Nay at his own house, how patiently did he put up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meanest of his Servants, to gain his design at last ? Whereas *Ajax*, according to the report we have of him, would have born a thousand deaths, rather than those Contumelies. This Contemplation should make every man look into himself, to see what he has of his *Own*, and to make his best of *That*, without attempting to

to see how well he can act the part of *Ano-* Let every
ther. For that which every man has *Pecu-* man Act
liar to himself, is the thing which best be- his own
comes him. Wherefore every man should Part.
 take a true estimate of what he is, and im-
 partially examine his Abilities, and Defects;
 What he can do, and what he cannot:
 That we may be, at least, as wise in our
Lives, as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage*:
 who make *choice*, not so much of the *Best*
Parts, or *Plays*, as of the *fittest* for their
disposition. They that have the strongest
 Voice, chuse the *Epigoni*, or *Medus*: They
 that are best for Action prefer *Menalippe*,
 or *Clytemnestra*. *Rupilius* (whom I re-
 member) always acted *Antiope*: and *Æso-*
pus very seldom play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Player*
 now take more care of himself upon the
Stage, than a *Wise Man* in his *Life*? Let
 every man see in the *first* place, *which way*
 his Talent Lies; and in the *next*, let him
 endeavour to *improve* it. But if we should
 be forc'd at any time, by necessity, to play
 a Part that we were never made for: let
 it be our Care, Study, and Thought, so to
 behave our selves, that at least we may not
 lose our Credit, where we cannot get any.
 So that the best of this Case will be to a-
 void great Miscarriages, without pretending
 to *excel*, by the forcing of our *Nature*.

XXXII. Now to those *two parts* alrea-
 dy spoken of, that is to say, of *Common*
Nature, and *particular Inclination*, there is
 a *Third*, that is cast upon us either by Time
 or

Let every
man chuse
his own
Study.

or Chance; and also a *Fourth*, which we assume according to our own Judgment. For to be Kings, or Generals, or Noblemen, to have Honors, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. But as to our way of living or profession, it is more at our own Choice, what part we will Sustain. Wherefore One man takes to *Philosophy*, another to the *Civil Law*, a Third to *Eloquence*: and so even in practising the several Virtues, some men affect an Excellency rather in *One* than in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous in any particular way; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading in Their Steps: as *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law*: And *Scipio Africanus* emulated his Father in Feats of *Arms*. Some again are not content with the honor they derive from their Fore-fathers, unless they add somewhat to it of their Own. As the same *Africanus* augmented the honor of his *Military Knowledge* by the accession of *Eloquence*. And so did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who being a *Captain* not inferior to his *Father*, made himself yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and polite Parts. But it happens sometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himself rather to some Course, or design of his own; which is a thing often found in men of aspiring minds, that are descended

descended from obscure Parents. All these Circumstances must be taken into Consideration, in our Enquiries about *This Decorum*, (or what is becoming.)

THE First point to be settled is This, what it is that we design either to *Be*, or to *Do*; and what course of Life to take to. Some Course of Life must be pitched upon. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to resolve, and pitch upon a way of living, which we usually do according to our liking; at which time, we are least able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in some certain purpose of Life, before we are able to distinguish betwixt a Better and a Worse. For whereas (according to the Report of *Prodicus*, related by *Xenophon*) so soon as ever *Hercules* came out of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chuse what course of Life he will Steer) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One* of *Virtue*, and the *Other* of *Pleasure*, sat a long time considering with himself, which of the *Two ways* he should take; this might possibly be the case with *Hercules*, that was the Son of *Jupiter*; but not with us, I fear, that commonly follow those men still that we like best; and take up an affection for their ways, and Studies. Much the greatest part of us being trained up under the Institution of our Parents, do insensibly contract an Affection for their Methods and Customs. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular

Popular practice; esteeming That still to be the Best, that pleases the *most*. And yet some there are, that lead the Course of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by a certain Felicity of Providence; or by the goodness of their own natural inclination; or by some particular advantage of Institution from their Parents.

XXXIII. BUT it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of Eminent Wit, and great Learning; or to find Either of them, with so much Time for deliberation, as is needful for the Election of a profitable Course of Life: In which deliberation, a regard must be had to That which is most proper, and Natural to every particular: For (as is already said) since in whatever we do, we must enquire into every man's particular *Genius*, before we can say what becomes him; so we must be more Careful yet, in the Establishment of our whole Lives, to see that we maintain an Equality throughout; and that we never differ from our selves, or falter in any instance of our Duty.

*Nature
and For-
tune to be
consulted
what
course of
Life to fix
upon.*

BUT since *Nature* has the *greatest* power in *This Case*; and *Fortune*, the *next*; we must consult them *Both*; what Course of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the *first* place: For she is much firmer, and more constant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*. Whosoever therefore shall Conform in the Ordering of his Life, to the
Incli-

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Inclinations of an uncorrupted Nature, must keep constantly to that Tenor, which is the *Decorum* of *Life*; unless he find himself mistaken in his Choice. And in that Case (for it is a Case to be put) there must be a Change admitted of Purposes and Manners. And that change will be more easily and commodiously wrought, under the favour of Times and Occasions: But where the Season is not favorable, it must be Introduced by Little and Little; as Wise men say of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendships; *'tis better to unstitch than to tear them all to pieces on a sudden.* But when we have once alter'd our Course, we must be infinitely Careful to make it appear, that we have done it upon good and weighty Reasons. Now whereas I have (in what is aforesaid) propounded the Imitation of our Ancestors; let this be one Exception, not to imitate them in their Vices; and this another, not to offer at it in such instances where our Nature and Constitution will not bear it: As the Son of *Africanus the Elder*, (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Aemilius*) could not possibly (by reason of the Craziness of his body) be so like his Father, as the Other was like His. Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to *Harangue* the People in *Publick Assemblies*, or to lead *Armies*, there are some Duties yet in his Power, which he is obliged to perform: as the *Offices* of *Justice*, *Faith*, *Liberality*, *Modesty*, *Temperance*,
which

Let every
man do all
the Good
he can.

which Benefits will fairly supply the want of the Other. The best of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation of Great, and Virtuous Actions* of our *Ancestors*; and the Son that shames the Renown of his Father, is to be lookt upon both as scandalous and impious.

XXXIV. Now in regard that there are *several Duties* properly belonging to *several Ages*; and many things that becoming a *Young man*, would be ridiculous in an *Old*; we shall say something also under That distinction.

The Duty
of a Young
man.

Youth
should be
Temperate
and Industrious.

IT is the duty of a *Young man* to Reverence his *Elders*, and to make his Choice of the Best, and most approved among them, for his *Directors* and *Governors*: For the Ignorance, and Folly of Youth should be ordered, and instructed, by the *prudence* and *experience* of the *Aged*. But above all things, Youth should be restrained from *Loose* and *Wanton pleasures*; and trained up rather in *Laborious Exercises*, and in the *Fatigues*, and *Toyles*, both of *Body*, and *Mind*: For it makes men *Vigorous*, and *Industrious*, as well in *War*, as in *Peace*. And even in the Intervals of Liberty, and Diversion, young Men should have a Care of *Intemperance*: and not to pass the Bounds of *Modesty*; which would be the more Easily attained, if their *Seniors* would please to have an Eye upon them on such occasions.

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WHEN we come to be in *Years*, the labours of the Body must be abated, and we should encrease those of the Mind: but striving still, by all means to be serviceable to our Friends, and to our Juniors, by our Advice, and Wisdom: but principally to the Commonwealth. But above all things, have a Care of a Drowsie, a Languishing and a Lasie Old Age; and so likewise of a Luxurious: which, as it is reproachful and dishonourable in every Age, so in this it is most of all. But if the Intemperance of *Lust* be added to it, the Mischief is Double. *First*, the *Infamy* which it reflects upon *Age it self*: and *Then*, the *Ill Example*, in Authorizing young men to be more Shameless and Wicked.

The Business of Age is Wisdom,

Beware of Sloth and Luxury,

It would not be impertinent, here to speak something of the Duties of *Magistrates, private Persons, Citizens and Strangers*. The *Magistrates* part, is to consider himself as the *Representative* of the *City*: and to uphold the *Honor*, and *Dignity* of it: to observe the *Laws*, and *Customs*, to do *Justice*, and to remember, that all these things are committed to his *Charge*. It is the part of a *Private man*, to live with his fellow *Citizens*, under one *Common Bond* of *Legal Duty*; neither falling so Low, as to make himself despicable, nor too much exalting himself: And never to entertain any Thought, but to the *Glory* and *Peace* of the *Commonwealth*. This is the man that we esteem, and pronounce to be a worthy

The Duty of a Magistrate,

A Private man,

E

Citizen.

and a
Stranger.

Citizen. As to the Duty of a *Stranger* or *Sojourner*: let him mind his own business, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himself within his Compass. By these means we shall generally be able to understand our *Duty*, when it shall come to be diligently examin'd, what is most *becoming* us, under the several Circumstances of *Persons*, *Times*, and *Ages*: But there is nothing so *Becoming*, as to behave our selves consistently, and steadily, in all our Actions, and Counsels.

The Deco-
rum of the
Body.

XXXV. BUT this *Decorum* shews it self in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and Postures, of the Body; and consists principally in three Things, Beauty, Order, and a kind of Ornamental Air, suitable to every thing we do. 'Tis a hard matter to express these exactly, but it shall suffice, that they may be easily understood. In the Observance of These three Points, we render our selves Acceptable in our Conversation with all People. Concerning these therefore we must say something.

The Seeds
of Modesty
are in Na-
ture.

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care in the forming of Man's Body, exposing only Those parts to sight, that are Beautiful, Comely and Agreeable to the Eye: and keeping Those parts conceal'd, and cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View: and serve us only for Unclean, and Common Necessities. There is no question, but the natural
Modesty

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Modesty of Men conforms it self, in this particular, to the exquisite fabrique of the Body: For whatsoever Nature has conceal'd, all men in their right Wits do naturally keep out of sight, and are as private as possible, in compliance with their Necessities: And for Those parts of the Body which serve the necessary uses of Nature; we neither call the part, nor the use of it, by the proper name: and that which may be honestly done, (if secretly) we cannot so much as honestly name. Insomuch, that those things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor so much as mention'd, without Obscenity.

Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Cyniques*, or to such of the *Stoiques* as are almost *Cyniques*, who blame and laugh at us, for reckoning those things to be *foul*, in *Words*, which are *not so*, in *Deed*: And yet Those things which we all agree to be *foul*, we can call by *Their own names*. As *Theft*, *Consenage*, *Adultery*, are all *dishonest* in the *Deed*: and yet we use the *Words* without *Scruple*. To beget Children is an honest Action: but it wears a *Course* name. And we find a great deal more to this purpose, against Modesty, in their Disputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatsoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modest man.

Nay, in our very Postures, and Gestures: as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying: in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there must a regard be

had

The Obscene humor of the Cyniques.
A Decency in Gestures and Postures.

The Mode-
sty of the
Romans.

had still to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two Things* we should be-
ware of. The *One*, not to do any thing
that is too soft, *Nice* and *Effeminate*: The
Other, to *avoid* things that look *Harsh*,
Rough, and *Clownish*. For why should any
one think these things proper for an *Orator*,
or a *Comedian*, but that *we* are under no
Rule? The Discipline of the *Theatre* has a
long time had such a regard to *Modesty*;
that no man enters upon the Stage, with-
out *Drawers*, lest some part of the Body
coming to be discover'd by Chance that
ought to be Conceal'd, should make an in-
decent appearance. The *Roman Customs*
will not allow Sons, when they are Men
grown, so much as to Bath with their Fa-
thers: Or Sons in Law, with their Wives
Parent. These points of *Virtuous Modesty*
we should observe, since Nature is both our
Mistress and our Guide.

Of Grace-
fulness
and Neat-
ness.

XXXVI. Now whereas there are two
Kinds of Beauty, under one of which is
rank'd an *exquisite Neatness*, under the other
a *Gracefulness* or *Dignity of Mien*; the for-
mer we should leave to the *Ladies*, the lat-
ter is proper for *Men*: who should for that
reason forbear to set off their Persons with
any thing soft or effeminate, and should
avoid the like fault in their very *Motion*, or
Gesture. How are we disgusted many times,
at the odd motions of *Fencing* or *Dancing*
Masters: and offended at the impertinent
and affected Gestures of some Stage-play-
ers?

Affectati-
on is Odi-
ous.

ers? And yet we Commend that which is Natural, and Simple, both in the One, and in the Other. The dignity of the Countenance is Maintain'd by a good Colour: and that Colour by the Exercise of the Body: and to all This we should keep our selves *Neat* and *Cleanly*: not to the degree of a *tedious Niceness*, but only so, 'as not to incur the censure of *Rudeness*, *Slovenry*, and *Neglect* of our Company. And the same Rule we should observe in our *Garments*: In which particular, as well as in other things, a *mediocrity* does best. In our walk- A Meaning we must neither march so Slow, as if we were officiating at a solemn Procession: nor yet make such post-hast, as to run our selves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into disorder: which is a sign of a Light, and Unsteady humor. But we must take more pains, yet, to keep the Mind in a temper of Conformity to Nature: which we may easily compass, if we can but preserve our selves from Falling into Transports, and dejections of Mind, and diligently attend to a Conservation of the Decorum here prescribed. The Motions of the Mind are Two-fold. Some are of Thought, and others of Appetite. Those of Thought are chiefly employ'd in the finding out of the Truth. Those of Appetite push a man forward to the doing of something. We must be careful therefore, First, to apply our Thoughts to That which is most worthy

of them : and, *Secondly*, to keep the *Appetite* in subjection to *Reason*.

Of Rhetorick, and Ordinary Discourse.

XXXVII. As to the matter of *Speech*, the Power of it is *Great*; and it is also *Two-fold*. The *One* is a *Speech of Contention*; the *Other*, of *Common discourse*. The *Former* is for the *Barr*, for *Publick Assemblies*, and for the *Senate*; the *Other*, is for *Private Sets of Company*, *casual disputes*, *Meetings of Friends and Acquaintance*, and likewise for *Table Conversation*. The *Masters of Rhetorick* have given *Precepts* for the *Former*, but we have none for the *Latter*; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. For if men would but apply themselves to the *Study* of it, they would never want *Masters* to *Teach* it. But there's no body that concerns himself to learn this. And yet we are all of us *Mad upon Rhetorick*, altho', for what concerns *words*, and *conceits*, the same *Rules* would serve *Both*. It is by the help of the *Voice*, that we *discourse*; and the *Two great advantages* of it, are to be *Clear*, and *Sweet*; We must stand indebted to *Nature* for them *Both*. And yet *Exercise*, and *Practice*, will help us in the *One*: and the *Imitation* of *close and smooth Speakers*, may be of use to us in the *Other*. What was it but This, that gave the *Catuli* so fair a *Reputation*, both for *Judgment* and *great Literature*? They were *Learned men*, 'tis true, and so were *Others*; but yet they were look'd upon as the *great Masters of the Latin Tongue*: They had a wonderful
Sweet-

The Voice should be Clear and Sweet.

Instances of Excellent Speakers.

Sweetness of Tone, and their Pronunciation neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable. The Voice, without any straining, neither too faint, nor too shrill. *L. Crassus*, 'tis true, was a more flowing Speaker, and no less ingenious: but for well-speaking, the *Catuli* were no less esteem'd. Now for sharpness, and pleasure of Wit, *Cæsar*, the Brother of the *Elder Catulus*, went beyond them all. Inſomuch that in pleading of Causes, his ordinary Discourse surpass'd the most elaborate Strains of others. All these things, severally, must be diligently heeded, to make us understand what it is that may best become us in every thing.

THIS Familiar Discourse, wherein the Followers of *Socrates* are most worthy of Imitation, should be *Gentle*, without being too *pressing* or *positive*: and I would have it *pleasant*, and *entertaining*. Nor would I have any man take possession of a Common Right, in such sort as to Talk all himself, to the Exclusion of Others: but in Discourse, as in Other things, every man should be content to take his Turn. The First thing to be heeded, is the subject Matter of the Discourse. If serious, it must be seriously handled: If Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightness, does well enough with it. But above all things, we must be Careful in the government of our Speech, not to discover any Vice or

Of Familiar Discourse.

Cautions.

Defect in our Manners; wherein a man is most liable to betray himself, when he sets himself to talk spitefully of the Absent; and either in Jest, or in earnest, maliciously exposes them to Contumely, and Reproach.

The Subject of it.

The Ordinary matter of *Familiar discourse*, is either about *Domestick Affairs*, the *Republick*, or matter of *Studies and Learning*.

If at any time we Pass These Bounds, we must as soon as may be take up again. But this must be as occasion offers; for we are not all equally pleased with the same thing at all times: and it must be thought upon also, how far our Discourse may be Grateful to the Company: And then, as we begin it upon Reason, we must not continue it beyond Measure.

Seasonable and not Tedious.

XXXVIII. BUT as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we should keep our selves Clear from Perturbations or violent Motions of the Mind, that rebel against Reason, so should we in our Speech keep a guard upon our selves against Those Intemperate Motions; and that we do not lay open our Distempers of Anger, Appetite, Laziness, Heartlessness, or the like. We should be very Careful also in our Conversation, to possess the Company with an Opinion of the Reverence, and Good-will that we have for them. There are many Occasions wherein we cannot avoid Chiding: and we may be allow'd sometime, a more than ordinary Contention of Voice; and a sharper

Not Passionate.

Respectful.

Let Reproof be without Anger.

sharper severity of Words : but yet This is not to be done neither, as if we were Angry; but we are to proceed to this kind of Reproof, as we do to *Cutting*, and *Scari-fying*, rarely, and *unwillingly*; nor ever at all, but upon *Necessity*; and for want of some other way of Remedy, but not in Anger still upon any Terms : For it never does any thing either well or wisely : And yet it may do well enough to use a Temperate, and a mild way of Rebuke; but still accompany'd with Gravity, that the reprehension may be apply'd without Reproach : It must be also signify'd that the Only thing intended by the Reproof was the Amendment of him that suffers it. Nay, it will become us in our differences, even with our greatest Enemies, in despite of all Indignities, yet, to preserve a Gravity; to keep our selves free from Passion. For whatsoever we do in distemper, can neither be well done in it self, nor approved by those that are Witnesses to the doing it. It is a very ugly thing likewise for a man to talk much of himself: especially with *Thraso*, to brag of things that are false, and to make Sport for the Company.

*Offentati-
on is Odi-
ous.*

XXXIX. BEING now to go through all the Points of *Decency* and *Duty* (as That is my design) I shall say something what kind of House I should think fit for a Person of Honor, or a Great Man, so as to have the Model of it accommodate for use; for That's the Intent of Building it:

*Of Build-
ing and
Palaces.*

and there must yet be had a regard to the Dignity as well as Convenience of the Person that Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius* (the first Consul of that Family) that he was highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scaurus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd for the Enlargement of his Own. The former brought the Consulship first into his Family: and the latter (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and Famous person, and the House enlarg'd) brought into it, not only a Repulse, but Shame and Misery. It does well to have the Dignity of the Master yet farther adorned by the House, but not that Dignity to be fetch'd altogether from it. The House should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the House; and it is in a House, as it is in other Cases; a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to others. In the House of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted, there must great care be taken that it be large enough: but a large House, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a Former Possessor: for 'tis an Odious Thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occa-

Fit the
House to
the Master.

Occasion) *Here's the Old House, but where's the Old Master?* I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into too great Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus's Villa's* (his Country-houses :) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must be some measure (and this should be a *Mean*) observ'd in These things; and that Mean must be referr'd in all Cases, to the Use, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

IN all Undertakings there are three things to be observ'd. *First*, That we govern our Appetites by *Reason*, which is a sure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Estimate of our Enterprizes, and allow Time, and Pains, neither more nor less than the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a Measure, even in those things that are matter of Dignity, and Reputation. We cannot do better, than to observe the *Decorum* already spoken of, without moving one step beyond it. But the first point (*viz.* the governing our Appetite by Reason) is the most Excellent of the Three.

XL. WE come now to the *Order* of Things, and the *Opportunity* of Seasons. Under this Science is comprehended that which

The Decorum of Place and Time.

the

Order de-
fin'd.

the Greeks call *ΕΥΤΑΞΙΑ*, by which we understand the *Harmony of Order*: and not *That Moderation* that includes *Modus* or *Measure*. However to call this also *Moderation*, the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the skill of disposing all our Words, and Actions, in their Proper Place*. So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the same: for they define *Order* to be only the *laying together of things in their due, and fitting places*. But they tell us, that the *Place of Action* respects the *Opportunity of Time*: Now *That seasonable Time of Action*, the Greeks call *ΕΥΚΑΙΡΙΑ*, the Latines, *Occasio*. So that *This Moderation*, taken in the sense aforesaid, is *the Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action*. Which is a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are discoursing of *Self-government, Temperance, and Virtues of that quality*. Wherefore having lodg'd these matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we are now to speak of those *Virtues* that refer to *Modesty*, and the *Gaining of a Good opinion, and Esteem in the World*: of which we have been discoursing for some time.

Indecencies
in respect
of Time
and Place.

IT should be in the *Order of Life*, as in That of an *Artificial, and well govern'd Discourse*. All the *Parts* of it should be *Equal, and Correspondent* one to another.
To

To bring in things that would do well enough over a Glass of Wine, or such as are Light and Wanton, upon a serious Debate, would be a most shameful fault. It was well said of *Pericles*, to his *Colleague Sophocles*, that was joyned with him in the Command of the Army: As they were met upon a Consultation about the Execution of their Joint-commission, there happened to pass by a very fine Youth, *What a delicate Child is there?* (says *Sophocles*, in the middle of the Debate.) *Brother* (says *Pericles*) *a General's Eyes should be as Temperate as his Fingers*. But if the same thing had been spoken at a Review of a List of *Wrestlers*, nothing could have been said against it; so powerful is the Consideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a man, for instance, were going to Plead a *Cause*, or upon any other business that required more than ordinary Thought, no body would blame him for thinking by himself upon the Road, or taking a walk; but That pensive, musing humor, at a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon, to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the not distinguishing of Times. Now for things which are very gross, as for a man to fall a Singing in a Court of Justice: or to do any thing that is notoriously preposterous, or improper: These are absurdities so well understood by all people, that there needs no Precept, or Caution, in the Case. But there are certain Niceties of Conversation, which are indeed so minute, that some make slight

The Niceties of Conversation,
of

of them; and *others* do not so much as *perceive* them. And yet these are the Points that require our most diligent consideration. For as it is in Musical Instruments, let them be never so little out of Tune, a skillful Ear presently takes Check at it; so we should take care to avoid the least disconsonancy of Life: and so much the Greater care, by how much the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* is of greater *value*, and *effect*, than a *Concent* of *Sounds*.

XLI. WHEREFORE, as there is no Jarr, or Discord in Musick, so small, as to scape the animadversion of a Critical Ear; so if we were as quick and accurate in Censuring, and Detecting the Errors of Life; we might be led to the knowledge of the greatest matters, even by the smallest. From the Motion of the Eye, from a Smooth or a Contracted Brow; from Sadness, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence; nay from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud speaking, and a thousand such Common Circumstances, we might gather the understanding of Human Duties; and of what Naturally becomes us, and what the Contrary.

By Observ-
ing others
we may
Reform
our selves.

Now toward the Erecting of a true Judgment upon things in This Kind, it were not amiss for us to begin our Observations *abroad*: And then to Avoid, or Correct that in our *selves*, which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For so it is (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we
are

are much better at spying out our *Neighbours Faults*, than our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the teaching of Children to do better, by shewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to do amiss. In Cases doubtful, and hard to be resolv'd upon, it will behove us to consult men of Learning, and Experience, for direction. Because the greater part of men are generally byass'd toward the side of Common Nature. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *says*; but likewise to what he *thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them: They take advice upon what's amiss, both with Themselves and their Friends: So should we be induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the Opinion of Others. But for what concerns Customs, and Civil Institutions, there can be no place there for the prescribing, where the matter it self is a Precept. Neither let a man so much deceive himself, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the purpose, or *Aristippus*, in the saying, or doing of any thing against common Usage and received Custom, must presently authorize him to the same Licence: For This Liberty, in those Excellent men, we are to look upon as a

Great Vir-
tues are a
Privilege
to some
Mistakes.

privilege

privilege purchas'd by their great and divine Virtues. Now for the *Cynics* (those Enemies of *Shame*, and consequently of *Honesty*, and *Virtue*) there's no enduring of them. But as for those whose Lives are remarkable for virtuous and great Actions, all worthy Patriots, and such as have behaved, or do behave themselves well in the Service of their Country, we should pay them all Honor and Reverence, as we should to Magistrates and Persons in Authority. We owe a respect also to Grey hairs, and a Submission to Those that are design'd to any Administration in the Government. We must distinguish betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Person, and a Publick. But to sum up all in a word, it is our Duty to Cherish, Maintain, and Preserve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

A General
Duty.

XLII. WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided into *Liberal*, (or in Vulgar *English*, *Creditable*) and *Sordid*. There are some *Gainful Employments* that carry along with them a *General Odium*; as that of a *Tax-gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first place, I do not like; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Employments*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Mean*, and *Servile*. The very Price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Earnest-money* for *Slavery*. It is also *Course Business*,

Of Trade.
Which is
either sordid,

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ness, That of a *Retailer*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels: For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying; which is a most Unmanly submission. And so for all *Mechanicks*, they are men of Low, and Vulgar business, and we are not to expect any thing that is Clear, and Generous, from the Shop. I am likewise no friend to those Trades that Minister to Luxury; as *Fishmongers, Butchers, Cooks, Pastry-men, Fishermen*; mentioned by *Terence*: To which you may add, *Perfumers, Dancing-masters*, and the whole Mystery (or Profession) of such as keep Gaming-houses. But for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and Minister Advantage in proportion; as *Physick, Architecture*; the furnishing of *Good Instructions*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with the Condition of him that uses them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*, That way, is mean, and little better than *Pedling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be manag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be esteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, sits down (not satiated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himself, and his Possessions.

and Voluptuary;

or Commendable and Creditable.

sessions. Of all *Beneficial Industry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a Man of Honor, and Reason, than the *Culture and Improvement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Cato Major*, we shall refer you thither for your Satisfaction.

of Two
Duties,
which to
Chuse.

XLIII. HERE is enough said already upon the *several parts* of *Honesty*, and our Duties arising from thence. But it may often happen that among several *Virtues* or *things Honest*, a dispute or contest may arise upon comparison; Of two things *Honest*, which is the *Honestest* (a Point omitted by *Panætius*.) For since there is *no Honesty or Virtue*, but what issues from One of these *four Fountains*, and has a respect either to *Knowledge, Society, Courage, or Moderation*; it must necessarily be, that upon choice of our Duty these *Virtues* must come into Competition or Comparison with each other. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is Naturally more concerned in *Duties* that arise from *Society*, than in those which arise from *Knowledge*; which may be thus made out. Take a wise man, that has the World at Will, both for Fortune and Leisure; let him consider with himself, and contemplate all things whatsoever, that are worth the Knowing: He would be yet sick of his Life, for all this, if he were to spend his time wholly in Solitude, and without a Companion.

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THE Principal Virtue of all, is That which the *Greeks* call σοφία, and *We*, *Wisdom*; for their φρόνησις (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being the skill of Judging what we are to do, and what to avoid: This *Wisdom*, I say, which I call the principal Virtue, is the Knowledge of things Divine and Humane: wherein is comprehended a certain Correspondence betwixt the Gods, and Men, and a Society among Them. Now if *This* be the most Eminent Virtue, as Certainly it is, so must that likewise be the most Eminent Duty, which refers to Community. For the Speculation and Perception of things, is but lame and imperfect, if it be not follow'd with Action; which Action is best seen, in providing for the Common Benefits of Mankind: And must therefore be reduced to the Subject of Humane Society; in preference to the naked Understanding of things. And this does every Good man find to be True, upon his Own Practice, and Observation. For where's the man, that is so transported with a Thirst of Knowledge, or a desire of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he should be call'd upon the sudden, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger: Where is the Man (I say) that in the heat and rapture of his most Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even supposing him to be in his Thoughts already

*Justice
more va-
luable than
Science.*

already numbring the Stars, and taking measure of the Universe? This gives us to understand, that the Offices of *Justice*, conducing to the Common Utility of Mankind (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of so much greater importance, than these of *Study* and *Science*.

*Learned
men useful
to the Pub-
lick.*

XLIV. AND even those very men whose Life and Application has been chiefly taken up with the search of Knowledge, have yet not been wanting in their Duty to the Publick, by consulting the advantage and well-being of Sociable Nature: For they have trained up many to be better and more useful Members of their several Commonwealths; as *Lyfis* the *Pythagorean* did *Epaminondas* of *Thebes*; and *Plato* did *Dion* of *Syracuse*; and many others the like. And for the service, (if any at all) which I my self have rendred to the *Republick*, I must ascribe it to my Masters, and to my Books, that instructed, and fitted Me for my Function. For such men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives*; but in their very *Graves* too: Trasmitting their Precepts down to after-times, for the Use of Posterity. Now to shew how much Their Leisures contributed to our Business: These Eminent men have not slipt so much as any one point appertaining to the *Laws*, *Manners*, and *Discipline* of the Commonwealth.

wealth. Thus do those that are most engaged in the pursuit of Learning and Wisdom, contribute their *Skill* and *Understanding* to the well-being of Mankind. And for this Reason a Copious Eloquence, joyned with Prudence, is much more profitable, than the most refin'd subtilty of *Thought*, without an ability of *speaking*. For *Meditation* does only *Circulate* within it self; Whereas *Eloquence* takes in all those, to advantage, with whom we have any Common Society. We must not imagine that *Bees* gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their *Cells*, but it is in their Nature to *Congregate*, and then they work their *Combs*. And so it is with *Men* much more; being brought into Society by Nature, they make use of their common Power and Skill both of *Acting* and *Thinking*. Wherefore if That Virtue (of *Justice*) which provides for the Defence, and Conservation of Men in Society do not accompany the *Understanding* of Things, such Understanding or Knowledge is but *solitary*, and *Fruitless*. And what is *Courage* without the consideration of Society, and the common bond of Humanity, but a *Savage*, and *Outragious Brutality*? From hence we may infer the Excellency of (*Justice*, or) that Virtue which unites and preserves humane Society, above that which is employ'd in the pursuit of Speculative Knowledge. There are some people

*Leagues
are more
for Society
than De-
fence.*

people that, without grounds of Truth, fancy all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say They) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing some Extraordinary way for the furnishing of it; no man, of excellent parts, would ever trouble his head about Business; but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of Knowledge. But This is a mistake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude, and wish for a Companion in his very Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond question, the Duties that tend to unite men together, and to preserve them in Society, are more to be esteem'd than those, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.


*Justice
and Tem-
perance
compar'd.*

XLV. IT may be another Question whether *This Community* which is so Consonant to Nature, be in all Cases to be preferr'd to *Modesty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are some things, partly so foul, and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Posidonius* has made a large Collection of such Cases: But so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do such things as these for the

the saving of his Country, which his Country it self would not have any man do for it? But however, this is the best on't ; that it can never be for the Interest of the *publick*, to have a wise man do any such thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of all Duties we are to prefer those that tend toward the Maintaining of Society. For a *Considerate Action presumes an Antecedent Knowledge and Prudence*. So that it is more to *Act Considerately*, than to *Think Wisely*. But let This suffice ; for the matter is made so plain, that there will be no difficulty to resolve upon *Two Duties in question*, which to *Chuse*. But then in respect of Community it self, there are several Degrees of Duties, in subordination one to another. The *First* is what we owe to the Immortal *Gods* ; the *Second*, to our *Country* ; the *Third* to our *Parents* ; and so in Order, successively, to Others. Upon a Brief Disquisition of This Matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is *honest* ; and which the *Contrary* : but when two sorts of *honest* are proposed, which is the *honestest*. This (as I have said) was slipt by *Panætius*. But let us now proceed.

The End of the First Book.

TULLY's





TULLY'S OFFICES.

BOOK II.

I. **I**N What manner Duties arise from Honesty, and from every distinct Branch of Virtue, is sufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in the Former Book. It remains now (my Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon those sorts of Duty, that have a regard to the Splendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches, Power; and a Competent provision of things Commodious for the Use of Man. The matter in question

F

was,

The Subject of this Book;

was, (as I told you) *First* what is *Profitable*, and what *not*. *Secondly*, What is more *Profitable*, *Comparatively* with that which is *Less*: Or, What's the *most Profitable* of All things, *without Comparison*. You have here the Subject of This Treatise: But before I enter upon this Discourse it self, I must give you a word or two of my Purpose and Intention.

The Introduction.

THERE are a great many I know that have been excited, by my Books, to the Love of Letters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but of Writing also: And yet Philosophy has gotten so ill a Name in the World, (verily with some good men too) that I am afraid sometimes, of hazarding my Credit with them; for bestowing so much Time, and Labour upon This Study. But truly, for my Own part, so long as the Management of Publick Affairs past through those hands, to which the Commonwealth had freely trusted it self; all my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way: But when One man came to Grasp all, and that there was no longer Any place for others to interpose their Authority, or Counsel, (those Publick-spirited men being gone too, that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my self to an Anxious, and irksom Melancholy, which would quite have destroyed me if I had not bore up against it; or, on the other, to plunge my self

self into Pleasures, below the Dignity of my Profession, as a man of Letters. Oh! that the Republick might have continu'd still in the Former state, without falling into those hands; that sought not so much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruin of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now standing, I should be doing at this instant just as I did before. First, my Business would lie more in managing publick Affairs, than in writing: and Secondly, what I should write would be the setting down my *Speeches* and *Proceedings* in those Affairs as formerly, instead of these Morals: But since the Dissolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies; There's no more Law, or Senate-Employment. Matters being brought to This Pass, (and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to sit still, and do nothing) What could I better do, than to betake my self to my Philosophy; My First Study, and the most Innocent, the Honestest Diversion of my Troubles? It was the Institution of my Youth; and I spent a great deal of Time upon't: Till I came afterward to push my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments; and then I dedicated my self wholly to the Government: But still reserving Those hours for Philosophy, which I had to spare from the Publick, and my Friends; and Those very hours were spent in Reading only; for I had no Leisure to Write.

TULLY'S *Offices*. Book II.

II. FROM the Extreme Calamity of the present Times, we have however drawn This Benefit, that we are now at Liberty to commit those things to writing which our Country-men were very little acquainted with, tho' in themselves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods!*) *What is more desirable than Wisdom? more Excellent; more useful to a man? or what more worthy of him?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philosophers*, from the very *Etymon* of the word: For *Philosophy*, by Interpretation, is only *the Love of Wisdom*. The Ancients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humane; and of their Causes*. What will any man speak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study? If he seeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the allaying of his Cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others: For it furnishes him, every day, with something or other, toward Attaining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unshaken constancy, be his Business, it is either to be compassed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing so small, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it: And shall any man be so mad then, as to think that there needs none toward the most Important Acquisition of our Lives? But if Virtue be a thing that may be learnt, where shall we look for it; if we depart from This way of finding it out?

This

*The Praise
of Philo-
sophy.*

This Question, as it falls properly under another *Topick*, so we have handled it in another place; and more accurately too; That is to say, in our Exhortations to Philosophy. My present purpose is only to set forth, that having nothing any longer to do in the Government, I made choice of This Subject for my private Entertainment. But I must expect to be here encounter'd, and that by some of the Learned too, with a charge of contradicting myself. For how does it consist, say they, both to be constantly reasoning upon other Points, and even now to be delivering *Precepts* of *Duty*, as things *Certain*; and yet at the same time, to maintain that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing*? I should be glad to be a little better understood; For I am none of those Roving, Wandering heads, that Live, and Live on; without proposing to themselves any Scope, or Design. How Miserable were That man's Mind, or rather his Life, that should be debarr'd the Use of his Reason, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being? Now for those Points which Others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain*; it pleases me better, that they should be *distinguished* by calling them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what should hinder me now from Embracing the One, and disallowing the Other? Or why may I not by keeping my self from being Arrogantly positive, avoid the imputation of

An Ob-
jection
Answer-
ed.

Rashness, a quality that holds no fellowship with Wisdom. But our Sect are wont to dispute against every thing: For (say they) without setting both sides of a Case off in their greatest Force, how shall any man know which is that we call *Probable*? But This matter (I suppose) is sufficiently clear'd, in our *Academical Questions*. Now for You, (my Son) tho' you are training up in the most Ancient, and Noble sort of Philosophy, and under the Institution of *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferior to the most Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to the Notions of our Sect, which you will not find very much differing from those of yours. But now to the Point.

The Distribution
of the
Whole
Work.

III. HAVING for method's sake, made a Distribution of our Design of treating upon *Humane Duties* into *Five Parts*; *Two*, upon the Points of *Decency*, and *Honesty*; *Two more*, with a respect to the Conveniences of *Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a *Fifth*, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, than *Another*, when *several things*, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*; We have already gone through the two branches of this Division relating to *Honesty*, which I must recommend to your particular Attention, and Study.

The Word
Profitable
is Corrupted.

The Point now in hand is That which we call *Profitable*: A word, which by the Corruption of *Time* and *Custom*, is perverted

perverted insensibly to the signification of somewhat that may be separated from *Honesty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*, that were not *Honest*, or any thing *Honest*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the most pernicious consequence imaginable to the Life of man. These Three Points (i.e. *Just*, *Honest*, and *Profitable*) being naturally so intermix'd, as to be almost the same in kind, are by Philosophers of the greatest Authority, thus distinguish'd in the Imagination with great Exactness and Integrity. Whatsoever is *Just*, that they determine to be *Profitable*: And again, whatsoever is *Honest*, the same is *Just*: From whence it follows, that whatever is *Honest*, the same is also *Profitable*. From the not understanding of this matter aright, it comes often to pass, that we have a Cunning, Artificial sort of People, in great Admiration: mistaking *Craft*, for *Wisdom*. This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following perswasion erected in the stead; that, there is no compassing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent, and Indirect Courses, but only by just Dealings, and honest Counsels.

Now the things appertaining to Conveniencies for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, and the productions of the *Earth*, and the like; or *Animated*, and endu'd with *Impulse*, and *Appetite*; And those again are divided, into *Unreasonable*, and *Reasonable*. Of the former

Profitable and Honest are near upon the same.

Craft mistaken for Wisdom.

Things Inanimate.

Animate.

Unreasonable.

mer kind, we may reckon *Horses, Oxen,* and other sorts of *Cattle; Bees, &c.* whose Labour contributes in some measure, to the Use and Benefit of Human Life. And then for *Reasonable*, we may account the *Gods and Men*. By Piety and Holiness, we make the Gods propitious to us. But in the next place to the Gods, it is in the Power of Men to render themselves most Beneficial to one another. And those things which may be hurtful, or Injurious to us, do fall likewise under the same Division. But in This Case the Gods are excepted; as presuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greatest mischief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we spake of, are most of them, the Effects of Humane Industry and Labour. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art, to the very procuring of them; and then there must be Humane Application to the *Using* of them: For neither Physick, Navigation, Tillage, the Reaping and Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conservation of them, could be effected without the labour of *Man*. There would be no Exporting what we have to spare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How should we fetch up Stones out of the Quarries for our necessary use: or Iron, Brass, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labour, and the Hands of men?

Reasonable.

One man is the greatest Benefit or Mischief to another.

The Necessity of Mutual Help and Society.

IV. WHENCE

IV. WHENCE came our Houses, at first; to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold? or How should we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruins, either by Tempest, Earthquakes, or even by Age it self: If the Obligations and Necessities, of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another? Our *Aqueducts*, our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbors, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Industry? From these Instances, and a thousand more, it appears undeniably that the very advantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally lost to us; but for That *Human Labour* and Endeavour that gives us Profit of them: and to which we are likewise indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beasts themselves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man also, to apply each particular Beast to its proper Use for the Service of Mankind; nor can we at this day either Feed, Tame, or Preserve what we have occasion for, or make our Best of their Service, without the Assistance of Men. Is it not by the help of Men, that we destroy those Creatures that are hurtful to us; and take others, that we may be the better for? What should I speak of those Innumerable Arts, without which we are little better than *Dead* while we

live? What *Cure* for the *Sick*? What delight for the *Sound*? What *Food*, or *Clothing*, without the help of *Arts*, and *Trades*, to supply us? This is it that furnishes, and Sweetens Humane Life: and in our manner of Feeding, and Covering, raises us above the Condition of Beasts. How should *Cities* have been either *built*, or *peopled* without *Correspondence*, and *Commerce*? And hence come *Laws*, and *Customs*, the *Equal*, and *Universal Bounds* of *Common Right*, the *Order* and *Regulation* of our Lives. And these things produce *Gentleness of Manners*, and *Modesty*; and from hence we are supported in a State of Security, and furnished in all our Wants, by the Intercourse of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchange of Good Offices, and Conveniences.

V. A great deal of this might have been spar'd; For it is clear to every man, That which *Panatus* has so much enlarg'd upon; Which is, that never any Prince or General, either in War, or in Peace, achiev'd any Great, and Profitable Exploit, without the Concurrence of Humane Aid. He makes his Instance, in *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, *Cyrus*, *Agessilaus*, *Alexander*; who could never have done those mighty things (he says) without the help of Men. But there was no necessity of Witnesses in so evident a matter. Now as the Advantages are very Great, which we receive by Communication, and Agreement of Men; So
there

there is no Mischief so detestable, which one man does not bring upon another. *Dicæarchus*, a Famous, and an Eloquent *Peripatetique*, has written an express Tract of the Destruction of Men. He summs up all the Fatalities of Mankind; as *Inundations*, *Plagues*, *Desolations*; the sudden *Inursions* of *Wild Beasts*, which, according to his Relation, have sometimes devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he says) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought one upon another. Now since it is without dispute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our selves; it must be the Bus'ness, as it is the Property of Virtue, so to mould and fashion mens minds; as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward its proper purpose. Now for those Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind soever, in the use and ordering of Beasts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather than of the *Mind*. But the Inclinations and Endeavours of Men readily to concur in the Improvement of our Fortunes, are chiefly excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Persons. For almost all Virtue moves upon *These Three Points*: First, the *Accurate Perception*, of every thing in its *Naked Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correspondence of Circumstances, and the Consequences of things, with the Rise and Causes.

*The great
Mischiefs
are from
one man to
another.*

*Virtue
consists
chiefly
in three
things.*

Causes of them. *Secondly*, the Moderating of our *Passions*, and *Appetites* (which the *Greeks* call *πάθος* and *ὀρεξις*) and subjecting them to the Government of Reason. The *Third*, is, the Skill of managing those with whom we *Converse* with so much *Courtesie*, and *Discretion*, as to gain their kindness and assistance, toward the furnishing of us with all things that our Nature requires, in sufficiency and plenty; and by their means also Defending and Protecting us from Violence, revenging our selves upon those that have attempted mischief upon us, by inflicting such punishments only as may stand with Equity and Humanity.

VI. Now by what Means we may arrive at this faculty both of making Men Friends to our Interest, and keeping them so, we shall speak presently; only we shall first mention one thing by the way.

The Power of Fortune.

WE are all of us sensible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Prosperity*, and *Adversity*: When she gives us a Fair Gale, our Course is smooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our desired Port. But when the Wind blows strong against us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thousand hazards.

Unhappy Casualties.

Now there are some Casualties, less frequent than Others: which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. First, from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempests*, *Shipwracks*, *Ruins*, *Conflagrations*; from *Beasts*, as *Strokes*, *Bitings*, *Trampling*

pling under foot, &c. These are *Accidents*, as I said, that fall not out *often*. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no less than Three lately :) the Loss of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Person but the other day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*; and a World of Gallant, and Deserving Men, by *Proscriptions*, *Imprisonments*, and *forced Escapes*, sacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honors*, *Command*, *Victory*; tho' these things are All look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to pass, without the Interposition of *Mens Assistance* and *Industry*. Now since thus it is, let us consider by what fair Means we may make such Interests, and Friendships among Men, as may turn to our Advantage. If you shall think the Discourse over-long; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wish there had been more on't.

WHAT good Office soever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, or Credit, he does it, either upon the Account of *Good Will*, as having some ground for *Personal Affection*; or out of *Respect*, as wishing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or *else*, upon the score of *Trust*, and *Confidence* in him; as one that is able to take good care of us: Or *otherwise*, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*: Or in hope of something from him: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular Pretenders,

*The
Grounds
of Honour
and Esteem
in the
World.*

tenders, to promise their *Donatives*.) Or
Lastly; Many Men are mov'd by the bare
Mercenary Obligations of *Money*, and *Reward*: The
Natures, *fouleſt*, and the *baſeſt* of all *Conſiderations*,
 both to Him that *entertains* the Address,
 and to the Other, that *makes* it. For Mat-
 ters are at an Ill paſs, when that which
 ſhould be obtain'd by *Virtue*, is attempted
 by *Money*. But ſince there is, many times,
 a *Neceſſity* of *That Proviſion*, we will give
 ſome Directions for the *Uſing* of it. Only
 ſomething muſt be ſaid in the *Fiſt* place,
 of *Thoſe Things* that have a nearer *Affinity*
 with *Virtue*. There are ſeveral *Reaſons*
 for which One Man puts himſelf under the
Power, and *Government* of *Another*; Ei-
 ther *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency* of *En-*
dowments, *Hope* of *Profit*; *Fear* of being
forc'd to't: Or Men are Inveigled by *Libe-*
ral Promiſes; or in fine, by *Corruption*, and
Reward; which we find to be a common
 caſe in our *Republick*.

Love is VII. THERE is nothing that *ſecures*
the beſt Se- *Power*, and *Greatneſs*, like *Love*: Nothing
curity of that *endangers* it, like *Fear*. Wherefore
Power. *Ennius* ſays very well, *He that is Fear'd,*
is Hated; and *they that hate a Man, wiſh*
Hatred is *him Dead*. But when it comes once to a
the certain *General Hatred*, there is no force that is
effect of *able to encounter it*: As we have found by
Fear. *late*, and dear *Experience*, even if the thing
 had been unknown to us before. And it
 is not only in the *Violent Death* of that
Tyrant, Caſar, (whom this *Oppreſſed City*
 was

Book II. TULLY's Offices.

III

was forc'd to bear, and whose Tyranny it even still submits to after his Death) that we may learn how pernicious a thing it is to be hated, but we may read it also in the common fate of other Oppressors ; scarce any of them coming to a Natural End. *Fear* is a *False*, and *short-liv'd Security* ; but *Love*, on the contrary, and *Benevolence*, are Firm, even to the *Death*. In the Case of a *Conquer'd People*, if nothing else will keep them in Order, suppose the same Rigor, and Authority necessary to be exercised, that a *Master* uses over his *Servants* : Yet for any Man to pursue the same course in a *Free City*, of making himself *Fear'd*, were a direct Madness. For let the Laws be never so much Oppress'd, by any man's Exorbitant Power, and the common liberty terrify'd into silence, yet they seldom fail one time or other, to exert themselves, either by some Act declaring Mens secret Opinion, or by private Votes at an Election of Magistrates, or the like. And Liberty that has been under restraint for a time, will be more keen in its Resentments than if it had never been interrupted. Let us therefore imbrace that which most conduces, not only to our *Security*, but also to *Wealth*, and *Power* ; That is, not to over-awe Men, but to endear them, for this is the ready way to the attaining of our Desires. either in Publick Affairs, or in Private. For who-soever would be *Fear'd*, must necessarily be afraid himself of all that are afraid of him.

*The Con-
dition and
Fate of
Tyrants.*

him. What shall we think of the condition of the *First Dionysius*, under the horror and the torture of his Fears? that singed his Beard with a hot Coal, because he would not venture his Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander the Pheræan*; that durst not trust himself with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded *Thracian* (as the Story goes) with his drawn Sword, for his Conductor; and his Guards sent before him to search all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and Linnen, for conceal'd Ponyards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durst venture himself only from his Table, into his Bed-chamber? O miserable wretch, that could put more confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his own *Wife*! But his Fears fell upon him, for she kill'd him with her own Hand, upon the jealousy of a private *Amour*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that can long maintain it self against a pressing and an Universal Fear. And this we may see in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant celebrated for his Cruelty; who was cut off, not like the *Pheræan Alexander*, by secret *Treachery*; nor yet like *Our Caesar*, by a particular band of *Conspirators*: But was put to Death, by the general Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrrhus*? Were not the *Lacedæmonians*, for their Iniquity,

*The End
of Phalaris.*

quity, and Mis-government, almost totally deserted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battel of *Leuctra*? Where they stood looking on, as Idle Spectators, till the *Lacedæmonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces.

VIII. I had rather make use of Foreign Instances, than Domestick, upon This Subject: But this however let me say, so long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleness*, more than of *Violence*: so long as they fought only for their *Friends*, or for *Empire*; the Issue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worst, no manner of Unnecessary Rigor. The Senate of *Rome* was in those Days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppressed Kings, People and Nations: And the Magistrates and Captains of Those Times, had no Other Ambition, no Other Pique of Glory in prospect, than to defend their Provinces, and to support their Associates with Truth and Equity: so that this might more truly be called the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This Custom, and Discipline began sometime since by little and little to decline; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct: And in Truth, after such Barbarities exercised upon the *Citizens Themselves*, nothing could any longer seem cruel or unreasonable towards their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cause attended with a most Impious, and Shameful *Victory*: When the Goods of so many Honest, and Wealthy Persons, and undoubted Citizens of *Rome*, were

Rome was formerly the Sanctuary of the Oppressed.

The Mis-
eries that
beset
Rome for
Cruelty
and Inju-
stice.

were expos'd to Sale in the Market-place; and to heighten the Affront, under the very Title of *Sylla's Booty*. There was another that came after him; whose Cause itself was bad, and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction*; and after infinite Vexations, and Ruins wrought abroad, we liv'd to see the Image of the City *Marseilles* born in Triumph, as an instance of our ruin'd Government: *Marseilles*, I say, without the assistance of which, our former Generals have never brought a Triumph from beyond the *Alps*. I might reckon up Histories without end, of our perfidious dealings with our *Allies*: but This One shall suffice; being the basest perhaps that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us is Just: For the Sufference of *many Criminals* made way to the boundless Licence of *This One*; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And there shall never want either Disposition, or Matter for a Civil War, so long as desperate Wretches are encouraged by the past Memory and future prospect of such bloody *Auctions* as *Pub. Sylla* managed under the Dictatorship of his near Kinsman, and renewed six and thirty Years after under another, with more Outrage, and Horror: and another that had been but a *Clerk* under the former

Prosperous
Cruelties
are dangerous
Precedents.

former *Dictatorship*, was now preferr'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treasurer*. This ought to convince us that we have no reason to expect to be free from Civil Wars, when such Rewards are in view. 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet standing, and in Being, tho' in continual dread of the utmost of Extremities : But the Government it self is absolutely sunk already. And to return to my Subject, all these Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our business rather to be Fear'd, than Belov'd. Now if such mischief could fall upon the whole *Roman* People for their *Tyranny*, and *Oppression*; how should any particular person expect to escape? Since therefore it is sufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much stronger than those of *Fear*, we shall now debate upon the Fairest *How to* means of obtaining that Affection, which *gain a fair* we so earnestly desire, with Honor and Ju- *Reputati-*stice. But we do not all of us stand in need *on in the* of it alike : so that we must accommodate *World.* the Matter to every Man's condition, and course of Life; to see whether it be necessary to procure a General Esteem, or that the kindness of some few may do the business. We may however conclude upon this, as the First, and principal point: That we contract Faithful Friendships; and make acquaintances with those that truly Love, and value us. This of being beloved by our Friends is one thing that almost equally concerns those of the highest Rank, and such

such as are in more moderate condition, and they should both endeavour to procure it. Indeed as for Honour, and Glory, and Popular Favour, all Men, it may be, do not stand equally in need of them, but yet they are good Helps (whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other advantages, and particularly towards the making of Friendships.

IX. As concerning *Friendship*, I have expressly handled it in another Book entitled *Laelius*. I am now to speak of *Glory*, though I have written two Books also upon that Subject, but yet I must touch it over again, as being a thing of great moment in the Conduct of our most Important affairs.

What is
perfect
Glory.

WE are then arrived at the highest pitch of Glory, when we have gain'd These Three Points: The *Love*, the *Trust*, and the *Admiration* of the People to that degree, that they think us *worthy of Honor*. Now to speak short, and plain; The Method is well nigh the same of procuring these three from the Multitude as from single Persons. But yet there is another manner of address also, toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favour.

Bounty
and Gen-
tleness
work
much upon
the love of
People.

To speak now to the Means of procuring Love, the first of the three Points before mentioned; Nothing works so much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberalty* or *Bounty*. And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination*; even when

when we want sufficient Means of expressing it in *Effects*. For the very *Fame* and *Opinion* of a Man's Frankness, Bounty, Justice, Faith; and briefly of all those Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetning, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderful power over the hearts of the people. For because that which we call *Honest* and *Becoming*, does of it self charm us, and by its own natural Beauty strangely moves the Mind of all Men towards it; and because it receives its Lustre from the aforesaid Virtues; therefore wherever we find those Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the person that we think possesses them. These are the most powerful attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives also, tho' of less moment.

As to the Matter of *Trust* and *Credit*; The Power of Justice and Prudence, to gain Trust. if we can get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Just*, our Business is done: For we have naturally a confidence in those that we think Wiser than our selves; In men of *Providence*, and *Forefight*, upon whom we may depend for our seasonable direction, and advice; as those that in Case of any difficulty, are able to help us out: This is accounted the True, and Profitable *Wisdom*. As to the *Trust* which we repose in *Just* and *Faithful* (that is, *Good*) Men, we do it because in them we do not entertain so much as the least suspicion of Fraud, or Injury: and therefore into such hands we think we may reasonably

*Wisdom
without
Justice, is
Craft.*

reasonably commit our Lives, our Fortunes and Posterity. But of the two Qualifications, it is Justice that creates the greater Confidence: For *Justice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wisdom*; but *Wisdom* can do nothing without *Justice*. For take away the Opinion of a man's *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtle* he is, by so much is he the more *Hateful*, and *Suspected*. *Justice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit*, he pleases; but taking them *Apart*, *Justice*, even without *Wisdom*, may do very much; but *Wisdom*, without *Justice*, is nothing Worth.

X. LET not any man wonder now at my dividing One Virtue from Another, as if it were possible for a man to be *Just*, and not *Prudent*; when the Philosophers are all agreed upon't (and my self too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philosophical Decision; and another thing to make a Discourse in Words accommodated to Vulgar acceptation: And that's my intent in this place, when I say that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wise*. For these are popular Opinions, and must be clothed in Common and popular Terms; which was also *Panæti*'s way of expressing himself. But to resume my purpose.

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory was this: So to behave our selves that people may hold us in

Admira-

Admiration, and account us worthy of all honour. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that are Great and beyond their Expectation: And so they are in particular Cases too: Where they find more Good in a man than they expected. But where they fancy any Virtues peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extol men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration; despising and vilifying such, on the other side, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Resolution, or Courage. But they cannot yet be said to *Despise* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Cozening, Mischievous Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Dislike*, yet they do by no means *Contemn*: For those only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy, Droning, Heedless Life*; and are good for nothing (as we say) either to Themselves, or Others. The Admirable Spirits are such as have the Repute of a Preeminence in Virtue; and keep themselves not only from doing Mean and Dishonourable things, but clear even of those Vices, which others cannot easily resist. For by the Charms of Pleasures, our Minds are Dissolv'd, and withdrawn from Virtue; and we are as much discomposed and shaken, on the other hand, with the Burnings, and Tortures of Pain. It is a prodigious power that the Consideration of Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, has over the Weakness

Admiration procured by extraordinary Virtue.

Great Virtue produces great Admiration.

As magnanimity,

ness of all Men. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable must That Virtue be, that takes so absolute a Possession of the Soul of man, in the Contemplation and Pursuit of things Great and Honourable. As in that elevated state of mind, to make him look down upon all the Circumstances of Fortune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*?

Justice,

Contempt of Money.

XI. THIS Bravery of mind never fails of moving great Admiration: And is especially taken for a wonderful instance of Justice (which single virtue constitutes the very Character of a good man) in the Eyes of the People; and not without reason neither. For no man can be *Just*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pain*, *Banishment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before *Equity*, the Comforts that stand opposed to these Calamities. But the highest Veneration of all is paid to him that holds out against *Money*: And wheresoever they find such a man, they look upon him as a man of approved Virtue, as much as if he had been tried in the Fire. So that by *Justice* we gain all those three points that lead to *Glory*; As *Benevolence*, by Obliging as many as we can; Trust (or Credit) for the same Reason; And *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of those things which the greater part of the World pursues with *Greediness* and *Passion*.

Now in my Opinion, there is not any Design or Condition of Life wherein one man does not stand in need of another;
and

and especially, as to the matter of *Familiar Discourse*, and *Conversation*: which a body shall hardly find to his satisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honest man*.

Wherefore the *Opinion of Justice* will stand a man in great stead, even in the strictest solitude, and retirement imaginable; and more perhaps in that State, than any other, as living, in some sort, out of Protection; and more exposed to affronts; which, under the Notion of an unjust person, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Business* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Justice*.

The Opinion of Justice gives a man Reputation.

Nay so great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and those that support themselves only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet subsist without some share of it. Infomuch that if one Thief does but Steal from another of the same Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith.

Justice is sacred even among Thieves and Pirates.

And if the Captain of a Crew of Pirates shews but any partiality in the Distribution of the Booty, he is at least deserted by his Party, if it does not also cost him his Life; For Robbers themselves are said to have Laws, and those Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompus* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bardylis*) that was celebrated for his Justice in dividing of Plunder among his Partners, and made himself a great Fortune by't; but not so great a one yet as *Viriatus* the *Lusitanian*; to whose

G

Power,

Power, and Courage some of our *Armies*, and Generals were forc'd to give way; till the *Prætor Lælius* (surnamed the *Wise*) defeated and scattered his Forces; and finally put such a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for those to do that came after him. How great now must be the force of *Justice* guarded by Laws and judiciary Proceedings under a *well-order'd Government*, when of it self alone it is able to Advance, and Establish even the Wealth and Power of Robbers, without any other support?

*Kings
chosen
for their
Virtues*

XII. *HERODOTUS* tells us that the *Medians* chose their Kings, Originally, for the Probity of their *Manners*, and in hope of enjoying the Benefits of *Common Justice*: Which I am persuaded was the End, and Practice likewise of our Predecessors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppressed by the Stronger, the people presently betook themselves to some one of more Excellent Virtue than the rest, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the distressed, and to make such Provisions, that common right might be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making of their *Laws*, they had the same Prospect, as in the choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*, and in Truth, it could be no Right, without being so qualify'd. If under the Administration of some *One man* that was *Just*, and *Good*, they attained that End,

End, they were well contented There to rest: But in Case of failing, there were Laws Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, should still pronounce one and the same sentence. This now is clear, that in all Elections, the people have still had a Care to pitch upon him for their Governor, that was most reverenc'd for his *Justice*: And provided that he were a Man of *Prudence* too, what is it that people would not believe themselves able to compass, under so Auspicious a Conduct? We are therefore obliged to cherish, and to preserve *Justice* by all manner of Means: *First*, for its Own sake, (for otherwise it were not *Justice*;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honor*, and *Glory*. But as in *Money*, there must care be taken, both in the *Getting* of it, and in the *Laying* of it out; for we shall have perpetual Occasions for it; and must provide for *Uses* of *Dignity*, as well as those of *Necessity*; So in *Glory*, regard must be had both to the acquiring and using of it. However it was a great thing said, That of *Socrates*; *The nearest and shortest way to Glory* (says he) *is for a Man so to live, as really to be what he would be Thought to be.* 'Tis a gross mistake, for any Man to think of getting a lasting Reputation in the World, by false Appearances of Things, Vain Ostentation, or study'd Forms of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted very deep, and shoots up like a Tree; whereas all Disguises pass

A notable
Saying of
Socrates.

G 2

away,

away, and shed like Flowers ; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Instances in abundance ; but for Brevity sake, I shall content my self with an Observation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus*, the Son of *Publius*, shall be famous to Posterity, so long as there shall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it self : But for his *Sons*, they were neither beloved, *Living*, nor lamented, *Dead* ; All good Men agreeing in a Detestation of their Lives ; and approving the Justice of their Executions.

XIII. HE then that would make himself truly Glorious, must be sure to discharge the *Duties* of Justice ; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But that we may make our selves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point rests in *being such Men, as we would be thought to be*) it will not be amiss to lay down some certain Precepts concerning this Matter. He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumstance to make him taken notice of, either by being the Son, for the purpose, of such or such a Father, which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Case ; or by any other Accident or good Fortune ; all Mens Eyes are presently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and Manners : He lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made Publick.

Some are
born re-
markable.

lick. But for Those, who by reason of ^{Others} their Obscure Extraction, are in their ten- ^{make them-} der age not so much known in the World, ^{selves so,} I would have them prompted Early toward great Undertakings; and bend their Endeavours directly That way; which they will do the more Vigorously, in regard that Young Men are so far from being *Envy'd*, that they are rather cherished, and Encouraged in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

THE First Lesson that I would give to ^{Let a} a *Young man* for his advance of his Credit ^{young Man} with the people; should be to addic^t him- ^{Study the} self to the Study, and Practice of *Arms*; ^{Use of} *Arms* at least where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues*. Our Predecessors, that were almost continually in War, made themselves Famous by This Profession. But it has been Your Lot, (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broils of a Divided State, where the One side was Extremely Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under *Pompey*; even in This very War, you acquitted your self as a *Man at Arms* to all purposes; an Excellent Horseman, good at darting, and of Indefatigable Industry in all Military Exercise, to the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth it self sunk here, and so did your Glory. It is not upon your particular, but a general account, that I have

taken up this Discourse: Wherefore I shall now proceed to that which remains.

*The Vir-
tues of the
Mind are
more No-
ble than
those of the
Body.* As the Operations of the *Mind*, are in all Cases much more Noble than those of the *Body*; so are the things that we compass by the Faculties of our *Reason*, and *Understanding*, of much greater value than those things that we bring to pass by *Corporal Force*. The *First* point that recommends us to a good Esteem in the World, is *Modesty*; after that, comes *Piety*, and *Reverence* to our *Parents*; and then follows a *Tenderness* of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*. It is a promising Sign, *It is a good Sign when a man loves good Company.* when a Young Man applies himself to persons of Eminence for Wisdom, Authority, and good Affection to their Country: For to be often with such Persons creates an Opinion, in mens Minds, that they themselves will one Day be such as those great Examples are whom they propose to imitate. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rutilius*, that if he liv'd, he would make a Famous *Civilian*, and an *Honest Man*. And what was This grounded upon, but the frequent Conversation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius*? But *Lucius Crassus*, I must confess, without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his own Fame, and dignifi'd himself in that Famous and Noble Accusation which he undertook (against *Carbo*.) Other young Gentlemen are usually much applauded, if they be but exercising themselves by way of prepa-

preparation for Oratory (as *Demosthenes* is said to have done) at those Years, in which *L. Crassus* made it appear, that he was excellently qualified to perform in publick Court, what it would have been no small Honour for him to have been even so much as studying at Home.

XIV. Now whereas we divide *Speech* of *Speech* into *Familiar Discourse*, and *Powerful Argument* (or *Contention of Speech*.) The Latter undoubtedly is of the greatest Efficacy towards the purchasing of *Glory*: And this is it which we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a certain *Courteousness* and *Affability* of Discourse, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet extant some Epistles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Cassander*; and of *Antigonus* to his Son *Philip*; (Three persons highly esteemed for their Wisdom :) And they do all of them prescribe the Use of *courteous* and *kind Language* to him that would Ingratiate himself with the *Multitude*; and the Caress of some Frank and Familiar Name, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow-Souldier*, or *Comrade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himself to the *Souldiery*. But then a Powerful Harangue among the *Multitude*, has often a mighty Effect upon all of them together, raising their Passions: For men greatly admire one that speaks fluently and wisely, who is by his Auditory supposed to have more Understanding and Knowledge, than

The Subject of it.

other Mortals ; and in such an Harangue, nothing so apt to do Wonders as a Concurrence of *Weighty Matter*, and *Modesty* of Delivery ; which, in a Young Man, make it still the more admirable. There are many Occasions that require *Eloquence* ; and many of our Country-men, (and young Men too) have got great Reputation by it, both at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which raises the greatest Admiration, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar* ; and the Subject of it, is of two kinds ; *Accusation*, and *Defence* : the *Latter* is the more *Laudable* of the Two ; and yet in many Cases, the *Other* is likewise to be *Approved* ; as in what I said just now of *Crassus* : And *Anthony* also, when he was a Young man, did the same thing. *Publius Sulpitius* raised the Glory of his *Eloquence* by his Charge against *C. Norbanus*, a Seditious and Worthless Citizen. But this is not a thing to be done often ; nor, in Truth, is it to be done at all, unless on the behalf of the *Government*, as those did, whom I just now mentioned ; or by way of return, as did the two *Lucullus's* : or in favour of those who are under our Protection as I my self did for the *Sicilians* : and *C. Julius* for the *Sardinians*, against *Albutius* ; and *Fufius* got a Reputation of Industry by his Accusation against *Marcus Aquilius* : so that it may be once done, but by no means often. But if any Man be oftner called to it, he must put it upon the Score of Duty to the Commonwealth, the
 Enemies

Enemies whereof a Man may often prosecute without blame. But even There too, we must keep within the Bounds of Moderation: For it is the part of an Ill-natur'd Man, (or I might rather say, scarce of a Man) to make a Trade of hunting People to Death. And beside the danger that it brings upon a Man's self, it is but a mean ^{Not credit-} Character in the World to get the Name ^{table to be} of an Accuser (or Prosecutor) as *Marcus* ^{always} *Brutus* ^{Prosecu-} chanced to do, though a Person of ^{ting.} a most noble Family, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian). And moreover, be sure to observe this Rule of Duty, as Inviolable, and Sacred; *Never to have any* ^{Have a} *thing to do in the Exposing of Innocent Blood.* ^{Care of In-} For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the ^{nocent} World can justify; for what can be so Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reason, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conservation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Destruction of Honest Men? But it does not follow yet, because we must not upon any terms persecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in some Cases, without scruple, defend the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Custom, and to Humanity, so to do. It is the part of the *Judge*, constantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not so strictly ty'd up to the *Precise Truth*, as not to make his best sometimes of that which carries some near *Resemblance* of it. I should not

take This Freedom upon This Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Panætius*, (one of the foundest of the *Stoicks*) to support me in it. The greatest Favour and Renown, is gotten by a *Defensive Eloquence*; and it is so much the Greater, if it happen to be in Assistance of one that is in danger of being oppressed and crush'd by the Power of some great Man. We have brought off many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roscius Amerinus* against the Power of *L. Sylla*, who then carried all before him. The Oration you know is still Extant.

Liberality
is Two-
fold, La-
bor and
Money.

XV. HAVING already set forth the Methods by which a Young man may advance his *Reputation* in the World; we shall now discourse the matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Twofold*; For we oblige those that stand in need of our Help, either by our *Labor*, or by our *Money*. The *Lat-ter* is the *Easier* way; especially where the *Benefactor* is Master of an *Estate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honourable* and *Splendid*, and better becoming a brave and noble Mind. For tho' the Will may be Frank enough to do a kindness in both Cases, yet the Matter of the Obligation comes in one case out of the Coffers, in the other, out of the Virtues of the Person obliging. And then by These Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry, and one Bounty is destroy'd by another; and the more we Oblige, the more we lose the Means of Obliging.

But

But he that is Beneficent and Liberal of his Pains, that is to say, of his *Industry*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to assist him toward the doing of more: and then by the Custom and Practice of doing good Offices a man does not only learn the *Way* of *Obliging* many, but gets the very *Habit* of it. It is a Notable Reprehension, that of *Philip* in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*, for endeavouring to ingratiate himself with the *Macedonians* by the Force of *Money*. *What is it, (with a Mischief) says he, that should make you expect Faith from those People whom you your self have Corrupted with Money? Is it that instead of their Prince, you would have the Macedonians expect to find you only an Under-steward and Cash-keeper?* An Office so much below the Dignity of a Monarch, was well called by that Name, and it was yet better express'd, to call such profuse giving, *Corruption*: For the very Receiver is the worse for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epistle was written only to his Son; but it may serve as a Precept to Mankind.

Now as there is no question, but that the Bounty which consists in *Labour*, and *Industry* is the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extensive*, because more men are the better for't; we meet with several Occasions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exercise also of the *Other sort of Bounty*, which

A generous Re-proof.

The Bounty of Labour is the fairest of the Two.

Give
within
compass.

which in some Cases must be put in Practice, but with Choice, and within Compass: For there are many People that squander away their whole Estates upon Inconsiderate Gratuities. Now can any thing be more senseless, than for a man to take pains to put himself out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do? And these excessive Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Overgiving, they fall to the repairing of their *Profusions* upon *Some*, by *Violence* upon *Others*: by which means, though they design by being bountiful to gain mens favour, yet the Friends they get by *Giving*, on the *One* side, will not ballance the Enemies they raise, by *taking away* on the *O-ther*. Wherefore as I would not have the Door to my Treasure so close shut, that Bounty could not open it; so neither would I have it set so wide open, to admit all Comers. There is a *Mean* to be observed, and that should be in proportion to our Ability. We have a common saying which is grown by use into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembring. For what *Mean* can be observed (or Bounds kept) when those that have been accustomed, and others encouraged by their Example, both come to want the same thing?

XVI. OF *Great Spenders* there are *Two* *Prodigality*-*sorts*; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they lash out upon Treats, Popular Doals, Prizes, Publick Sports, and Spectacles,

cles, and other Entertainments, which are no sooner past, than forgotten. The *Libe- True Libe- ral*, they employ their Expences upon Re-*reality.* deem- ing of Captives, setting a Friend out of Debt, or helping him out in the bestow- ing of a Daughter, or assisting him in some way to raise or improve his Fortune. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theo- phrastus's* head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among so many Excellent things, he should be guilty of one so very gross an absurdity. His Discourse runs much upon the Ho- nour, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Presents ; and he makes this to be the great advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furnishes a man with means to be at That Expende. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more certain, and Considerable, in the few Instances I have before-mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Aristotle's*, up- on This Subject : *We make nothing* (says he) *of our Profusions upon the Humouring of the Common People, but to hear of Ten Crowns given in a Siege for a Bottle of Water, what a wonderment is made of it,* as a thing Incredible ; till upon second Thoughts, we find the price excus'd by the Necessity ? But in the Other Extravagant Waste, and Unbounded Expende, where there is neither Honour, nor Necessity con- sulted in it, and the very pleasure passes with the Spectacle ; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but
the

*Fine
Shews are
only for
Women
and Chil-
dren.*

the weakest of the people that stand affected with this Vanity? and no sooner are they satiated, than the Delight it self is forgotten. And he well observes, that none are much taken with these Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves, that is to say, people either of servile Condition, or of servile Minds, scarce any Man of Sense, Judgment, or Consideration, approving of them? I know very well that it has been an Antient Custom in This City, even in virtuous Times to expect Shew and Splendor even from the best men in the time of their *Ædileship*. *P. Crassus* the Rich (as well in his *Fortune*, as in his *Name*) in his Office of *Ædile*, entertained the People with a *Shew* of a prodigious Expence: and *L. Crassus*, some time after him, held the same Office with great Magnificence, tho' joyned with *Q. Mucius* too, a man of singular Moderation. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appius*, with a great many more; as the two *Luculli*, *Hortensius*, *Silanus*; which were all out-done by *P. Lentulus*, in my Consulship: and *Scæurus* Emulated him. But the most Pompous, and Expensive Solemnity of all, was that of our Friend *Pompey*, in his *Second Consulship*; This is enough to shew you my opinion in all these Cases.

*In what
Case Pro-
fusion may
be allow-
ed.*

XVII. BUT yet however, we must have a Care on the other hand, not to incur a suspicion of *Avarice*. *Mamercus*, (a very Rich man) was repulsed when he stood for
Consul,

Consul, because he had refused the Charge of *Ædile*. Wherefore, if the people call for it, on the One side, and wise men be not against it, (tho' they do not desire it) on the Other; the thing ought to be done: But according to our Abilities, as it was my own Case: or otherwise, where we may reap some advantage by it, that will more than Countervail the Charge: As it turn'd much to the Reputation of *Orestes*, not long since, that he expos'd publick Dinners in the Streets, to the Multitude, under the Colour of Dedicating his Tenths to *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for supplying the people in a great Scarcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Bushel: when by so doing, he deliver'd himself from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude; and (being *Ædile* too) by a Liberality, that was neither Dishonourable nor Burthensome. But it was a most Glorious, and Memorable Action of my Friend *Milo's* hiring Gladiators for the *Publick Safety*, (which at that time depended much upon my Preservation) by means whereof, all the attempts and outrages of *Clodius* were Crusht and disappointed. So that such Expences should be grounded either upon Necessity or Profit; and even in These Cases too the best Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a Person of great Worth and Understanding) was wont to make it his Vaunt, that it never cost him one Penny of Money to the people, to obtain

But still within Bounds.

tain all the high Posts that were ever conferr'd upon him. *C. Curio* said the same thing; and without Vanity: so might we our selves too, in some degree; for the expence of my *Ædileship* was so small, that it could not signifie any thing in comparison of those high Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon me as by a Common Consent; and That in my own Year too: which is more than any of those before-named can boast of. I take that Mony to be best laid out which is employ'd upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquæducts, and other Works, for the good of the Publick. Those Bounties give more of present satisfaction, I must confess, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may say; but the other will find better acceptation with Posterity: As for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I shall speak the more Favourably of them, for *Pompey's* sake: But Learned men, I perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panætius*, for one, whom in this Discourse I have rather Follow'd, than Interpreted: and then there is *Demetrius Phaleræus*, who blames *Pericles*, the greatest Man in *Greece*, for his Extravagant Profusion upon the Portico's of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Discourse of a *Commonwealth*. Now for a Conclusion; This kind of great Expence, upon the whole matter, is stark naught; and yet by the Circumstances of Times, and the like,

like, it may be render'd Necessary; but even then there must be observ'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion* to our Ability.

XVIII. As to the Other sort of *Ex-Of Liberality* *pence* that arises from *Liberality*, we must accommodate our selves to the Occasion, and in Differing Cases use Differing Methods. One man lies under the pinch of a pressing Calamity: another man's Condition is not much amiss perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My Bounty ought, in the First place, to assist the Miserable Person; at least if he be *How to bestow it.* not such a one as deserves to be miserable. And yet I would not be so hard neither as not to help him also, that is Well already, in order to his Farther advantage: but this is a point that requires singular Care and Judgment in the Choice: For it was well said of *Ennius*, *A Benefit misplaced turns to a Mischief*. But in that which is bestow'd upon a Good and a Grateful man, we reap an Advantage (of thanks) both from the person himself, and from others: For the most acceptable thing in the World is a discreet *Liberality*, which men are therefore generally more ready to Commend, because the Goodness of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind.

We must therefore endeavour to oblige as many as we can, by such kind of good turns as will be remember'd by the Children and Posterity of the persons Obliged,
that

that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Detestation for one that forgets a kindness, and every man looks upon himself as Injur'd by such discouragement of Bounty: And the Guilty in this Case, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Besides, there is great Advantage accrues to the *Publick* from such sort of Bounty as redeeming Captives from Slavery, and enriching persons of mean Fortune; which, as *Crassus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the Work of the Senate it self. And is not this now a Nobler way of Obliging than the Casting of our money away upon *Pageantries*, and *Popular Spectacles*? This is an Expence for a man of Sense, and Honour; whereas the other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the fancies of the Common people.

Our Obligations
should be
Frank.

As we are to Oblige with Frankness in giving; so we are not to Exact our own with too much Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, selling, letting, hiring; in matters of Neighbourhood, either in City or Country, to behave our selves with Candor, and Good Nature: tho' to the prejudice sometime of our Own Right: avoiding Law-suits as much as may be, and a little more perhaps than needs; for it is not only Generous, but Profitable too, for a man in some Cases to remit somewhat of the strictness of his just due: but in so doing

ing he must have an Eye yet to his Family, or Estate, which it were Impious not to keep from running to ruine; but in such a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harshness, or Greediness in the Dispute. For the greatest Advantage of an Estate, is to be able to do others good, without wasting ones Patrimony.

It is with great Reason that *Theophrastus* Of *Hospitality* recommends *Hospitality*: for in my Opini-

on it is a very Honourable fashion for the Houses of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illustrious Guests: and it gives no small Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That sort of Beneficence in This City. But then for those that would make themselves a great interest in the World, by creditable means, it is a mighty advantage to have the Favour and Assistance of foreign Nations, procured by those whom they have entertained. *Theophrastus* writes, That *Cimon* had a way of entertaining (as Guests) those of his own *Ward* (which was the *Lacian*) even when himself was at *Athens*, for that he gave strict Order to his Servants in the Countrey that his House should be still Open, to whatever *Lacian* pass'd that way.

XIX. Now for Those Obligations that are only the Effect of our *Labour*, and *Industry*, without expence of *Money*, they are both *Publick*, and *Private*: Extending from the *Commonwealth* it self, to every *Particular* Obligations of Care and Industry.

The Reputation of the Civil Law.

cular Member of it : For what readier way can there be in the World to Eminent *Power and Interest*, than the Skill of Directing, and Advising in Difficulties of *Law* : together with the Power of Obliging so many upon That Score? Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of our Fore-fathers, the Knowledge, and Interpretation of our excellently constituted *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Esteem : and reserved (until this Confusion of Affairs) as a Matter Sacred, in the Possession of Men of Highest Authority and Wisdom. But the Glory of This Science, as well as all Honour and Distinction of Worth, is now quite Extinct : and to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a person not inferior in *Honour* to all that went before him; but in this *Knowledge* much their Superior. So that This is a study generally acceptable, beside that it puts us in the way of doing a thousand Good Turns.

Some Affinity betwixt a Civilian and an Orator. The Force of Eloquence.

AND there is some Affinity or Resemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and that of an *Orator* : Only the *Latter* has more in it of Dignity, creates more Friends, and sets a Man off with more Lustre. There is not any thing more valuable than *Eloquence*, either as it fills the Hearers with *Admiration* ; or gives *Hope* to the *Miserable* ; or creates as many *Friendships* as there are Persons that it Defends ; and our Predecessors accounted of it as the most Honourable of all the Professions of the

the Gown. Men of Eloquence therefore that are willing to take pains, and (after the Example of our Fore-fathers) undertake the Defence of many, without either Grudging or Reward, must needs be very extensive Benefactors and Patrons. I should take Occasion here, likewise to Lament the Discontinuance, if not the utter Loss and Destruction of Eloquence, if it were not for appearing over-much concerned in my own Case. And yet we cannot but take notice, since we have lost so many brave Orators, how few we have any hope of, among those that are growing up; and how much fewer yet, of those that are left, have any tolerable Abilities; tho' tis true that we have men of Boldness in Abundance. Now since we cannot be all of us either *Orators*, or *Lawyers*, (having indeed but few great men in either Faculty) yet we may by our Pains be very serviceable to a world of people, by soliciting the kindness of others on their behalf, by recommending them to the Judges or Magistrates, by taking care of their Affairs; by petitioning those that are *Lawyers* or *Orators* in their Favour. Now whosoever takes This Course, shall be sure to Oblige a great many men, and consequently the Effects of their Industry will be very extensive. One Thing there is no great need to advise, (because it is so very obvious) *viz.* that while we would oblige one man, we do not offend another. For it happens
many

*The Decay
of Orators.*

*Disoblige
no man.*

many times that we disoblige such as either in point of Duty, or in point of Expedience we ought not. If we do it needlessly 'tis a sign of Negligence; if wittingly, of Folly and Rashness. And even in the case of such as we happen to offend against our Will, or Design, we ought to excuse our selves as well as we can, by shewing them the Inevitable Necessity that forc'd us upon it, and the Desire we have, upon any favourable Occasion, to make them some favourable amends.

*In Benefits
consider the
Man, not
the For-
tune.*

XX. IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have usually a regard either to peoples *Manners* or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common saying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the Man only that we consider, and not the Estate*. This is a handsome flourish, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly bestow his Time and his Pains, upon the service of a Powerful, and a Wealthy person, than in the support and protection of the best Poor man that ever was born? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our services where we may reasonably hope for the speediest, and the most certain Return. And This proceeds from a Mistaken Estimate of the Nature of Things. For what if *That Honest Poor man* cannot requite us in Kind, He may do it yet in *Thankfulness of Heart*, and in *Just Acknowledgments*? It was well enough said, (whoever said it) *He that Has my Mony, has not Restor'd it;*
and

Book II. TULLY's Offices.

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and he that has Restor'd it, Has it no longer.
 But in the Case of Good Will, he that has
 Paid it Has it still; And he that Has it still,
 has Paid it. Now for those men that va- *The Pride*
 lue themselves upon their Titles, or Pos- *and Vanity*
 sessions, and have the World at Will; they *of Great*
 are so far from accounting themselves un- *Men.*
 der any Obligation for a Benefit Received,
 that they look upon the ~~very~~ acceptance of
 it, (let it be never so great) as an Obliga-
 tion laid upon the other side. Nay they
 will not stick to be Suspicious, and Jealous
 of it, as a Prologue to some Petition, or
 farther Design. But to tell them, *that ever*
they stood in need of, or were Beholden to
any man, is to strike them to the very Heart.
 Whereas the *Poor man*, that takes all
 Friendly Offices to himself, without any
 respect to his Condition; *This Poor man* *The Poor*
 (I say) makes it his Business, not only to *man's*
 express his Gratitude to those that have al- *Gratitude.*
 ready obliged him, but to ingratiate himself
 likewise to those which he hopes hereafter
 may be kind to him; as having Occasion
 for many Friends. And if it be his Good
 Hap to render his Patron a profitable ser-
 vice, he modestly makes the Value of it to
 be Less than it is, rather than Greater. And
 it is farther to be Observed, that upon the
 Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledg-
 ment terminates either in Himself alone,
 or, at the Utmost, in the Effect it may
 have upon his Children, and Family. But
 upon defending of a poor Creature, that is
 yet

A Wise
Saying of
Themis-
tocles.

yet Virtuous, and Modest, a man is taken to be a sure Protector, by all the poor honest men in Nature; which is no Inconsiderable party out of the Body of the Common people. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the *Good*, than the *Fortunate*. We should do our best however to leave no sort of men unsatisfied; and if This point should come in question, let *Themistocles* decide the Controversie. It was put to him *Whether a man should rather bestow his Daughter upon a Poor man that were Honest, or upon a man that had More Wealth, but Less Integrity.* And his Answer was This; *I had rather bestow her upon a Man that wants Mony, than upon Mony that wants a Man.* But our Minds and Manners are now-a-days corrupted and depraved with the Admiration of Mens riches: and yet, as to their great abundance, what share can the generality of us have in it? It may be of some use perhaps to him that has it; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Cases* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it serves only to supply a man with more Conveniencies, but does not make him one jot the more Honest. Not that I would serve a good man ever the less, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would still serve him for his *Virtue*, and not because of his *Wealth*: and govern my self by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with respect to such
acts

acts of kindness as we do by our *Pains*, I shall conclude with this one Precept more, That we never attempt any thing against *Justice* and *Equity*, nor to the Injury of a third Person. For *Justice is the Foundation of an Everlasting Fame, and there can be nothing Commendable without it.* *Justice is the Foundation of a Lasting Fame.*

XXI. HAVING already treated of Benefits with a regard to *Particular Persons*; we shall now Discourse of That sort of Bounty, which respects the *Universality* of the *Commonwealth*. Of This Bounty there are Two Kinds. The *One* concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community*; the *Other*, the *Particular Members* of it: And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both: or however, to take Care of particulars: but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it; or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus's excessive Largess of Corn* to the people, was *Mischievous*; for it exhausted the *Treasury*; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People*; and consequently both the Republick it self, and the Citizens were the Better for't.

IT should be the Principal Care of him that has the Administration of Publick Affairs, to see that every Individual be protected in his Propriety; and that private men may not be dispossess'd of their Rights.

H

and

and Estates, under the pretext of a Publick Good. It was a pestilent proposition, That of *Philip's*, in his *Tribuneship*, about an *Equal Partition of Lands*; but then it was a great Instance of his Moderation to let it fall so easily again. He did many things, to curry favour with the People; particularly he dropt one very ill Speech, *that there were not Two thousand men of Estates in the whole City*. What a desperate Hint was That toward the bringing of all things to a Level, and all Conditions of men to a Parity: One of the greatest Plagues that can befall a State? For it was the main End of the Founding and Establishing of Cities and publick Bodies, that Particulars might be secur'd in their Possessions, and every man safe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though men Associate by an Impulse of Nature, it was Desire and Hope yet of keeping what they had gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the charging of the people with Extraordinary Taxes: which happened either through the Lowness of the Treasury, or the Expence and Burthen of a Continual War. This is a Course by all means possible to be avoided, by timely Care long before-hand; but if ever any Commonwealth should fall under This Necessity (for I had rather foretel it of any Other, than Ours; as I speak This only by way

*The danger
of Level-
ing Prin-
ciples.*

*No Extra-
ordinary
Taxes.*

way of General Discourse, without particular reference to our own Government) it will be highly necessary that the people be punctually informed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to subsist, but by complying with such a Necessity. It likewise behoves all Governors to take care that there be a publick Plenty of the Necessaries of Life: How this is generally done, and how it ought to be done, is a matter so well known, that it is sufficient barely to mention the thing thus by the By.

BUT above all things, let all men in any Publick Administration, or Office, keep themselves clear from the least suspicion of *Avarice*. *I would to the Heavens* (says *C. Pontius* the Samnite) *that Fortune had reserved me for another Age, and kept me from coming into the World, till the Romans had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I should quickly have put an end to their Empire.* Truly he must have staid many ages then; for 'tis but of late that *Rome* has been tainted with This Evil. Now if *Pontius* was a man of such a Resolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The first Law that ever we had against the *Corruption of Magistrates*, is not as yet of a hundred and ten years standing; and that was *Piso's*. But we have had a great many Others since That time; and every one still more severe than the

Other. How many Criminals have we had? How many Condemned? What a Confusion upon the *Social War* in *Italy*? And that War excited too merely by the *Guilty*, to save themselves from *Punishment*? There was no longer any Course of Law, or Justice; but our Friends and Allies, lay exposed to Exaction and Pillage, without Relief: And if we are not totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakness of Others, than from our own Virtue.

The Absti-
nence
of Africa-
nus,

XXII. *PANÆTIUS* extols *Africanus* for his *Abstinence* in the matter of *Mony*: And why not? But still he might have found greater Virtues in him than That: For That Abstinence of his was not the Virtue of the *Man* only, but of the *Times*. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Perseus*, made himself Master of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite value; and brought so much *Mony* into the Publick Treasury, that One General's Booty deliver'd the People from any farther need of Taxes. And This he did without any other Advantage to his Family, than the Honourable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Actions. *Africanus* the Younger (in imitation of his Father) got as little by the Destruction of *Carthage*; and his *Fellow-Censor*, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the prodigious rich City of *Corinth*. But his Business was rather the Ornament, and Lustre of *Italy*,
than

than That of his own *House*. Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left.

THERE is not certainly a more Detestable Vice (especially in Princes, and Public Magistrates) than Covetousness: For it is not only a Mean or Base thing, but the greatest Villany and Wickedness, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That Oracle which the *Pythian Apollo* deliver'd in the Case of *Sparta*, looks like a Prediction, not only Applicable to the *Lacedæmonians*, but to all Opulent Nations also whatsoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Destroy That Commonwealth. There is no surer way in Nature for men in Power to gain upon the affections of the multitude, than by *Forbearance* and *Moderation* in the matter of Money.

*Avarice a
Detestable
Vice.*

*The Power
of the con-
trary tem-
per in Pub-
lick Ad-
ministrati-
ons.*

BUT They that out of an affectation of Popularity, either attempt such a *Level-ling Division of Lands* as is above-mentioned, and so Force the Right Owners out of their Possessions; or propose the remitting of Just Debts; these people shake the two Foundations of Government; In the first place Concord and Agreement, which can never consist with This way of taking Monies from some, and Discharging others: And in the next place, Common Equity and Justice, which is then utterly destroyed, when no Man is left the Master of his own? For it is a Privilege Essen-

tial to a Community, that every man be thereby free and secure in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Interest and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine : for it makes the Loser still your Enemy ; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither : Or at best, so coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to : Especially dissembling the Inward satisfaction of being forgiven a Debt ; for fear of being thought unable to pay it. Whereas the Injur'd party will never forget it, but carry the purpose of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there should be more to whom we Unjustly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjustly take away ? This does not mend the matter one jot : for we are not to judge in This case by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never had an Estate, to dispossess another of that which has been many Years (nay Ages perhaps) in the Possession of himself and Family ; and that he that had this Estate, should have it taken from him ?

*The danger
of Inva-
ding Pro-
prieties.*

XXIII. IT was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedemonians* Banish'd *Lyfander*, one of their *Ephori*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all President of former times. And there follow'd such Broils upon it, that their best Men were Banish'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place
of

of an *Aristocracy*; even to the utter dissolution of one of the best Constituted Republics upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither; but the Contagion of Those Tumults, which had their Original from the *Lacedemonians*, spread it self so far, that the rest of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd thereby. What shall we say of our *Gracchi*? (the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Africanus*) It was this very point of Controversie about *Lands*, that destroy'd them too. But on the contrary, how much Honour has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himself, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon*? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Possession of *Ursurpers*, when he recover'd it by a surprize from *Argos*, suppress'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Restor'd six hundred of the Wealthiest Citizens that had been Banish'd, and set the Commonwealth it self at Liberty upon his arrival. But finding great difficulty at last how to accommodate the business of Lands and Possessions; and considering that it would be hard on the One side for those that he restor'd to their Town to live still in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Estates; and little Better, on the Other side, to break in upon, and take away Possessions of Fifty Years standing; wherein so many several Interests were concern'd in so long a Tract of Time, by Inheritances, Purchases, Portions, Settlements, and the

A Generous account of Aratus.

like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners: He concluded it Unreasonable either to take from the One what they were possess'd of, or not to satisfie the Other, in some degree, for their Just Pretensions. Wherefore determining with himself that Money was necessary to settle this matter fully, he resolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria*, giving Orders that all things should continue in the same state he left them, until his Return: So that he presently posted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolomy* (the *Second King* of that Name, after the building of *Alexandria*) whom this Illustrious Person had no sooner informed of his Business, with the Design he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country; but without any difficulty, he prevail'd upon that Wealthy Prince for a large Sum of mony. This Treasure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal Persons of that place, to advise with upon This Affair, and to take a strict account, as well of those that were possess'd of Other Mens Estates, as of those that had Lost their Own. The matter was so handled, that upon a reasonable Estimate of the Lands, some were perswaded to content themselves with the value in Mony, and to yield the Land, of which they had been in possession; and Others chose rather to take Mony for their Land, than to contest for the Recovery of it. So that
in

in the Conclusion, the Controverſie was Compounded; and both Parts abundantly ſatisfy'd with the Accord. What Pity was it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of *Rome*? This is the right way of proceeding in ſuch Caſes; without expoſing to Sale the Eſtates of Citizens (as it has been Twice in our days) by *Auction* and publick *Outcry*. This *Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wiſe man, conſulted the Common welfare of all Parties: And it is the higheſt point of a Good, and a prudent Magiſtrate, not to divide the Interests of the People, but to keep all within the ſame Bounds of common equity. Why ſhould any Man dwell *Gratis* in my Houſe? as if I were to Purchase, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for Another (in deſpite of my heart) to reap the Fruits of my Labour, and Expence? For This is the Caſe in taking away from me That which is my Own, and giving to another That which does not Belong to him. And what's the End of a Law for *Cancelling all Debts*, but that you ſhall buy Land with my Mony; you keep the Land, and I loſe my Mony?

XXIV. UPON this account there ought to be timely care taken that no Debts be permitted to grow, which may endanger the Publick: And This may be ſeveral ways prevented: but if it does happen, it muſt not be remedied by making Creditors, that are Perſons of Subſtance, loſe their own. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth

H 5

like

*No Debts
to be per-
mitted
which
may en-
danger the
Publick.*

like Faith, and Credit: which can never be expected where People do not lie under a Necessity of Paying their due Debts; a thing which was never so violently prest, as when I was Consul: All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it: And yet I resisted all their Motions tending That way, so effectually, as utterly to root this great Evil out of the Commonwealth. There never were greater Debts, nor ever was there better Payment made, or with less difficulty; because of course when there was no hope left of defrauding their Creditors with safety, men were forced upon taking care to pay. It is true, that one who was in those days subdu'd, tho' of late a Conqueror, did afterwards find a time to put his former purposes in Execution, even when he had no need so to do: His very Appetite being so Vicious, that he took pleasure in the Evil it self, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good Patriots to keep themselves clear of this same perverse sort of Liberality, that takes from one, and gives to another: and in the first place, to provide that all men may be equally supported in the Enjoyment of their own, by Law, and Common Justice. And that the poor, and simple may not be Circumvented, or Oppress'd by Power, nor the Wealthy obstructed in the holding or recovering of their Dues, by the Envy and Malignity of the people. And moreover, they should
by

by all means endeavour, both in War and Peace, to advance the Republick, in Empire, Possessions and Revenue: These are the proper Offices and Atchievements of Great Men, and this was the Study, and the Exercise of our Forefathers. Those that addi&ct themselves to these Duties, gain great Glory and Good-will to their Own particulars, beside the profit that they bring to the Publick.

ANTIPATER the *Tyrian* (and a *Stoick*) lately deceased at *Athens*, charges *Panætius* with leaving out Two Branches in these Precepts concerning things *profitable*, one touching the management of our Health, the other of our *Estate*. But I suppose that they were rather pass'd over by That famous Philosopher, as things well enough understood: for that they come under the Head of things *profitable*, is past all question.

Now it is a good means of preserving *Health*, for every man to understand his own Constitution: to observe what agrees with him, and what not: To be temperate in all respects of *Diet*, *Dress*, *Exercise*, which are to keep the Body in good order: To forbear all excessive pleasures: and lastly, to use the help of skilful Physicians, in case of need. In the getting of an *Estate*, we must do nothing but what is warrantable, and honest: And when it is fairly gotten, it may be preserv'd, and improv'd by *Diligence* and *Frugality*. This Point is excellently well handled by *Xenophon*

A Caution in matter of Health and Estate:

phon the *Socratist*, in his *O Economiques*; which I my self at about your Age, turned out of *Greek* into *Latin*.

Two Pro-
fitable
things
meeting in
compari-
son.


XXV. THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things in Comparison, (which was the Fourth Head proposed in beginning, but omitted by *Panaetius*) a case which very often happens, ought to be considered: For sometimes *Bodily Goods* fall into Competition with the Goods of *Fortune*: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Those of the *Body*: And sometime again, One of either of them is compar'd with Another of the same Kind. *Bodily Goods* are compared (*preferably*) with outward ones thus, I had rather have *Health*, than *Money*: Outward with Bodily thus, I had rather have a *Great Estate*, than a *Robust strength* of *Body*. And so Bodily Goods with one another: I had rather enjoy *Health*, than *Pleasure*; I had rather be *Strong*, than *Nimble*. And then in the Comparing of *External things*, I had rather have *Honour*, than *Wealth*: and an Estate in the *City*, rather than in the *Country*. The Comparison that was made by the *Elder Cato*, was of This kind. The Question was put to him, What he look'd upon as the first and best Means of Improving an Estate? His Answer was, to keep a stock of *good Cattle*. What the second? A stock of *tolerable good Cattle*. What the third? A stock of *Cattle* still, though worse. What the fourth? *Tillage*.
What

What do you think of *Usury*? (says the *Enquirer*.) And what do you think of *Murder*? (says *Caro*.) By This and abundantly more, we cannot but understand that Things Profitable come often in Competition with each other: And that This Fourth enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting and Disposing (I wish I could add well Using) of Monies, it is (a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philosopher; and) better understood by the Good Men upon the *Bourse*, than by the Learned Men in the *Schools*. It is a thing needful however to be known, as appertaining to the Business of *Profit*; of which we have been discoursing in This Book. We shall now proceed to what remains.

The End of the Second Book.



TULLY's





TULLY's OFFICES.

BOOK III.

I. **I**T was the saying (my Son *A famous saying of* *Marcus*) of *P. Scipio*, (the *Scipio Africanus* first of those surnamed *Africanus*) recorded by *Cato*, who was pretty near of the same Years, that *he was never less Idle, than when most at leisure; nor ever less alone than when by himself.* It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Business; his Solitudes, in
Dis-

Cicero's
Retreat.

Discourses to himself ; without any Loss of Time ; and without need some whiles of any other Company. Insomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Listless, and Heavy, did even set an Edge upon him : That is to say, *Solitude*, and *Leisure*. I would I could say as much of my self in reality as he does : But though I cannot come up to the Original in Imitation of that Illustrious person, I am not much behind him yet in my *Good Will*. For since I have been driven by the force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Business of the Bar ; I have apply'd my self to a Life of Leisure too : upon That very Consideration, quitting the Town, and betaking my self to the Country, I have frequent opportunities of being alone. Not that I compare either this Leisure, or Solitude with that of *Africanus*. For his was only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himself some Respite from the Honourable Charges he sustained in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Recess, as a man sometimes puts into a Port : But my Leisures proceeded not from a desire of Respite, but from want of Employment. For since the Destruction of the Senate, and Dissolution of all Courts of Justice, what is there for me to do, either in the Senate-house, or in the Hall, that is worthy of my Character ? So that
after

after a life spent in so Eminent a Post, and in the Open View of the people, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, as much as I can, and live quite alone to avoid the very sight of such Criminals as the World every where swarms withal. But because I have heard Wise men say that we are not only to chuse the least of necessary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themselves to extract somewhat of *Good*, if possible: I therefore make the best of my Repose, tho' not such perhaps as he has deserv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed so much to Their Quiet. And tho' this be a Solitude wholly of Necessity, not Choice; I would not yet have it absolutely Fruitless. *Africanus* (I must confess) was pursuing and accomplishing things of much greater Reputation; for we have no Monuments of his Thoughts committed to Writing; No Remains of his Leisures, and Solitude, that we find extant: From whence we ought to conclude, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, in respect of the Exercise of his Mind, and the finding out means to effect those glorious Things which he was closely pursuing in his Thoughts. But Alas! I have not that strength of Mind to *Think* away my Solitudes, and supply the want of Company with bare Meditation. So that My whole Diversion is to pass away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that way now, in a little while, since the overturning of the Government, than I did

*Cicero's
Solitude
different
from that
of Africa-
nus.*

did in many years before, while it was in a flourishing Estate.

II. Now (my Son) tho' the Field of Philosophy be Profitable and Fruitful from one end of it to the other, without any Waste, or Desert: there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields greater advantage, and benefit, than that part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus's* care in the inculcating of this Lesson daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiss yet to be often minded of so necessary a point; and (which way soever you turn your self) to have this voice still sounding in your Ear, even, if it were possible, without hearing any thing else. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himself an Honest Course of Life; but it is perhaps no man's concern more than yours; because the world expects it from you, that you should succeed to the Industry, the Honours, and (if I may so say) in some Measure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to answer for upon the score of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Dishonourable than after so ample a Commission granted you to the famous *Staple* of the whole World, for *Good Manners* and *Letters*, to come back empty; to the Disparagement both of the Master,

Of Civil
Duties and
a Virtuous
Life.

Master, and the City? Wherefore, to make good this expectation, you must strive with all the faculties of your Mind, and take all the pains you can possibly (if I may call it pains to be improving, which is so great a pleasure) and let it never be said that after all other supplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your self: But let this suffice: having written so much, and so often to you already, upon This Subject. We shall now return to the remaining part of the Division propounded.

PANÆTIUS is the man, without Panætius of Civil Duties. Dispute, that has the most accurately handled This question: and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with some amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propositions* that men are wont to deliberate and advise upon, in the Case of *Duty*. *First*, whether the matter in question be *Honest*, or *Dishonest*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honest*, and the *Other* profitable; how to distinguish. He has written Three Books upon the Two former Heads; and promised a Discourse upon the Third; but he has not been so good as his word: which I do the more wonder at, because I find his Scholar *Posidonius* writes that *Panætius* liv'd Thirty years after the Publishing of these Books. And I am in some Admiration too, that *Posidonius*, in his Commentaries, should pass the matter over so slightly;

Cicero ex-
poses an O-
mission of
Panætius.

slightly ; especially making this Remark upon it, that of the whole Body of Philosophy, This is the most necessary part. There are some that will not have This to be an *Overfight* in *Panætius* ; but a point left out upon Consideration ; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reason they give, is This. *Honest*, and *Profitable* (they say) are *Convertible Terms* ; and not to be so much as Imagined in Opposition. From hence there may arise another Question, whether the Third Branch of *Panætius*'s Division should not have been absolutely rejected, without any mention of it at all : But as to this, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall, there can be no question ; For he that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes through with Two parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third. And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the Authority of *Posidonius* himself to Witness as much ; writing in a certain Epistle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panætius*) was wont to say. As there was never any Painter (says he) that durst venture upon Finishing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (such was the Delicacy of the Face, that there were no hopes of matching it with a suitable Body) so in the Case of *Panætius*, the Excellency of those things which he did perfect, was so Transcendent, that

that no man after him durst ever attempt the supplying of what he either Omitted, or left imperfect.

III. So that of *Panætius's* Intention there can be no longer any doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Division, as proper to the finding out our Duty, may perhaps bear a dispute. For taking it either according to the determination of the *Stoicks*, that nothing can be *Good* but that which is *Honest*; or according to the Opinion of your Friends the *Peripateticks*, that *Honesty* is the *Sovereign Good*, to such a degree, that all other Goods are as nothing in the Balance against it; This however is past all doubt, that *Profit* can never be admitted into a Com-
 petition with *Honesty*. How did *Socrates*,
 as we are told, Curse the First dividers of
Honest, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*,
 which are so *Inseparable* by *Nature*? And
 the *Stoicks* go so far along with him too,
 as to hold that nothing can be the One,
 without being also the Other. But if *Panætius* were one of those that will have *Virtue* to be *Therefore* Esteem'd for the *Profit* that she brings us; measuring things *Desireable*, either by *Pleasure*, or *Freedom* from *Pain*; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Possible Repugnancy* of *Profit*, to *Honesty*. But being of Opinion, That the *Only Good* is That which is *Honest*: and that whatsoever stands in Opposition to it, under the shew of *Utility*, a man's life is
 neither

Nothing can
 be Profitable,
 but what is
 Honest.

neither the *Better* nor the *Worse* for it, either With it, or Without it: He should not so much as have put the Case, methinks, where *Profit* and *Virtue* should appear in the *Comparison*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoicks* account for the *So-veraign Good*; is nothing else (as I understand it) than to lead a life always Congruous to *Virtue*: And to chuse all other things, which are agreeable to our natural Propensions, only so far as they are not repugnant to *Virtue*. The matter standing Thus; some men are of opinion that This Comparison was not properly introduced; and that there was not any need of prescribing in This Kind, at all.

True Honesty
and True
Wisdom are
Inseparable.

THAT which is *Honest* truly and properly so Called is only to be found in such as are *truly Wise*, and can never be separated from *Virtue*. But in those who have not perfect *Wisdom* there never can be that same perfect *Honesty*, there may be some Resemblances of it. And therefore all those Duties that we treat of in this Discourse, the *Stoicks* call *Middle Duties*: which are Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a large extent: and a great many people attain to them by a Felicity of Nature, and by a Progression, and advance upon Study. But those which they call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Consummate in all the parts (or numbers, as they express it) and This perfection is only to be found in a Wise man. However such an Action wherein

Middle
Duties.

a man acquits himself well in the Discharge of these *Middle Duties* goes currently with the *Multitude* for *perfect* to all intents and purposes; They not being able to distinguish wherein it is *Defective*: But so far as They understand the Business, think there is nothing wanting. Just as *We* see many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of other Instances, how strangely the unskilful are delighted with them, and yet for the most part commending the least masterly stroke in the piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several parts; But when they come to be better instructed by such as have Skill, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion.

IV. THE Duties here treated of, are with the *Stoicks* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not *peculiar to wise men*, but *Common to Humane Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature, or Virtue. Now when we speak of the *two Decii*, or the *Scipio's*, as *Courageous men*, or when we call *Fabricius*, or *Aristides*, *Just men*; we do not propose their Example as the Standard of that *Courage*, and *Justice* that is required in a *Wise man*. For I do not look upon any one of them to have been *Wise* to the Degree of *Wisdom here intended*; no, nor those very Persons upon whom the World has bestowed Both the *Reputation*,
and

No man
Good or
Wise in the
Abstract.

and the *Name of Wise*, I mean *M. Cato*, and *Caius Lælius*; nor even the *Seven Sages* themselves. But by the Frequent exercise of *Middle Offices* they had somewhat of the *appearance*, and *Resemblance of Wise men*. So that we must neither Compare *Profit* in Opposition to that which is *truly Honest*; nor oppose any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Honest*, which is the thing that all men pursue, that would be accounted *Good men*. And we must as well uphold and preserve That Practical Honesty that falls under our Capacities; as the perfectly *Wise* do that which in Strictness and Truth, is only the *Honesty*. For otherwise, how shall we be the better for what progress we make toward Virtue? What I am now saying is meant of those that by a strict performance of the several Duties, get themselves the Reputation of being *Good men*.

The Epicureans
measure
Honesty
by Profit.

BUT for those that Measure all things by the Common Interest of *Advantage* and *Convenience*, which they will not allow *Honesty* to over-balance; it is ordinary for them to put what they think profitable in the Scale against what is *Honest*; which no good man will ever do. I suppose therefore, that *Panætius*, when he says that men are wont to make some doubts upon the comparison, means only (as he says) that they are *Wont* to do so; and not that they *do well* in so doing. For not only the Preference of what seems Profitable to Honesty,

fly, but the very comparing of them, and the making a doubt in the Case, is a shameful Business. But what is it then that we have sometimes occasion to doubt upon? Or what's the Ground of our Consideration? It is (I presume) upon the Quality of the Point in Question: For that which is Dishonourable at one time, may be Warrantable at another. As for Example, upon a supposition that may be applied more at large; what fouler Villany can be imagined than the Killing not only of a Man, but a Familiar friend? Is a man therefore guilty of this Villainy that destroys a Tyrant, tho' his Familiar friend? Why truly the people of *Rome* think not, because they reckon upon it as the most Glorious Action of an Honourable Life. Is it in this case that *Profit* prevails over *Honesty*; or rather that the *Honesty* follow'd the *Profit*? *Circumstances alter the Case.*

THE Certain way to keep us Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of *Profitable*, and *Honest*, will be the Establishment of such a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: This Rule I would have to be squar'd to the Reason and Discipline of the *Stoicks*; which is what I chiefly follow in these three Books for this Reason; because tho' the Ancient *Academicks*, and your *Peripateticks* also, (which were formerly all one) give a Preference to that which is *Honest*, before that which seems to be *Profitable*; the matter is yet more Generously handled by the *Stoicks*, *A Rule to keep us Right,*

I

In our Judgments of Profitable and Honest. *Stoicks*, that make *Profit* and *Honest Reciprocal*, than by those that Imagine a thing may be either *Honest*, and not *Profitable*; or *Profitable*, and not *Honest*. Now our *Academy* allows great Liberty, and gives us a Right to defend That which appears most *Probable*.

V. BUT to Return to my Rule; *To take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make a man's own Advantage by doing Mischief to another, is more Contrary to Nature, than Death, Beggery, Pain, or whatever else can befall a man's Body, or Estate.* For at first Dash it destroys all Neighbourhood and Society: For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his own advantage may Assault, or make a Prey of another; there follows necessarily an Absolute dissolution of Human Society, which is founded upon the most certain and powerful Dictate of Nature. Put the Case that each particular Member should have a fancy that it would be in better case if it could draw to it self the Health, and Good Blood of the Member next unto it; the whole Body must, of necessity, Consume and Perish: In like manner if every man should take from another what he can get, and apply his Neighbour's Goods to his Own Use, this would undoubtedly put an end to all Society and Intercourse among men. It is both allowable and natural enough for a Man to provide Necessaries for himself, in the First place; But it is altogether

together against Nature for him to advance his own Fortune, Wealth, or Power, by the Spoil of other men. And it is not only by the dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Constitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawful for One man to do any Mischief to Another for his proper Benefit. It is the express Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws to maintain the Bond of Society, Safe, and Inviolable: and they punish the breakers of it with Death, Banishments, Prisons, and Fines: And much more does *Natural Reason* it self exact this from us: *Natural Reason* (I say) which is the *Law Divine and Humane; Both in one*. Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propose to live in a Conformity to the Principles of Nature) will never allow himself to covet what is Another man's, or to take away from his Neighbour, and give to himself. For Generosity and Greatness of Mind, Gentleness, Justice, and Liberality are much more Consonant to Nature than Pleasure, Life, or Riches: which, in comparison with the Common good, are by all men of Brave and exalted Minds, neglected and despised. Whereas on the Other side, to Spoil my Neighbour for my Own Advantage is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Torments, and the like. And it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all sorts of Labours and Troubles for the Service and Conservation,

(if it were possible) even of the whole World: After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of *Men* has placed for his Virtues among the *Gods*: All this (I say) is more Agreeable to Nature, than to live in Solitude; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleasures, and Plenty; with all the advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above. This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, so much to prefer difficulty and action, before a Life of Idleness and Sloth. From hence it comes to pass, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And besides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not against Nature; or else he supposes that Death, Poverty, Pain, Loss of Children, Kindred and Friends, are more to be avoided, than the doing of Injuries. But if he conceives that one man may do an Injury to another without an offence to Nature, there's no dispute with One that has lost his Reason; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of himself. But what if he thinks the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other*, that is, Death, Poverty, Pain, to be *Worse*? He is in a Grievous Mistake, to fancy any Calamity of Body or Fortune comparable to the disorders

The Interest of his Mind.

est of the
Whole is
the interest
of every
Part.

VI. WE should all of us therefore set this one Consideration before us, That the Interest of the *Whole*, is the Interest of *Every*

very part; and that if any one draws more to him, it than belongs to him, Human Society cannot subsist. Now if it be the very prescript of Nature, that one Man shall take Care of another, whoever he be, upon the score of Common Humanity; it does necessarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publick, is the Interest of every particular, according to the same Principle of Nature. Let but this be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of one and the same Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and so is the Other, by Consequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to say, as some do, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my Own Pocket; but that to take from other People, is quite another case; such men imagine that themselves and their Fellow Citizens have not the same natural Right, nor any common tie to promote the publick Welfare, an Opinion utterly Inconsistent with the preservation of Society in a publick Body.

THERE are some again will have their Fellow Citizens to be considered, but not *Strangers*: Now These Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society in general; and take away That once, there will be no longer any Good Nature, Liberality, Honesty, or Justice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth: And whoever destroys these, is to be accounted an Enemy

Better suf-
fer any
Calamity
than do an
Injury.

to the *Gods Themselves*, for breaking that Union among men, which was no other than a Constitution of *Divine Appointment*. The strongest Band of Society is a General Agreement in This Position, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from another, for my own Advantage, than to suffer all the Miseries that can possibly befall any Man in his Body or Estate: Nay, that can befall the very Mind it self; provided they hinder not our acting according to Justice, which one Virtue is the Mistress, and the Princess of all the rest. But what? (will some say) Shall a Wise Man that is ready to Perish for want of Bread, not take the Meat from the Mouth of a good-for nothing Fellow, to keep himself from Starving? No, not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my own Benefit. Well, but suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloody Tyrant) should he not do it? These are Cases easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthless person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publick;

lick; and to take it purely upon That Consideration, it is not blame-worthy: But otherwise, I must rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my self by what I force from another Man: so that it is not more against Nature to be Sick, or Necessitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of another: But the abandoning of the Common Good is an Offence to Nature; for it is Unjust; and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Translation of Necessaries from a slothful and unprofitable wretch, to the behoof of a Wise, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whose Loss might be of great damage to the Publick: Provided that it be done merely out of such a respect, without any Vanity, or Self-love, or making use of a Publick Pretext for a Colour to a particular Injustice. In so doing, I keep my self still upon my Duty, consulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

As to the Case of *Phalaris*, the decision is Obvious: For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, than a Member of Human Society; and there can be nothing against Nature in the despoiling of one, if you can do it, whom it is honourable to Kill; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and pestilent sort of men were exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as

we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Blood and Spirits have in a manner forsaken them, and that they grow dangerous to the Rest: so should that fierce and outrageous Brutality in human Shape, be separated, if I may so say, from the Common Humanity of the Publick Body.

VII. OF this Quality are all those Questions of Duty, whereof the Resolution depends upon the Circumstance of Times: which Kind of Cases, I presume, *Panatius* would have pursu'd, if somewhat of accident or bus'ness had not taken him off from his purpose. We have said enough in our former Books upon This Matter; to shew what we are always to shun, as evil and shameful in it self, and what we are not obliged to avoid, because it is not any ways either *Misbecoming*, or *Dishonest*.

Certain
Principles
to be given
for grant-
ed.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work we have begun, and almost finished, I must deal with You, (my *Cicero*) as the Mathematicians do with their Disciples. They lay down certain *Postulata*, to be taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of discoursing the Points; to the end that they may make themselves more easily understood. So must I require of You (my *Cicero*) to yield me this point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is desirable of it self, but what is Honest*. But if *Cratippus* will not allow you to admit of the Proposition whole as it lies; This yet, I presume, will not be deny'd, That
Virtue

Virtue is *Chiefly*, (if not *Only*) to be desired, and for its own sake. Either of the two will be sufficient for my purpose, and each of them in their turns has the appearance of greater probability, and no other Opinion in this Case is so much as probable. And First, let me vindicate *Panaetius*, in This, that he has not said that there ever can be an opposition between things *Profitable* and *Honest*; (nor could he have justifi'd it, if he had, upon his own principle) but things seemingly *Profitable*: for over and over in all his Discourses he still makes *Profitable* and *Honest* to be *Convertible*, and represents the opinion of those that divided them, as the most pestilent Error that ever enter'd into human Life. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, in Appearance, not in Reality, not with a Design that we should ever prefer the Profitable before the *Honest*; but for our Caution, and Instruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We shall therefore complete this Part which he left unfinish'd, without any help from others, but purely upon our stock, (as we say :) For since *Panaetius* left This Subject, I have seen nothing yet that has given me any sort of satisfaction.

VIII. WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that presents it self unto us, under the appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is dishonest, or shameful, annexed unto that which has the appearance of Pro-

Nothing can be beneficial, that is dishonest.

fit, we are then to relinquish it, not as a thing *Profitable*, but as considering that *Utility*, and *Dishonesty* cannot stand together. For if there be nothing so *Contrary* to *Nature* as *Dishonesty* and *Baseness*, (for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Constant, and rejects the contrary) and if there be nothing so agreeable to Nature as *Utility* or *Profit*, then it is impossible that they should both meet in the same Subject. Again; if we are born for *Virtue*; and if either (according to Zeno) *Virtue is to be desired for it self alone*, or if (according to Aristotle) *it weighs down all other things*: then does it follow, of Necessity, that *Virtue* must be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*: and whether way soever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable*; so that whatever is *Honest*, is also *Profitable*. It is therefore a mistake that men of no true probity are apt to fall into, presently to lay hold of that which *appears Profitable*, and consider it *apart* from that which is *Honest*. From Hence come Murthers, Poysonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publick Cheats, Oppressions, Squeezing of the People, or our Confederates: From Hence come the Intolerable Insolencies of Men of over-grown Fortunes; and finally, even sometimes in free Cities, the Thirst of Dominion; than which nothing can be conceived more foul and detestable. They take false Measures of the *Value* of things, without so much as dreaming of the *Punishment*;

ment; I do not mean the *Punishment* of the *Laws*, (for those they can with ease break through) but That of the *Followness* of their Guilt, which is the bitterest of all. The great Punishment is that of Conscience. Wherefore this sort of men should be excluded Humane Conversation, (as most Execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they should either follow That which they see to be *Honest*, or knowingly pollute themselves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the Act it self. Wherefore we should never deliberate at all, in such Cases, where the very deliberation it self is Shameful.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we should not entertain any Hope or Design, of Concealing, or disguising Matters; for we should take up This for a Maxim; (at least, if we be ever the better for our Philosophy) that if we could carry things so *Private*, as that neither Gods nor Men should discover us, we should yet have such a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of *Avarice*, *Injustice*, *Lust*, or *Immodesty*, escape us. A Divine Precept.

IX. HENCE it is that *Plato* introduces the Fable of *Gyges*, as not impertinent to this purpose. The Story has it, that a *Torrent* having eaten a *Hollowness* in the Ground, *Gyges* went down into it, and there observ'd a Brazen Horse, with doors in his Sides. Upon the Opening of these doors, he discover'd the dead body of a Man, The Fable and Moral of Gyges's Ring.

Man, of a Prodigious Size, with a Golden Ring upon his Finger. Gyges boldly pluckt it off by Force, and put it upon his Own, and being the King's Shepherd, he went his way, and joyn'd himself with Other Shepherds. Finding, that upon turning the Stone of the *Ring Inwards*, he became Invisible to *Others*, and yet saw every thing *Himself*, and that upon turning it *back again* he became *Visible*, as *before*; by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Assistance Murther'd the King, his Master; and in a short time remov'd all out of the way that he thought stood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this wickedness he Committed unseen of any body, and so by the help of this Ring he made himself King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wise Man werē the Master of such a Ring, he would reckon himself no more Privileg'd to do an Ill thing with it, than without it; for an Honest man considers the *Goodness* of the *Action*, not the *Privacy* of it. It is objected by some (that shew themselves to be better *Men*, than *Philosophers*) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any man would report it for a thing either True, or Possible: but see however the Force and Scope of this Ring, and of this Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Lust, that no body knows of, or so much as suspects? Suppose that this Impiety could be kept so secret, that neither
God

God nor Man should ever come to know it: Would you commit it? *'Tis a thing impossible*, they say, *to be supposed* (though perhaps it is not.) But what would they do (say I) if they could do the thing, which they say they cannot? They return you the same senseless Answer over again: they say *'tis Impossible*; and there they stick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Question. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or no: But I put the Question, as if they were to answer upon the Rack. If they make answer, that *if they were sure to escape Punishment, they would do what they found most Expedient*, they confess themselves to be *Criminals*; and if they *deny* it, 'tis a Concession that *all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themselves*. But to Return now to my purpose.

X. THERE fall out divers Cases, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times disorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Resolutions: not as upon a Deliberation whether a man should strain a point of *Honesty* in regard of the *Greatness* of the *Benefit* in Prospect; (for That were certainly wicked) but whether That which seems so *very Profitable* may be done without *Dishonour*. It might have lookt like an unjust thing in *Brutus*, to depose *Collatine*, his *Fellow-Consul*, who in the Expulsion of the Kings, was both his *Partner* in
the

The appearance of Profit oftentimes distracts us.

the *Advice*, and his *Assistant* in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the whole *Family*, and the *Relations* of that proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquins*, and the very Memory of Kingly Government, this being a Resolution of publick Advantage, was so Honest, and Just an Action, that *Collatine* himself was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: so that this Utility was valu'd for the Honesty sake, without which, in truth, it had not been profitable. But this did not hold in the Case of that Prince that Founded our City: For he was so wrought upon by the shew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone than with Company. He cast off all Piety and Humanity, for the obtaining of that which seemed unto him to be Profitable, tho' it was the clear contrary. The *pretended Honesty* in the Action, was to punish the Affront of his Brother's leaping in scorn over the Wall; but it was neither Competent, nor likely. Wherefore under favour of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*, (no matter which you call him) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

How far
we may
look to our
selves.

AND yet we are not to neglect our own advantages neither: or give them up to Others, when we want them our selves. But every man should attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to

Ano-

Another. *Chrysippus* had many Witty sayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Course, (says he) a man may be allow'd to strive, and contend his utmost: but to trip up his Antagonist's Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So in human Life, for a man to endeavour to get That which may serve for Use, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawful.*

IN Friendship, 'tis true, there are many *Many Niceties in Friendships.* Niceties, wherein we act against our Duty, as well in the not doing of any Office which may Honestly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend contrary to Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon This whole Matter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable; as Honours, Riches, Pleasures, and other Circumstances of the like Kind; these things are never to be preferr'd before Friendship; But no good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either against the Commonwealth, his Oath or his Word: No not if he were himself to be a Judge in his Friend's Case; for he lays down the person of a *Friend*, where he takes up that of a *Judge*. I would have him make so much allowance to Friendship, as to wish that his Friend may have *Justice* on *his side*; and I would have him allow him all the Favour in point of *Time*, to plead his Cause, that the Law will permit; but when

when he comes to pass his *Sentence*, upon Oath, let him remember, and consider, that he calls God to Witness; that is (as I suppose) his Own Conscience, the Divineſt thing God himſelf ever beſtow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practice of our Anceſtors; (if we could but truly keep to it) They never ask'd any thing of a Judge, but upon Condition that it might conſiſt with Juſtice. This Requeſt has relation to thoſe things which (as I ſaid e'en now) a Judge may fairly allow to a Friend; for if a man were obliged to do all things that a Friend would have him do, this would be no longer a Friendſhip, but a Conſpiracy. Let me be underſtood only of Common Friendſhips: For among men that are Wiſe, and Perfect, there can be no fear of any ſuch thing. The Story goes of *Damon*, and *Phintias*, (*Pythagoreans*) ſo great was the Kindneſs they had for one another, that when *Dionyſius* the Tyrant had ſentenced one of them to death, the Party Condemned only deſired a few days reſpite to put his Affairs in order; and the Other became Surety (Body for Body) for his Appearance. The Priſoner return'd at his day, and the Tyrant fell into ſuch admiration at their *Generoſity*, and *Juſtice*, that he requeſted them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendſhip. Wherefore in all Friendſhips, where the ſeeming Profitable and the Honeſt meet in Compariſon, we ſhould never conſider the Appearance

The Generous
friendſhip
of Damon and
Phintias.

pearance of Profit, but square our Actions according to the Honesty. But wheresoever any thing shall be required in *Friendship*, which does not stand with *Honesty*, in that Case *Religion*, and *Faith*, must take place of *Friendship*. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choice of the Duty here in Question.

XI. WE are Liable also to many ^{Publick Mis-}stakes under the appearance of Profit, in ^{stakes under}Cases where the Publick is concerned; as ^{the appearance of}our Countrymen were to blame in the Ir- ^{Profit.}recoverable Destruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worse, in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only because they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, because of the Neighbourhood of *Ægina* to one of their principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel*; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary* to *Nature* than *Cruelty*.

THEY do very Ill also, that either Pro- ^{Humanity}hibit, or Banish Strangers from among ^{to Strangers.}them; as *Pennus* did in the Days of our Fathers; and *Papius*, not long since. It is well enough not to suffer him that is *no Citizen*, to pass for a *Citizen*, (according to the Law of our Consuls *Crassus* and *Scævola*, who were Wise men.) But it is undoubtedly most Inhuman, absolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourse in a City, to Strangers.
Those

Those are great and Remarkable Cases wherein the *Shew* or *Colour* of *Publick Utility* is despised, in comparison with *Honesty*. Our own Commonwealth gives us many eminent Instances, which, as upon many occasions, so especially in the *Second Punick War*, after that Miserable Disaster at the Battle of *Cannæ*, shew'd greater Courage in Distress, than ever it had done under the greatest Success. There was not the least sign of Fear among us, nor any mention of Peace; such is the Power of *Honesty*, that nothing of Profit can appear against it! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to resist the force of the *Persians*, came to a Resolve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Troæzen*; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrtilus* that advis'd them rather to stay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counsel. He gave them the advice which he took to be most profitable; but it ceased to be *Profit*, when it stood in opposition to *Honesty*. *Themistocles*, after his Victorious War against the *Persians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of something that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth; but it was not convenient to be made Publick, and therefore desir'd them to appoint some body to whom he might impart the matter in private. They named *Aristides*; and he told him that the

Lace-

Lacedæmonian Fleet, which was laid up at *Gytheon*, might easily be Fir'd by surprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedæmonians*. *Aristides*, when he had heard it, came into the Assembly where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themistocles's* Counsel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honorable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not likewise *Honest*; and so rejected the proposition, only upon the Report of *Aristides*, even without hearing it. How much did these people go beyond us; that suffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*, while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries*?

A scrupulous point of Honour.

XII. LET it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Dis honourable*; no, not in the very possession of that which we account so to be. Nay it is a most destructive Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagin that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Dishonest*.

BUT there fall out many Occasions (as I have said before) wherein the *Profitable*, and the *Honest* may seem to fall in *Competition*: in which Case we should consider, how far they stand in direct Opposition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for instance, upon these Questions. An *Honest* man sets sail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodesians* in great distress for want of it; and the *Commodity* bearing an Excessive price.

This

Some nice
Cases of
Conscience.

This person knows that there are other *Alexandrian* Ships under sail, and bound for the same Port, and with the same Cargo: whether shall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other Merchants coming with Relief, or say nothing of it, and make the best Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Case, supposing him to be a Good and a Wise man, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to Conceal this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes some doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*. In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babylonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoick*) is of One Opinion; and his Disciple *Antipater* (a very acute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumstances laid open; so that the Purchaser may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the other knows. *Diogenes* says that the *Vender* is bound to discover all the Faults, so far as he is obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to sell the Commodity, he may without Deceit make the best on't. Here (says he) *I have brought my Corn; I have run the Risque on't, and I set no higher a Rate upon the Commodity than Others do; nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper: There being now a greater plenty by my coming, where's then the Injury?* Now *Antipater*, on the other side, Reasons it thus. How is That? (says he) It is our Duty to consult the Good of Mankind, and

and to serve Human Society; and we come into the World under that Obligation. We have Principles of Nature, which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing *Profitable to our selves*, that is not so to the *Publick*: And likewise, to account of the *Publick Profit*, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of Men, which so much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply*? *Diogenes* will reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this instant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or what is the ultimate Good, which are things much more Profitable to be known, than the price of wheat? And yet you will not say that I Conceal This from you. But it is not absolutely necessary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is necessary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (says the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be such a Society then, as that no man shall have any thing particular in it of his Own? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You see in this whole Dispute, that it is not said, tho' This or That be *Disshonest*, I will yet do it, because it is *Expedient*: But that it is so *Expedient*, as that there is nothing *Disshonourable* in it: And (on the Other

ther hand) out of that very Consideration that it is *Dis honourable*, it is therefore *not to be done*.

XIII. SUPPOSE an Honest man has a mind to put off his House for some fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himself: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the purpose) tho' it may (perhaps) pass for *Healthful*; all the Rooms annoy'd with Vermin, built with bad timber, or ready to drop down, which is only known (as I say) to the Master of the House. The Question is, if he Conceals these faults to get a better Rate for his House than he could otherwise have done, whether he acts against Justice and Honesty, in That *Concealment*? *Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the Case of *not setting a Man Right that's out of his way*. (A Crime which was punish'd at *Athens* by a Formal Solemnity of Publick Execrations.) Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaser to ruine himself, and to fall into the worst of Snares, by a Mistake? Nay it is worse yet, than the *not shewing of the way*; for it is leading another knowingly and wilfully into an Error. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other side, Can he be said to have forc'd you to buy it, who did not so much as Advise you to't? That which did not please the One, he exposed to sale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he shall not be taken for a Cheat, that sets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and
well

well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much less shall he be accounted one, that does not so much as Commend his House; for where the Purchaser uses his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not oblig'd, in all Cases, to make good every word we say, how should we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not say? Nor can any thing be more Ridiculous than for a Merchant to publish the Faults of the Commodity he exposes to Sale. What would be more senseless than to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer; *Here's an Infected House to be Sold?* Now so it falls out, that in some doubtful Cases, the *Honesty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it so qualify'd on the Other; that it may not only be *Honourable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Dishonourable*, to Omit it. This is a Point that often seems to come into question betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honest*.

THESE Difficulties must be set right: ^{Resolutions} for I did not propose them to start a Question, but to give a Resolution. It is my O-^{upon the former Cases.}pinion, that it it was neither justifiable for the Corn-Merchant to keep the *Rhodians*, nor for the Sellers of the House to keep the Buyers in Ignorance. All kind of silence indeed is not properly Concealment, but the keeping of another man, for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he

he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a Concealment This is, and the Quality of the man that uses it, who does not discern? This is not the practice undoubtedly of an Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Just or a Good man: but rather of a Shifting, a Close, a Deceitful, a Malicious, a Sly Shuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to get by the Bargain, that wears these foul Names, and lies under all these Reproaches?

*An Artifi-
cial Cheat.*

XIV. BUT if the saying *Nothing* in this Case be so Blameable; what shall we think of them then that spake *False*? *Caius Caninus* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor Learning) going sometimes to *Syracuse*, not upon Business (as he was wont to say) but for his diversion; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy some Gardens there, where he might invite his Friends and enjoy himself when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of, there was one *Pythius*, in *Syracuse*, that drove the Trade of a Banker. *I have Gardens here* (says he) *tho' not to be Sold, but however if Caninus pleases, he may use them as his Own.* And so he invites *Caninus* to those Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Caninus's* promise to come, *Pythius* (whose business gave him a great Interest there, among all sorts of people) sent for the Fishermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fish just before his Gardens; and so gave them

them their Lessons what to do and how to behave themselves. *Canius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fish he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius's* Feet. What's the meaning of all this (says *Canius*) so many Fishes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fish (says he) in *Syracuse* which is not to be had in this Place. They take in their Water here, and cannot be without the Convenience of this Manor. This set *Canius* agog upon the Purchase, and nothing would serve but *Pythius* must sell him the place; He seem'd, at First, very unwilling to part with it; but to be short, *Canius* being eager of it, and Rich, brought him to an Agreement, and presently struck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own price: Security was taken for the Mony, and the business finish'd. *Canius* invited some of his Familiar Friends thither the next day; and he himself coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighbourhood whether the Fishermen kept Holy-day that day, because he saw none of them There. Their Answer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any Fishermen that us'd to be There: Insomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thi-

ther the day before. This put *Caninus* into a Rage: But what Remedy? For my Friend and Collegue *Aquilinus* had not as yet produced his Formulary, relating to *Dolus Malus*, or *deceitful Tricking*, in which upon enquiring what was intended by that same *Dolus Malus*, his answer was, that it was *the pretending of one thing, and doing another*. Which truly was a full and clear Definition of it, as indeed he was one that well understood *defining*. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that *Pretend one thing, and do another*; are to be accounted *Perfidious, Wicked, and Deceitful*; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by so many *Crimes*.

XV. BUT if *Aquilinus's* Definition be True, there must be no *Pretending* or *Dissembling* allow'd of in Human Society: And a Good man will neither do the one nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. However such *deceitful tricking* was punishable also by the Laws: (As the Case of *Guardianship* by the *Twelve Tables*, and the *Circumvention* of *Minors* by the *Latorian Law*.) And sometimes, where the Law was silent, by the Determinations of Judges, in which was always added a Clause of *Acting upon Good Faith*. And of other Determinations such words as these are most remarkable, namely, in Arbitrations of Controversies arising about the Dowry of Wives, *MELIUS EQUIUS*, i. e. *After the fairest and most equitable manner*;

ner; and in matters of Trust, *UT INTER BONOS BENE AGIER*; dealing fairly as one Honest man should do by another. Can there be any Mixture of Fraud now in the fairest and most equitable manner? Or what place is there for Deceit, or Iniquity, in Fair Dealing, as one Honest Man should do by another? But there is always Deceitful Tricking i. e. *Dolus Malus*, (according to *Aquilus*) included in falsely pretending of something that is not. Wherefore there must be no Lye admitted in any Business, or Contract; nor should there be any Underhand substituting of an Over-bidder by the Seller, to enhance, or of an Under-bidder by the Buyer, to bring down the price; but Both parties should say at a Word what they will Give or Take. *Q. Scævola*, the Son of *Publius*, being upon a Purchase, bad the Proprietor tell him in One Word what he would have for the Estate: He did so: And *Scævola* told him he look'd upon it to be better Worth, and so gave him Eight Hundred Pound more for it. There is not any Man but will confess that This was the part of a Good man, tho' they deny him to have acted wisely; as they would if he had sold it for less than he might have had. This is the fatal mischief therefore, that Some Men are accounted Good, and Other men Wise, as if they could be separated. Hence *Ennius* says that a Man's Wisdom serves him to little purpose, if it be not Profitable to himself. This would

A Generous Scruple of Scævola's.

indeed be true enough, if *Eunius* and I were but agreed about what it is to be *Profitable*. I find *Hecaton* the *Rhodian* (*Panætius's* Scholar) telling *Q. Tubero* in his Books of *Offices*, that it is the part of a *Wise Man* to do nothing against *Publick Customs, Laws, and Institutions*; and with-all, to take good heed to his *Fortune, and Family*: For we should not propound to be *Rich*, only to our *Selves*, but to our *Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly*, for the *Service of the Republick*. For the *Estates and Provisions of particulars*, are the *Wealth of the City*. The *Proceeding of Scævola* above-mention'd would never suit with *Hecaton*: For he only says that he would not do any thing for his own *Profit* that were *Unlawful*: and truly he deserves little *Thanks, or Commendation* for his pains. But if all *Pretending and Dissembling* be this same *Dotus Malus*, or deceitful tricking, there are very few cases quite clear of *That Deceit*. Or if he be only the *Good Man*, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no body; such a *Good man* will not be easily found. It can never be *Profitable* to do an *Ill thing*; because it is always *base, and shameful*. And it must ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, because it is always *Honest and Creditable*.

Conceal-
ments pu-
nishable in
Bargains
for Estates.

XVI. IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the Matter of *Estates*, that the *Vender* should still tell the *Purchaser* the *Defects*,

fects, or Inconveniencies of the Estate, which himself knows. For it being sufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man should make good what he promises or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the penalty of *Double Damages* for Denying it; the Civilians have also set a Punishment upon *Concealments* too, by enacting, that if the Seller of an Estate knew any Fault in it, without expressly acquainting the Purchaser with it, he should be obliged to make it good. As in the case of the *Augurs Tower*; where they were to take their Observations from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having an House upon the Hill *Calius*, the *Augurs* commanded him to take down such parts of it as hinder'd their prospect. *Claudius* expos'd the entire House to Sale, and so put it off; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaser. The *Augurs* sent the same orders to him, when it was in His Possession; when *Calpurnius* therefore had taken it lower, coming afterwards to understand that *Claudius* had offer'd the House to Sale after that the *Augurs* had ordered him to take it down, forc'd him, upon an Arbitration, to give such Satisfaction as Equity and good Faith required. *Marcus Cato* pass'd the Sentence, the Father of the late *Cato* of our Time. (For as we use to distinguish Others by the Name of their Fathers, so we ought to distinguish the Father of this admirable Person by the Name of his Son.) The Sentence was This, That

since upon the Sale of That Estate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to; he should Indemnifie the Buyer of it. He therefore determin'd it to be a point of *good Faith*, that the Purchaser should be acquainted with Faults that the Vender knew. Now if This was a Just Judgment, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that sold the *Infected House*, to conceal as is above supposed. But it is not possible for any Law to reach all the various Cases of these *Concealments*: And yet however, so far as they go, they are diligently observ'd. Our Kinsman *Marcus Marius Gratidianus* sold to *Gaius Sergius Orata* the very House which he himself had bought of him but a few years before. This House paid a Service to *Sergius*, but *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cause was brought into the Court; *Crassus* was for *Orata*, and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*: *Crassus* insisted upon the *Law*, that what Incumbrance the Seller knew and did not mention, that ought to be made good. *Anthony* insisted upon matter of *Equity*, because That Incumbrance was not unknown to *Sergius*, who had formerly sold the same House, and so there was no need to say any thing of it; neither could he be said to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but

but to shew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with men of Wiles, and Shifts?

XVII. BUT Laws and Philosophers Laws and Philosophers provide different ways provide against Frauds different ways: The Laws regarding only matter of *Overt Act*, whereas Philosophers judge according to *Equity*, and *Reason*: which Reason does against Fraud.

it self require of us, that we do nothing with a Design to ensnare, or with False Pretences, or Deceit. For do not we call it Entrapping to contrive a Pit-fall, or set a Toyle, without either rouzing or hunting any thing to it: Since the Beasts, many times fall into it, without a Pursuer? So He that offers a House to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaser? His House is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and somebody is caught at unawares. Now tho' I understand that according to depraved *Custom*, this in Practice is not accounted *Disshonourable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* against it: It is nevertheless yet forbidden by *the Law of Nature*. For, as I have often said already, and must say oftner, *Society*, in the *largest Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under That is the *Society* of those of *the same Nation*, and after That, of the *same City*. Wherefore our Forefathers distinguish betwixt the *Law of Nations*, and the *Law Civil*. For what is *Civil Law* is not consequently the *Law* The Law Civil, and the Law of Nations. of *Nations*; but what is the *Law of Nations* ought necessarily to be part of the *Civil*.

vil. Now to say the Truth, we have not among us any substantial or expresse Figure of the *True Law*, or *sincere Justice*: So that we are fain to make use of *shadows*, and *pictures* of it; and it were well if we could keep up, even to them too: For they are Copied from the *best Originals*, of *Truth* and *Nature*. How glorious is that Provisional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honesty, I may not be deceived and brought into a snare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *dealing fairly, as one honest man should do by another, and without Fraud or Covin.* But then who are *honest men*, and what is *Fair dealing*, is a Great question.

*Of Good
Faith.*

Q. *Scævola* the High Priest was wont to ascribe a very great force to all those Arbitrations that mentioned *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name of Good Faith* to be of a Large Extent: As having a respect to *Guardianships, Societies, Trusts, Commissions*, things *bought, or sold, hired, or let*, relating to the Community, and Entercourse of Life. He must be a great Judge, that in these Cases can determine (especially meeting in most of them with Contrary Decrees) how much One man is bound to make good to Another, in every Circumstance. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices should be avoided; And That *Craft* also which imposes upon the World for *Prudence*; how far from it soever. For
Pru-

Prudence is placed in the *Choice* of *Good*, or *Evil*; but *Craft* prefers *Evil* before *Good*; at least if all things that are *Base* be *Evil*. And 'tis not only in *Lands*, and *Houses*, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to that of Nature, forbids *Fraud* and *Circumvention*; but also in the dealing for *Slaves*, the Seller is barred from all Kind of *Fraud*. For he that is presum'd to know whether the *Slave* be sound, be apt to run away, be given to Theft, is made answerable to the Buyer, by the Proclamation of the *Ædiles*. But this does not hold in the Case of an *Heir* that found such a *Slave*, or *Servant* in the *Family*. From hence it may appear, since *Nature* is the Fountain of *Justice*, that it is also according to Nature, that no man should make Advantage to himself of another man's Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Pest in Human Life, than pretending that to be a Piece of Skill which is only *wicked Craft*: And from thence proceed those Innumerable Cases, where the *Profitable* seems to run Counter to the *Honest*. For, where's the man that would stick at any *Injustice*, if he might but hope for *Impunity*; or come off without any man's knowing it?

XVIII. LET us examine the Matter if you please in those Instances where the Common people, perhaps, are scarce sensible that they do amiss: For we do not speak in This place, of *Murthers*, *Poysonings*, *Forgeries*, *Robberies*, or *Embezzlements*

of the *Publick Treasure*, which should rather be suppress'd by *Prisons*, and *Fetters*, than by *Words*, and *Philosophical Precepts*: But let us here rather consider what we find commonly to be done, even among those that have the Reputation of *Honest* men. There were some people that brought out of *Greece* to *Rome* a forg'd *Will* of *Q. Minutius Basilus*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'ness pass the better, they put into the Testament, *M. Crassus*, and *Q. Hortensius*, two of the most considerable men of the City, as *Joint-Heirs* together with *Themselves*: They did, Both of them, suspect it to be a *Counterfeit*; yet having no hand in it themselves they were well enough content, not to refuse making some advantage of other peoples Wickedness. And what then? Is it a sufficient Justification that they themselves did not appear to have had any hand in the Knavery? I am of another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, *I lov'd* him while he was alive, and I do not *hate* the *Other* now he is Dead. But when *Basilus* had Willed his Sister's Son, *Marcus Satrius*, to bear his own Name, and made him also one of his Heirs, *As for him*, says he, (in this pretended Will) *I leave him only the Patronage of the Picenians and Sabines*. What a foul Blot was this upon those Times? was it not a most unreasonable thing that the Chief men of the City should carry away the *Testator's Estate*, and

A case of
Conscience
about a
Forgery.

and leave nothing to *Satrius* the Right Heir but his *Name*? For if he stands guilty of an *Injustice*, that neither *keeps off* an Injury from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulses* it when he may, (as we have said in our First Book) what shall we think of him that does not only not Repel an *Injury*, but even Helps it on and promotes it? Nay, for my own part, let the *Inheritance* be never so real and without Forgery; yet if it be gain'd by *Crafty Flattering Offices*, and not by plain Truth, but *False Pretences*; even That *Inheritance* I cannot approve as honestly got. But in such Cases men are sometimes apt to take One thing to be *Profitable*, and Another *Honest*, but they are Extreamly mistaken, for the same Rule holds both in *Profit* and *Honesty*; and He that is not thoroughly sensible of This, lies ready for all sorts almost of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whosoever says thus to himself, *This is Honest*, 'tis true, but the *Other* is *Expedient*; he takes upon him, to *divide* those things by a *Mis-*^{No Divi-}
take that are *coupled* by *Nature*; which ^{viding of}
^{what Na-}
^{ture has}
^{Coupled,}
 opinion is the fountain of all Kinds of Treachery, Mischief and wicked Practices.

XIX. WHEREFORE if a Good man, by the very holding up of a Finger could make his Name slide into the Will of a wealthy Person, he would not do it, tho' upon a Certainty that no man could ever so much as suspect him for it. But if such a
 One

One as *M. Crassus* could get an Estate which he has no Title to, upon the same Terms, upon my Credit he would not be ashamed to dance in the open Court. But a *Just*, and such a one as we can allow for a *Good* man, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and transferring it to *himself*; and whoever wonders at This, does as good as confess himself Ignorant of what a good man is.

Who is a
Good man.

BUT he that will thoroughly examine the inmost notions of his Own Mind, will be able to tell himself, that only *He* is a *Good* man, who does good to as many *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without some Injurious provocation. What then? does he no Harm that supplants the Right Heir, to get himself into his place, as slyly as if he had remov'd him by Poyson? But what (will some say) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes certainly, If he will take This along with him, that it is not possible for any thing to be *So*, that is *Unjust*. He that has not learn'd This Lesson, can never be a *Good* man. I remember, when I was a Boy, I heard my Father speak of *Fimbria*, a Person of Consular Dignity, who was appointed Judge in the Case of *Marcus Lutatius Pintia*, (a Knight of Rome, and a very *Honest man*) who undertook upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Money, to prove himself a *Good* man: but *Fimbria* did

did absolutely refuse to pass Judgment in That matter; lest he should either derogate from the Reputation of a person so much Esteemed, if he gave it against him, or appear on the other side, to pronounce any man to be Good, considering the Infinite Variety of Duties and excellent Qualities to make him so. So that neither *Fimbria's* Good man, nor *Socrates's*, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honest*: And such a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare so much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in Publick. Is it not a Shame then, for *Philosophers* to *Doubt*, where the *Common people* themselves are *Resolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare Proverb is *Their's*; when they would express a man of an exact Sincerity and Justice, *You may play at * Love with him in the dark*, they say; and what is the meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honest*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiser for't? In the Moral of this Proverb, we are taught, that neither *Gyges's* way is to be endur'd, nor so much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the case formerly supposed) tho' a man might make himself Master of the whole World by so doing. For whatsoever is *Shameful* and *Dishonourable*, let it be never so *Secret*, nothing can make it *Honest*; and that which is *not Honest*, it is as impossible

* *A little
Play with
the Finger.*

possible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Opposition* to *Nature*.

XX. WELL but (you'll say) where the Advantages are very great, there is also some reasonable *Temptation* to offend. When *C. Marius* appeared out of all hope of the *Consulship*, and (having lain neglected for seven years after his *Prætorship*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: being sent Express to *Rome* by *Q. Metellus*, that great Man and Eminent Citizen, whose Lieutenant he was, he publicly charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they made him *Consul*, he would in a very short time deliver up *Jugurtha*, either Alive or Dead, into the Power of the *Roman* people: whereupon they made him *Consul*. But This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Justice*; by a false Suggestion to draw an Envy upon so brave a man, and so Famous a Citizen: Especially *Marius* being *Metellus's* Lieutenant, and by his order sent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinsman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Prætorship* discharge the Office of a Good man. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Consulted the College of *Prætors* about settling by Common Consent some Standard for the Valuation of their *Monies*, which were then sometimes up, and sometimes down, at such a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They joyn'd unanimously in

A treacherous
Action of
C. Marius.

a Decree, appointing a *Penalty* and settling the Form of Tryal; and agreed to meet and go all together to the Common Hall in the *Afternoon* for the publishing of it. When they were gone, some one way, some another; *Marius Gratidianus* stept presently from the Court to the Common Hall; and there made *Proclamation* by *Himself alone* of that which was the *Common Act* of the Court: which you will find (if you observe the Story) to have given him great Reputation; the people setting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incense* and *Tapers*: In one word, no man ever render'd himself more *Popular*. These are Points that puzzle a man sometimes in his Deliberations; especially when the Matter seems but small, wherein any Violence is offer'd to Equity, but the Consequence following from it to be of great Importance. As for Instance, it did not appear so very foul, to this *Marius*, to prepossess himself of the Favour of the People, by preventing his *Collegues* and the *Tribunes*: But then it was, in appearance, a matter of great Advantage to him to advance himself to the *Consulship*, which was the thing he then aimed at. But there is *One General Rule* for all these Cases, that I would have you take special Notice of; See *First* that what you account *Profitable*, be not *Disbonourable*; and *Then* if it be *Disbonourable*, let nothing perswade you to think it *Profitable*. But what

Small matters may be of great Importance.

what then? Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or the *Other* to be an *Honest man*? Examine, search into your own real inward Sense, and consider with your self what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *Notion* of a *Good man* that you find there? Will a *Good man* for his own Advantage be brought to tell a *Lye*, *Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive*? Certainly nothing less.

A Good
man will
not do an
ill thing.

Is there any thing then, on the *Other* side, so *Valuable*, or any Advantage so *Desirable*, as that a man would forfeit the Reputation and the Glory of a *Good* and a *Wise man* to gain it? Can That thing which we call *Profit*, bring us an Advantage to Counter-vail what it takes *from us*, in depriving us of the very *Name* of *Good men*, and divesting us of *Faith*, and *Justice*? What difference is there betwixt a *Man's* turning of himself into a *Beast*, by a *Real Metamorphosis*, and his bearing the *Fierceness* of a *Brute* in his *Mind*, under the outward *Shape* of a *Man*?

XXI. AGAIN, what shall we say to such as make light of all things that are *Just* and *Honest*, for the Acquiring of *Power*? Do they not do the same thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cæsar's* Daughter to make himself *Great*, under the Boldness and Protection of his *Father-in-Law*? But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himself, to augment his *Own* Power while the envy of it was born by the *Other*: but how *Unjust*

just This was to his Country, and how *Disadvantageous* and *Disshonourable*, he did not consider. And as for his Father-in-Law, he had often in his Mouth those *Greek* Verses out of the *Phœnissæ* of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not so gracefully perhaps, but so as to be Understood.

To get a Crown, a man would break a Trust, If break't at all : in all things else, be Just.

IT was unpardonable in *Eteocles* (or rather in *Euripides*) to make That the *Exception* from a Crime, which of all Crimes is it self the most *Abominable*. Why then do we gather Instances of such Petty things, as Inheritances, Trafficks, and Bargains, managed by Fraud? Have we not had before our Eyes an instance of one that not only had the Ambition to make himself the Master of the People of *Rome*, and the Emperor of the World it self, but also accomplish'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to justify This Ambition: for in so doing he passes an Approbation upon the Subversion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honour*, that *Foul*, and *Detestable Oppression*. But he that confesses the Unlawfulness of any man's Usurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought so to be; and yet supposes it a thing Profitable to him that can compass it; with what sort of Reprehension,

The Ambition of Julius Caesar.

Utility
should be
guided by
Honesty.

hension, or rather what Severity of Language shall I attempt to reclaim such a man from his Error? For (I appeal to the Immortal Gods) what *Profit* can any man find in the Foulest and most Execrable *Parricide* committed upon his *Country*; albeit he, that is Guilty of it should come afterwards to be stil'd the *Father* of it, by the *oppressed People*? *Utility* should therefore be guided by *Honesty*; and in such manner, that tho' the *Words differ*, the *Thing* should be still the *same*. I do not find any thing more *Profitable*, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, than *Power* and *Empire*: But on the contrary, when I look upon the Matter in a true Light, I do not find any thing more *Unprofitable* to him that *Unjustly attains it*. For what *advantage* can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulness*, *Fears*, *Day* and *Night*; and to lead a *Life* that is beset with *Snares*, and *Dangers*?

*For to a Crown the envious and false
Are numberless, the kind and faithful few,*
says *Accius*; And yet the Crown he there speaks of was one that was lawfully obtained, as coming by Descent from *Tantalus* and *Pelops*. How much greater then think you must have been the Number of the Unfaithful to That Prince, who had oppress'd *Rome* it self by a *Roman Army*, and by Force brought under his yoke a City that was not only free in its own Constitution, but which had also given *Laws* to others? How ulcerated a Conscience do you think This man must
needs

needs have? What wounds in his Soul? Or how is it possible that any man's Life should be Profitable to himself, when the Condition of it comes to be such, that Posterity will ever have a Veneration, and Esteem for those that take it away?

Now if those things that carry the Fairest Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they appear to be, because they are full of Shame and Dishonour; This, methinks, should Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewise *Honest*.

XXII. AND however besides this has been determined, as in many other Cases, so most remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his second *Consulate*: For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerful*, and a *Generous Prince*; there came a *Deserter* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius*; and promised him, upon Condition of a Considerable Reward, that he would convey himself back, as privately as he came; and Poyson the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carry'd back to *Pyrrhus*; and the Senate applauded what he had done. Now if a man should regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion* of *profit*, This one *Deserter* might have put a Period to That hazardous War, in the removal of the most Considerable *Enemy* of the Empire. But where the point in Controversie was *Honour*, it would have been

Fabricius's Generosity to Pyrrhus.

Wealth it
self may be
Unprofitable.

been a Scandalous and an Impious practice to have conquered a Noble Enemy with *Baseness*, and *Treachery*, instead of *Resolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who had the like Reputation in *Rome*, as *Aristides* had in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never separated Profit from Honour) to encounter an Enemy by *Arms*, or by *Poyson*? If *Empire* be desirable for *Glories* sake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injustice* in the Attempt: For therein can be no *Glory*. But if Wealth and Power be what we by all means desire, we ought to consider that it can never be *Advantageous* to us when got with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable advice, that of *L. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to make those Cities Tributary again, which *L. Sylla* had discharg'd, for a Sum of a Mony, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And This too, without their Mony again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counsel, to the Scandal of the Government. At this rate there's more *Faith* to be found among *Pirates*, than among *Roman Senators*. Well! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long shall we dare to call any thing *profitable* that is not *Honest*? How is it possible that *Hatred*, or *Infamy*, should ever be *profitable* to any Government, that must support it self by its own *Reputation*, and the good will of its *Confederates*? Nay, I have had

had many a dispute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* himself; he insisted me thought too rigorously upon the Interest of the *publick Treasury*, and *Revenue*: He would deny every thing that the Farmers of the Revenue desired, and much of what our Confederates ask'd; whereas we ought to have been Bountiful to the latter, and to have treated the former as we were wont to treat our own Tenants: And so much the rather, as the keeping the Orders firm to each other did much contribute to the preservation of the Commonwealth. And *Curio* was much in the wrong too: who, tho' convinced that the *Transpadans* had a just Cause, still concluded, *Vincat Utilitas*, Let Utility carry it. Now he should rather have said that it was not *Just*, because it was not *profitable* to the Commonwealth, than pronounce it to be *profitable*, and yet own that it was not *Just*.

XXIII. IN *Hecaton's Sixth Book* of Offices, we find a great many Questions to this purpose. As for Instance, he puts ^{Instances} the Case, *Whether in a great Scarcity of* ^{of Good and Profitable in} Corn, a Good man may refuse to maintain his Slaves? He reasons it *Pro* and *Con*; but at last, concludes the *Duty* with ^{on.} a regard rather to *Profit*, than to *Humanity*. He puts another Question, *Whether, in the Extremity of a Storm at Sea, a Man should rather throw over a Serviceable Horse, or a Slave of little value?* And here his private Interest draws him
One

One way, and Humanity Another. And again, Suppose that, upon a Shipwreck, a Fool should get hold of a Plank; whether or no may a Wise man take it from him, if he can? He's upon the Negative, because the thing is Unjust. But what if it were the Master of a Ship? Shall not he take his Own? No, by no means: He may as well throw a Man over-board, that is at Sea in his Ship, because the Ship is his Own: For till they come to the End of the Voyage, the Ship is rather the Passengers than the Master's. But what if there should be but One Plank, and Two men equally Wise, and Deserving, in danger to be Drown'd? Whether shall Either of them seize it that can, or shall One of them yield it to the Other? I would have it yielded to him that may do most Good; either in the Republick, or in his Own particular, by Living. But what if they be both alike? I would have no Contention; But let the One render to the Other as if the point had been decided against him by Lot, or throwing Cases of Cross and Pile. What if a Father should Conscience. Rifle a Church, or Dig a passage under ground to Rob the Treasury? Whether or no should the Son give an Information of it to the Magistrate? This would be against filial Duty, and he should plead for his Father, if he were Accused. But is not my Duty to my Country above all other Duties? Yes, it is. But then my Country it self is concern'd, that the people in it should bear

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bear a Reverence to their *Parents*. But what if a Father should attempt to usurp the Government, or design the betraying of his Country? Shall the Son Conceal it? I would have him earnestly desire his *Father* to desist; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuse him. He should moreover threaten him; and in the Conclusion, if he finds his Country in danger of utter Ruin, he is to value the Safety of it before That of his *Father*. He puts another Question, if a Wise, and Good man, shall by oversight take False money, whether or no may he put it off again in payment, after he knows it to be Counterfeit? *Diogenes* says he may: *Antipater* is against it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. Suppose a man sells a piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep; Is he bound to tell this or no? *Diogenes* says he needs not; but *Antipater* says that a Good man will tell it. These are Points of Right in Controversie among the *Stoicks*. In the selling of a Slave, whether or no am I bound to discover all his faults? I do not mean those which the Civil Law obliges me to discover, or to take him again: But such as these, whether he be a *Liar*, a *Gamester*, a *Thief*, a *Drunkard*; Some are For the telling of it, and Others not. What if a man should sell Gold, believing it to be Copper? Is a Good man that knoweth it to be Gold, bound to tell him it or no? Or whether can any man Justifie the buying of That for One Penny
which

which is worth a Thousand? I have now both clearly shewn my own Opinion; And what are the Points in Controversie among the Philosophers before-named.

*Conscience
in Con-
tracts.*

XXIV. WE come now to consider whether *Those Contracts and Promises* are always to be observ'd, that are neither Extorted by *Force*, nor (as the Prætors Edict has it) *Dolo malo*, i. e. by deceitful tricking. *I have (suppose) a Remedy given me for the Dropsie, upon This Condition, that if it Cures me, I am never to use that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapse into the same Disease, and the person with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any farther Use of it: What am I to do in This Case? Why, since it is an Inhumanity in him to refuse me; besides that my Using of it does Him no Hurt: I ought to Consult the Means of Life, and Health. Well! Suppose a Wise man should be made Heir to a Million of Money, upon This Obligation from the Testator, that before he touches one peny of it, he should dance publicly before a Court of Justice, or in the Market place? He promises accordingly so to do; and without passing That promise, he could never have been entitl'd to that Estate: Should he do it or no? I could wish he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has past his Word, if he accounts it a Shameful,*

ful, and *Dis honourable* thing to discharge That Condition, he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the *Estate*, than *Otherwise*; unless peradventure he apply the mony to some great and pressing Exigence of the Publick, so that it would be no longer *Dis honourable* so to Dance, since he would thereby do so much good to his *Country*.

XXV. NEITHER is a man (*always*) bound to keep those Promises that are of no Advantage to those to whom the Promise is made. *Phœbus* (to come back to Fables) having promised his Son *Phaeton* a Grant of whatever he should ask; *Phaeton* demanded that he might mount his Father's Chariot; he had his Desire, and before he was well settled in it, he was for a mad Youth destroyed with a Thunderbolt. Had not this *promise* of his Father's now been better *broken* than *kept*? And then the Promise that *Theseus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it? *Neptune* had promised to grant him *Three wishes*: he chose for one the Destruction of his Son *Hippolytus*, upon a suspicion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law; and the Granting of That Wish was the greatest Affliction that ever came near to *Theseus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnon's Vow* to *Diana*, in promising her the most beautiful Creature that should be born within his Dominions that year? which proved to be his own Daughter *Iphigenia*;

L

whom

whom he accordingly sacrific'd, as the fairest Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promise had never been fulfilled, than so horrible a Crime admitted? Wherefore sometimes we should not fulfil a Promise. Nor is every thing entrusted with us in all Cases to be restor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Trust with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad*: Now to Restore it, in such a Case, were a *Crime*, and the *Refusal* of it, a *Duty*. What if I should be entrusted with his *Money*, and then find that he's about to make *War* upon his *Country*? Shall I render it? I think not; because it is against the good of the *Commonwealth*, which we ought to prefer before all things. So many things that seem *Honest* enough in *their Own Nature*, are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time* and *Circumstances*. To make good a Promise, stand to a Bargain, deliver up a Trust; when it comes to be rather *Hurtful*, than *Profitable*, becomes *Dis-honest*. This, I think, is enough said of those seeming *Utilities*, against *Justice*, that are cover'd with a *pretext* of *Prudence*. But as we have drawn all Duties from the four Fountains of *Honesty* in our First Book, we'll keep still to our Subject; and shew, how those things that seem to be *profitable*, and *Are* not, stand in the greatest Opposition to *Virtue*. Here is enough said of *Prudence*, the *Counterfeit* of which is
Craft:

Craft: and likewise of *Justice*, which can never fail of being *profitable*.

THE *Two remaining parts* of *Honesty* follow, One of which shews it self in the *Greatness* and *Dignity* of a *Gallant Mind*; the other in *Framing* and *Governing* our *Lives* by the *Rules* of *Continence* and *Moderation* of *Temper*.

XXVI. *ULYSSES* was drawn by an *Of Forti-*
appearance of *Profit*, as the *Tragic Poets* ^{*inde.*}
relate (for there appears no such *Suspicion*
of him in *Homer*, who was much the best
Author, but however the *Tragedies* charge
him with having had a *Design*) to avoid
going to the *War* by *Counterfeiting* him-
self mad. This was no *Honest Design*.
But it may be said perhaps, that it was *Pro-*
fitable to stay at *Home*, and *Govern*, in an
Easie, *Lazy Life* at *Ithaca*, with his *Pa-*
rents, his *Wife*, and his *Son*. But do you
Imagine, that in *daily Labours*, and *Hazards*,
there can be any *Dignity* that is to be com-
par'd with *This Tranquillity of Life*? Yes
verily; I cannot but have a *Contempt* for
such *Tranquillity*, because those things that
are not *Honourable*, I cannot allow to be
Advantageous. But what do you think the
World would have said of *Ulysses* if he had
gone on in that *Disguise*; who notwith-
standing all his *Brave Exploits* in the *War*,
did yet suffer these reproaches from *Ajax*,
in the *Tragedy*?

*He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us
 take it,
 Was th' only man, himself, you know, that
 brake it:
 Pretended madness, and by trick design'd
 To baulk the Company, and stay behind:
 And the bold Cheat had past, without all
 doubt,
 But for sly Palamede that found it out.*

Now it was much better for him, to
 encounter, as he did, not only Enemies,
 but likewise Seas and Tempests; than to
 abandon Greece, which was then by one
 Consent carrying a War among the Bar-
 barians. But to pass over things Fabulous
 and Foreign, let us now come to Matters
 of Fact, and Affairs of our own Coun-
 trey.

*The Case of
 Regulus.*

XXVII. *MARCUS Attilius Regulus*,
 in his second Consulship, when he was sur-
 pris'd, and taken Prisoner in *Africa*, by
Xantippus the *Lacedemonian*, a Comman-
 der under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hanni-
 bal* (who was then General) was sent to
 the Senate, under an Oath of rendring him-
 self again at *Carthage*, unless certain *Car-
 thaginian Noblemen* should be releas'd in
 exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had
 before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as
 the Story makes it out, he judg'd it *Vain*,
 and *Idle*. The colour was this, he might
 stay in his own Country, live at home with
 his

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his Wife and Children, might look upon the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of War, and still retain the Honour of his *Consulary Dignity*. Who can deny these things to be *Profitable*? who should, think you? why *Magnanimity* and *Courage* deny it: (and would a man desire more substantial vouchers?) For it is the Property of these Virtues not to fear any thing; to despise all human accidents; and to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befall a man.

BUT what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his Bus'ness; but refus'd to give his Opinion; alledging that so long as he was under an *Oath* to the Enemy, he was in the Condition of a *Prisoner*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as some will say) and one that stood in his own light) that which he did speak was against himself: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Interest* to exchange their Prisoners; for they were young men (he said) and good Soldiers, but himself wasted with Old age. His Authority prevailing, the Prisoners were detained, and himself return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquisite Torments he expos'd himself, by his Return; only he was resolved not to violate his

*His Honour
and Justice.*

Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death ; his Condition was yet more Honourable, than if he had ended his days in his Own house ; a *decrepit Captive*, and *Forsworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Prisoners, but also to dissuade it ? But what ? shall we call *That Foolish*, that conduces to the *Good* of the *Commonwealth* ? Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publick*, that is not so to the *Whole* ?

XXVIII. IT is a subversion of the *Fundamentals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honesty*, for we do all of us desire that which is *Profitable* : It is an *Attractive* that draws us to it, whether we will or no. For is there any man that avoids things *Profitable* ; or rather that does not vigorously pursue them ? But since *Profit* is not any where to be found, but in that which is *Praise-worthy*, *Honourable*, and *Honest*, therefore we do account these Considerations as most Noble, and Excellent ; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather *Necessary* than *Splendid*.

Objections
against
him.

BUT what is there (will some people say, by way of *Objection*) in an *Oath* ? are we afraid that *Jupiter* should be angry at us ? why, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us, is a point agreed by all Philosophers, not only those that think *God* neither takes any trouble *Himself* nor gives
any

any to Others, but those also that will have God to be always in *Action*, and doing of something. Again (say they) what greater harm could even an Angry *Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, than *Regulus* did to *Himself*? So that there was nothing of *Religion* that should preclude so great a *profit*. Was it lest he should do a *mean* thing? First, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuse the *Least*. But was that Dishonourable Proposition then an Evil Equal to the Torment? And *then*, That of *Accius*: *Thou'st broke thy Faith. No Faith I gave or owe to faithless men.* Though it was spoken by a Wicked King, was yet said with clear Reason. Again these Objectors add, that, as we say some things appear *profitable*, which are *not* so; so do they say on the Other side, that some things appear *Honest* too, which are *not* so: As in this case, *Regulus's* returning to the Torment, to save his *Oath*, seems to be *Honourable*, but it is rendred *Dishonourable*, because it was done under a *Force*, and by an *Enemy*, and so ought not to be made good. And they add farther, that whatsoever is *very profitable*, becomes *Honest* upon That Consideration, tho' it did not appear so before.

XXIX. THESE are the Objections which are commonly urg'd against *Regulus*. But let us *examine* them particularly, and begin with the First. *There was* (say they)

they) *no fear of Jupiter, lest he should hurt him in his Anger, because he does not use to be either Angry or Mischievous.* This Reason lies as strong against all other Oaths, as against This of *Regulus*. But the thing to be Considered in an *Oath* is not what we fear, but what Obligation we lye under of keeping it. Now an *Oath* is a *Religious Affirmation*; and whatsoever we promise positively, as in the presence of *God*, we must keep it: for this does not concern the Anger of the Gods, which is a Passion they are not subject to, but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Justice*! *It is a glorious Exclamation of Ennius.*

*O Holy Faith! Thou sacred Oath of Jove;
And fit to have thy Mansion with the Gods
above.*

HE therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Dignity of *Faith* it self, to which our Forefathers ascribed *Divine Honours*; placing her in the *Capitol*, (as *Cato* tells us in one of his Speeches) next unto *Jupiter* himself. *But even an Angry Jupiter (say they) could not have hurt Regulus* *Pain is no more than he did himself.* That were true, *Evil.* if there were no evil but *Pain*: But we have the Authority of the greatest Philosophers for it, that *Pain* is so far from being the *Greatest Evil*, that it is *None at all*. And let me recommend *Regulus* to you
upon

upon this point, as no Ordinary Testimony ; Nay, perhaps none more convincing. For what nobler Instance can be desir'd, than to see so Illustrious a *Roman* subject himself voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather than forego his *Duty* ? for whereas they say, the *Least* of *Evils*, meaning that we should rather do *basely*, than *suffer miserably* ; Is there any *Greater Evil* than turpitude (or baseness ?) Even in bodily Deformity, it has something that gives Offence : But how much greater then should we account the Depravation and Uglinefs of a *Polluted Mind* ? Wherefore they that argue these things with the greatest Generosity and Vigour, (as the *Stoicks*) dare pronounce *That* Only to be *Evil* which is *Base* and *Shameful* : Nay, (the *Peripateticks*) such as do not carry the matter quite so high, yet make no difficulty of unanimously pronouncing it to be the *Greatest Evil*. As for that saying, *No Faith I gave or owe to faithless men* : It was well enough said of the Poet, because when spoken in the Character of *Atræus*, it was accommodate to the *person* : But if they take up This once for granted, that a man is not oblig'd to *keep Faith* with him that has *no Faith* : let them have a care not to make use of that Shift as a Cover for Perjury.

BUT there is such a thing as *Right* and *Justice* even in a State of *War*, and the *Faith* of an *Oath* is in most cases to be

*Perjury
what.*

kept with an *Enemy* : For whatsoever we have sworn, so as to have a full Persuasion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That must be observ'd : But Otherwise a man may dispense with that Obligation without *Perjury*. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Pirates*, should promise them a certain Sum of Money for the saving of his *Life* : 'Tis no deceit to recede from it, tho' he had given his Oath for the performance : for we are not to look upon *Pirates* as *Open* and *Lawful Enemies* ; but as the Common *Adversaries* of *Mankind*. For they are a sort of men with whom we ought to have neither *Faith*, nor *Oath* in Common. For *Perjury* does not always consist in not doing what you swear. But *Perjury* is the not performing of that which we swear upon our *Conscience* to be our meaning, according to the usual words in the form of our Oath. It was a pertinent saying of *Euripides*, *In Words I swore, my Mind was never sworn*. But it was not for *Regulus* however to embroyl the Conditions, and Rules of *War*, with *Perjury* ; having to do with a *Just*, and a *Lawful Enemy* ; in which Case all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For if it were otherwise, the Senate would never have sent and deliver'd up so many famous men in Chains to their *Enemies*.

*The Rigour
of the Ro-
man Dis-
cipline.*

XXX. BUT now this was the Case of *Lucius Veturius*, and *Spurius Posthumius*, in their *Second Consulship*: Who, for Concluding a Peace with the *Samnites* (after the fatal Battle of *Caudium*, where our Legions surrendring at discretion, were sent off with Disgrace) were deliver'd up to them as their Prisoners, because they had done it without the Order, and Consent of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the same time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes* of the *People*, were deliver'd up likewise, to vacate the Peace concluded, because it was done by Their Authority; and *Posthumius* himself, that was deliver'd up, was the man that advis'd and propounded it. And the same thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the *Numantines*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perswaded the representing of it to the *People*, himself, that he might be deliver'd up to the Enemy; which proposition being so recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Attilius*, was accepted, and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was mote Honourable than that of *Q. Pompeius*, who in the same case, upon his supplication that such a *Decree* might not be past against him, prevail'd, and was discharg'd. Here that which seem'd Profitable, was more consider'd than the Honesty; but in the Other Examples, the false Appearance

Appearance of Profit gave way to the Authority of *Honour*, and *Virtue*. But (say they in the Case of *Regulus*) *The Promise made under a Force, ought not to stand good*. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: But however, why did he go to the Senate, especially to move against himself, and dissuade the Release of the Prisoners? This is to reprehend the most Generous point in the whole case: he would not rest upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cause, that the Senate might pass judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interposed, the Prisoners had been certainly restor'd to the *Carthaginians*; and then, *Regulus* might have continu'd safe in his own Country. But as he did not account that course *Profitable* to his Country, so he thought it the *Honestest* Part, both to give his Opinion and suffer as he did. Now as to their saying, that when a thing is very *Profitable*, the advantage makes it *Honest*: Let me tell you, that it must *Be* so, and not be *Made* so: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honest*, and it is not *Honest*, because it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, because it is *Honest*. So that out of many Wonderful Examples, a man shall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Instance than This.

XXXI. BUT in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the most Worthy and Generous
part

part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Prisoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now-a-days, he could not yet at That time do otherwise: So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather than of the *Man*: For our Forefathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the most Sacred Obligation in Nature. And this we find in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacratæ*, shew as much: And so do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an Enemy; and so do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Censors*; who were not so strict in any thing, as in the bus'ness of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Aulus*) after his *Dictatorship*, was impeach'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people*, for Exercising the Power of a *Dictator*, some days beyond his time; And was farther accus'd for Banishing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is said to have gone presently to *Rome*; and the next morning by day-light, to *Pomponius's* house. Who being acquainted with his coming, and imagining, that being povoked by ill usage, he had probably brought him some Complaint against his Father, presently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and so order'd
the

the young man to be brought unto him. *Titus* was no sooner in the Chamber, but he drew his Sword, and swore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not presently give him his *Oath*, that his Father should be discharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehension of his present danger, past his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the people; telling them why he was forced to desist from the prosecution; and so discharged *Manlius*. Such a Veneration had they in those times for the Tye of an Oath! This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a *Frenchman* in a *Duel* upon a Challenge, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*, which the *Latines* call *Torquis*, took the *Surname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Consulship* the *Latins* were routed and dispersed at *Veseris*, near the Mountain *Vesuvius*. He was a man of the highest rank of Brave men, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, than he was afterward cruelly severe to his Son.

The Severity of the Romans in case of Perfidy.

XXXII. BUT as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath, so those ten men, whom *Hannibal* after the Battle of *Cannæ* sent to the Senate, upon an Oath to render themselves again in the Camp which the *Carthaginians* had taken, if they could not obtain such an exchange of Prisoners as was propounded, were as much to be blamed, if they did not return.

But

But this Story is variously reported : For *Polybius* (an Author of singular Credit) says that *Nine* of the *ten Noblemen* that were sent, delivered themselves back when they could not prevail with the Senate for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the *Ten* stayed at *Rome* : Having Returned to the Camp, so soon as he was out of it, upon a pretence that he had left something behind him ; by which *Return*, he would understand himself to be discharg'd of his Oath : But without reason ; For *Fraud* does not dissolve the *Perjury*, but bind it faster. Wherefore it was a foolish piece of Cunning, and a most perverse Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this shifting Jugler should be sent bound to *Hannibal*. But the most glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Prisoners ; not taken in the Battle, or that had run away upon hazard of their lives, but they were only such as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Consuls*, *Paulus* and *Varro*. They might have been redeem'd for a small Sum of Money : but the Senate would not agree to't : for a Lesson to the *Roman Soldiers* that they must either *Conquer*, or *Die*. This resolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him than any thing else (as the same Author has it) to see that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greatest Adversity, should still uphold so generous

a Resolution. So that things *seemingly Profitable* are still overcome by things that are *really honest*. But *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to the *Camp*, under the same Colour, to deliver themselves from their Oath; and that they were branded for it with all sorts of Ignominy by the *Censors*. We shall now put an end to This matter; for it is clear, that whatsoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, because it is Flagitious, Foul, and Shameful: as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather consulted his *Own Interest*, than that of the *Publick*, in the business of the Prisoners; or had chosen to have staid at home.

Of Temperance,

XXXIII. THE Fourth part yet remains, consisting in *Decency, Moderation, Modesty, Continence, and Temperance*. Now can any thing be *profitable*, in opposition to this Chain of such rare Virtues? But *Aristipus's* *Cyrenaiques*, and those called the *Annicerian Philosophers* place all Good in *pleasure*, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Laudable*, for the *pleasure* it produces. As these grew out of date, *Epicurus* came in vogue; the Supporter, Improver, and in a manner, the Author of the same Opinion. With these we must contend (as they say) for Life; if we are resolv'd to defend, and to maintain the Cause of *Honesty*:
For

For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happiness of Life* rests in a *Sound Constitution* of *Body*, and in the certain prospect of the continuance of such a *Constitution* (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the highest degree too (for so they understand it) will be found to clash with *honesty*. For first, what Province shall we assign to *prudence*? If the search and enquiry after Delights; How wretched a Bondage is *Virtue* in, when it comes to serve *pleasure*? But what is the *Office* of *prudence*? Is it only to make a more skilful Choice of *pleasures*? Suppose that nothing could be more *Delightful* than That: There is nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Dishonourable*. Again for him that pronounces *pain* to be the greatest of *Evils*; what place is there in such a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that exercises it self in Contempt of *Labours*, and *Pain*? For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places speaks Generously enough (as he does in This) of *pain and Affliction*; We are not yet so much to consider what he says, as what may be reasonable for him to say consistently upon the Foundation of Terminating all *Good* and *Ill*, in *pleasure* and *pain*: As to hear him now speak of *Continence* and *Temperance*; he says many very good things in several places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we say) For how can any man commend *Temperance*, and yet place our

Chiefest

Epicurus
places Good
and Ill in
Pleasure
and *Pain*.

Chiefest Good in pleasure? For *Temperance* is the *Enemy* of *Sensual Appetites*, and *Sensual Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Follower*s of *Pleasure*. And yet in these Three kinds [*of Virtues*, i. e. *Prudence*, *Fortitude* and *Temperance*] they shuffle as well as they can, and their *Evasions* are not without some *Colour*. They make *prudence* to be the skill of supplying or procuring *pleasures*, and keeping away *pains*: And then they make a shift too, to acquit themselves in the point of *Fortitude*: which they say enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *pain*. And in speaking of *Temperance*; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themselves after a fashion; for they say that the *Greatness* of *pleasure* arises only from an *Absence* or *Detraction* of *pain*. But as for *Justice*, [*according to their Scheme*] it stands but upon a tottering *Foundation*, or rather falls quite to the *Ground*; and so do all those *Virtues* that discover themselves in respect of *Community*, and in the *Society* of *Mankind*. For there can neither be any *Goodness*, *Liberality*, or *Gentleness* (any more than *Friendship*) if these things be not desirable for *Themselves*, but only in *Relation* to *pleasure* and *profit*. Let us then bring the matter into a *Narrow Compass*: And thus as we have laid it down, that nothing can be *profitable*, in *Opposition* to *benefit*, so we do here affirm that
all

all Pleasure is directly contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Dinomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controversie, by coupling *pleasure*, with *honesty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beast*. Whereas *Honesty* is so far from admitting such a Conjunction, that on the contrary, it Rejects, and Despises it : neither is it possible that the *Ultimate Good*, which ought to be one simple thing, can be made up and compounded of things so disagreeable. But of this elsewhere more at large, since it is a weighty bus'ness. To my purpose now in hand. How the Matter is to be determined in Case of an Opposition betwixt *Honesty* and seeming *Profit*, we have said enough already. But if *pleasure* shall be said to carry some shew of *profit* also, yet there can be no Conjunction of it with *Honesty*. For allowing the most we can to *pleasure*, it does but serve us for *Sawce*, without any Profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Present* : in *My Opinion* a *Great* one : but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow These Three Books of Mine, an Entertainment in your Study, among the Commentaries of *Cratippus*. And whereas if I my self had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had
not

not plainly Commanded me back, even when I was half way through) you should sometimes have been your Father's Disciple too : So now that I am fain to speak to you in these Writings, I would have you bestow as much of your time upon them as you can : and you can bestow as much as you have a mind to. When I shall understand that This sort of Study pleases you, I shall then be speaking to you of it, both present with you (as I hope to be shortly) and absent from you, while you are at this distance. Wherefore my *Cicero* farewell : And assure your self that you are exceeding dear to me : And yet much dearer will you be, if I shall find that you take delight in such Memorials, and Precepts, as these.

FINIS.



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